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 ABSTRACT OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis has evaluated the roles of dorsal and ventral processing streams in 
recognition and use of objects. Four main empirical studies are presented. First, to 
investigate how the cortical brain processes semantic and action knowledge in 
different object-related tasks, I examined structural data from stroke patients 
(Chapter 2) and functional data from healthy individuals (Chapter 3) using a voxel-
wise statistical analysis method. Using data of different modalities (structural CT, 
fMRI) from different sources (patients’ lesions; healthy subjects’ functional activity) 
handled with a systematic analysis approach, I attempted to find convergent 
evidence to support the dissociation of semantic and action processing. Second, I 
also looked into the potential differentiation within the mechanisms underlying object-
related action (Chapter 4) and object naming (Chapter 5) separately. Overall, 
comparable findings were provided from the voxel-based morphometric analysis of 
patients’ lesion data and the fMRI study with healthy participants: an association was 
observed between ventral brain structures and the retrieval of semantic 
knowledge/object recognition while a dorsal fronto-parietal-occipital network was 
found to support the processing of action knowledge/object-oriented action. Specific 
dissociations were also observed within the representations for object-oriented 
actions as well as the mechanisms underlying naming of objects. 
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Chapter 1.General Introduction 
1.1. Prelude  
Considering this daily routine of a PhD student in the stages of finishing up his thesis: 
After stopping the alarm clock from ringing, I get out of the bed, go to brush my teeth 
and shave, have a big bowl of cereal with milk, make sure I have my phone and keys 
in the pocket before setting off for the library; once arriving at the library, I usually 
grab a pen to write down a to-do list for the day and then switch my laptop on; 
checking my watch, I wish time wouldn’t pass so quickly but the librarian is already 
coming to ask me to leave. This is how my days were spent over the past few 
months while striving to complete this thesis. Perhaps my mundane everyday routine 
isn’t too different from many ordinary adults (apart from a bit more anxiety, stress and 
hopelessness). Also, we are all very similar in that from the point we start our day, we 
interact with a lot of objects and need them to facilitate our daily activities. Indeed the 
ubiquitous presence of objects in our environment and our relentless encounter with 
them has granted them a unique focus in the study of human cognition and brain 
functions. This thesis has focused on determining the multiple mechanisms 
underlying object processing in both neuropsychological patients and healthy 
individuals. Here, objects are referred to as mainly man-made artefacts that can be 
handled and used functionally solely with the hand of an individual so they may 
comprise manual tools and other manipulable items, unless otherwise stated.  
 
In this chapter, I present a review of relevant literature on the key concepts and 
findings that have provided the theoretical background and context for the current 
research. Then, since each of the following individual empirical chapters was written 
with a purpose for publication, there will be a more in-depth review of existing 
literature in its own introduction that is most relevant to the specific scope of the 
investigation presented. This arrangement is adopted to avoid unnecessary 
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repetitions on the materials presented overall. As a minor point to note, I will use 
mainly the collective pronouns (‘we’ and ‘us’) whenever necessary throughout the 
empirical chapters because my current work would not have been possible without 
the guidance and support from my supervisors.  
 
1.2. Dorsal and ventral processing of objects 
Broadly speaking, effective use of an object requires at least the abilities to identify 
the right item and to retrieve its corresponding action knowledge. In neuroscience 
research the dualism between ‘vision for recognition’ and ‘vision for action’ has been 
an issue that receives a great deal of attention over the past few decades. Building 
on the work by Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982), Goodale and Milner describe a now 
classical dual route model for visual processing (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Goodale et 
al., 1994). The two broad cortical pathways are often referred to respectively as the 
ventral and dorsal streams in relation to their location in the brain, or as the ‘what’ 
and ‘where/how’ systems in relation to their proposed function (Baizer, Ungerleider, & 
Desimone, 1991; Morel & Bullier, 1990; Young, 1992). Originating in the primary 
visual areas, both pathways process information about the physical properties and 
spatial location of the object, and both are subject to regulatory effect of attention. 
According to Goodale and Milner, the differentiations between the two paths could be 
understood not so much in terms of the visual inputs, but rather the output systems 
they serve correspondingly. The ventral stream is thought to run through the 
temporal areas and to be responsible for perceptual analysis of the visual information 
required in object recognition and categorization, and hence it is dubbed the ‘what’ 
system. In contrast, the dorsal stream is thought to pass visual signals primarily 
through the parietal lobe. This route is concerned with online control of goal-directed 
actions (reaching and grasping), by utilising moment-to-moment information about 
the disposition of the object in egocentric coordinates (e.g. size, position, with respect 
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to the hand). Therefore, the dorsal route is also known as the ‘where’ system. A 
similar view by Marc Jeannerod (1994, 1997) describes the ventral route as the 
‘semantic’ system for object representation and the dorsal route as the ‘pragmatic’ 
system for stimulus processing needed for action organisation. 
 
The core evidence for the proposed differentiation between ‘vision for recognition’ 
and ‘vision for action’ as separate functional systems comes from a series of 
neuropsychological cases that show distinct patterns of deficits resulting from focal 
lesions to the ventral and dorsal pathways. The inability to recognise objects visually 
is known as visual object agnosia, which is often linked to damage to the ventral 
stream (Heider, 2000). In contrast, patients with optic ataxia, who exhibit difficulties in 
orienting and shaping the hand during reaching and grasping objects presented 
visually, usually have identifiable dorsal parietal damage (Gréa et al., 2002; Pisella et 
al., 2000). More importantly, there are some evidence for a double dissociable 
between the ventral ‘recognition’ and the dorsal ‘action’ route. Patients with purely 
visual agnosia usually present problems with recognising objects, but retain the 
ability to carry out instructed actions with objects (Humphreys & Forde, 1998; James, 
Culham, Humphrey, Milner, & Goodale, 2003; Milner et al., 1991; Yoon, Humphreys, 
& Riddoch, 2005). DF is a well-known patient with this type of impairment (e.g. 
Goodale et al., 1994). With brain lesions destroying the lateral occipital complex due 
to hypoxia, DF still impressively demonstrated the preserved ability to interact with 
objects on the basis of visual information about their size and orientation, but she 
failed to identify the objects. This kind of observation suggests that object use can be 
achieved without prior recognition of the object. On the contrary, there are patients 
whose damage (Riddoch, Humphreys, & Price, 1989), or cortical degeneration 
(Hodges, Spatt, & Patterson, 1999), majorly affects the parietal cortex, and they 
show impaired performance on the correct use of objects despite their intact 
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semantic knowledge about objects. A caveat worth considering is that naturally 
occurring lesions do not correspond perfectly with anatomical or functional 
boundaries, and many reported clinical cases including DF do not have a uniquely 
selective lesion bound within either visual stream. Nevertheless, at least at the gross 
level, it can be argued that recognition of objects and object-oriented actions are 
selectively vulnerable to different nature of brain damage, suggesting that the 
relevant processes are segregated in the normal brain.  
 
The dual stream account is also corroborated by converging findings from studies of 
healthy individuals. Introduction of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to induce 
temporary virtual lesion to the parietal cortex (e.g. targeting the intraparietal sulcus) 
has been shown to disrupt immediate grasping action towards visual stimuli (Cohen, 
Cross, Tunik, Grafton, & Culham, 2009; Glover, Miall, & Rushworth, 2005; Rice, 
Tunik, & Grafton, 2006) and yet such an effect is not observed when TMS is applied 
to the lateral occipital area (Cohen et al., 2009). On the other hand, when the anterior 
temporal lobe is TMS-ed, participants make delayed response in picture naming and 
semantic comprehension (Pobric, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2010; Pobric, Jefferies, 
& Ralph, 2007). Furthermore, studies using functional imaging (e.g. fMRI) provide 
further data backing the functional dissociation between the two visual streams 
(Cavina-Pratesi, Goodale, & Culham, 2007; Shmuelof & Zohary, 2005; Yoon, 
Humphreys, Kumar, & Rotshtein, 2012). In a series of experiments, Shmuelof and 
Zohary (2005) demonstrated that naming objects modulated activation patterns in 
ventral fusiform gyrus, whereas action-oriented tasks, for example repeatedly viewing 
the same action towards some objects, modulate the intraparietal sulcus. Although 
observing or understanding action is certainly not identical (if not entirely different) to 
the actual execution of action, these findings based on TMS and fMRI experiments 
together implicate that the broadly defined dorsal and ventral systems have 
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specialised roles in action-related processes and object recognition.  
 
In the original proposal the two streams for visual processing were considered to act 
almost independently (Goodale et al., 1994; Milner & Goodale, 1995). However, 
recent evidence shows that they must interact at certain level in order to allow both of 
them to function properly (Goodale & Milner, 2004). This is evident in some patient 
studies. For example, using the same set of common objects to assess semantic and 
object use knowledge in semantic dementia patients, Hodges et al. (2000) found that 
when the patients failed to name an object, they were likely not to be able to use it as 
well. This suggests that object use may depend on access to semantic knowledge to 
a certain extent (Frey, 2007; Maria Caterina Silveri & Ciccarelli, 2009). On the other 
hand, as shown in Morady and Humphreys (2009)’s study, the naming of objects 
could improve after brain-injured patients, with central deficits in semantic 
knowledge, were asked to use the objects. Naming performance in these patients 
was also affected by how objects were used – they were better at naming the objects 
that were used correctly (versus incorrectly) by the experimenter (Morady & 
Humphreys, 2009). These data imply some contribution of the dorsal route to 
recognition of objects. In the study of Sunderland et al. (2013), patients with 
ideomotor apraxia performed tool-related actions more poorly and incorrectly than 
hand actions (involving grasping abstract items), even when the demands on 
postural or spatial representation of both types of actions were identical (Sunderland 
et al., 2013). A proposed explanation for the selective deficit in tool use lies in the 
failure to integrate the conceptual information such as specific details about object 
identity (from ventral stream) into the dorsal stream (for control of actions) 
(Sunderland et al., 2013). Indeed it appears that in particular action contexts such as 
acting with tools, interaction between the two processing routes is especially 
important. A similar contrast can be made in the case of patient DF. In one of the 
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earliest relevant articles DF was shown to exhibit nearly flawless performance when 
asked to pick up meaningless shapes (Goodale et al., 1994), yet errors were also 
noted in her grasping behaviours when the tasks are arguably more demanding such 
as one requiring predictions about comfortable final hand posture (Dijkerman, 
McIntosh, Schindler, Nijboer, & Milner, 2009) or visual object constancy to grasp the 
correct part for subsequent tool use (Carey, Harvey, & Milner, 1996). What is more, 
impairment in tool use has been associated with lesions in both parietal and 
occipitotemporal regions, though different areas are implicated in specific aspects of 
tool use (Hoeren et al., 2014; Johnson-Frey, 2004). Complementary evidence is also 
observed in fMRI investigations in healthy subjects. Bracci and colleagues recently 
showed that within the widespread left-lateralised functional network that is activated 
in response to the tool stimuli, the intraparietal sulcus is mostly involved in the 
processing of hand-object action-related information while the ventral 
occipitotemporal (vOT) structures tend to primarily encode category-related 
information of the object (Bracci, Cavina-Pratesi, Connolly, & Ietswaart, 2015). 
Moreover, the more dorsal lateral occipitotemporal cortex likely functions as a 
connection hub that supports integration of action-related and perception-related 
representations originating from the parietal and ventral OT cortical areas.  
Taken together, the two visual streams may transform visual information differently 
for different purposes, but their interplay seems to be especially crucial in more 
complex tasks such as tool use.  
 
The present thesis has a primary aim to further examine the roles of the dorsal and 
ventral processing streams within the context of recognition and use of objects. The 
empirical investigations have focused on examining the processing of action 
knowledge and conceptual (semantic) knowledge in relation to these hypothetical 
streams, using the voxel-wise analysis approach. In the first empirical chapter 
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(Chapter 2), I will present data from a study that used voxel-based morphometric 
(VBM) analysis to map the lesioned structures that might be uniquely responsible for 
deficits at different object-related action functions and object recognition in a large 
group of stroke patients. As a second empirical investigation (Chapter 3), I will report 
an experiment that investigated the processing of action and conceptual (semantic) 
knowledge about tools (along with animals) using fMRI in healthy individuals. Some 
advantages and constraints of these methods (lesion analysis and fMRI) are 
described at the end of this chapter. 
 
The way action knowledge is retrieved may depend on the input and the 
requirements of the task. Different object-oriented action functions including actual 
object use, production of pantomime action, and recognition of pantomime gesture 
may be dissociated, as reported in a collection of neuropsychological case studies 
that showed selective impairment of patients in one specific function but not the 
other(s) (Buxbaum, Giovannetti, & Libon, 2000; Goldenberg, Hentze, & Hermsdörfer, 
2004; Laimgruber, Goldenberg, & Hermsdörfer, 2005; Poizner, Mack, Verfaellie, 
Rothi, & Heilman, 1990; see Mahon & Caramazza, 2005 for a review).  Still, these 
action-related abilities have a lot in common and group-level patient studies have 
found strong, reliable correlations between levels of performance on different action-
oriented tasks (Buxbaum, Kyle, & Menon, 2005; Negri et al., 2007; Pazzaglia, 
Smania, Corato, & Aglioti, 2008). The study reported in Chapter 2 has determined 
the neural substrates that are shared and dissociated between different action-
related functions along with object recognition. Most importantly, this was done by 
testing the links between level of deficits on multiple tasks and occurrence of lesions 
using the same group of patients. 
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1.3. Retrieval of different types of object knowledge 
With a slightly different emphasis, a line of research has examined the kinds of 
knowledge that are processed rather than the types of cognitive processing 
undergone in different parts of the brain. In particular, an accumulated body of 
studies reveals that action knowledge (or motor/manipulation knowledge; e.g. 
knowing how to manoeuver to use a tool effectively) about tools can be dissociated 
from their conceptual knowledge (functional knowledge; e.g. knowing what a tool is 
used for). Some brain-injured patients present problems in everyday life with using 
tools or familiar objects that cannot be explained by physical limitations of their limbs. 
Many existing investigations to date show that these patients performed poorly when 
asked to match objects on the basis of the manner of manipulation (an eggbeater 
and a pencil sharpener; both require a circular motion of the hand) but largely 
retained the knowledge about object function (a stapler and cellophane tape; both 
are used for fastening things) (Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002; Buxbaum, Veramontil, & 
Schwartz, 2000; Rosci, Chiesa, Laiacona, & Capitani, 2003). Further analyses show 
that the patients assessed in these studies usually have extensive lesions in the left 
parietal lobe, near the IPL region, thereby suggesting that their behavioural deficit 
may originate from the focal damage to the IPL region. As a comparison, Sirigu et al., 
(1991) documented a patient F.B., with multimodal agnosia, who had noticeable 
difficulties in accessing functional knowledge about objects presented across various 
modalities (visual, auditory and tactile), but his ability to retrieve object-oriented 
actions was relatively spared. His CT and MRI scans revealed infarctions in bilateral 
medial and anterior inferio-temporal structures. Furthermore, patients with semantic 
dementia (SD) had selective and progressive bilateral atrophy and hypometabolism 
in the anterior temporal lobes (ATL), and the extent of this atrophy grows with the 
severity of the patients’ semantic impairment (Mummery et al., 2000; Nestor, Fryer, & 
Hodges, 2006). When probed with the same set of items, most SD patients were 
shown to suffer from poor knowledge of the functional purpose as well as of how to 
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use common everyday objects, despite that a few patients with the mild extent of ATL 
atrophy appear to have more preserved ability of object use (Bozeat, Lambon Ralph, 
Patterson, & Hodges, 2002; Hodges et al., 2000). It has been proposed that 
substandard performance on conceptual tasks occurs prior to the declining 
proficiency in using objects (Hodges et al., 1999). In a longitudinal study by Coccia et 
al. (2004) some patients at the very early stage of SD were shown to present mild yet 
apparent conceptual deficits in more demanding tasks, whilst their ability to use 
familiar objects were shown to be relatively preserved (see also Silveri & Ciccarelli, 
2009). Collectively these neuropsychological findings suggest that the parietal lobe, 
potentially with the IPL in particular, is crucial for the processing of action knowledge, 
whereas the ATL is likely involved in processing multiple types of semantic 
information. Its damage may have a more immediate, adverse impact on mastery of 
the conceptual knowledge. Complementary evidence from experiments with healthy 
individuals also supports the dissociation between action and conceptual knowledge. 
Ishibashi et al. (2011) applied repetitive TMS to the anterior temporal lobe and the 
left inferior parietal lobule of neurologically intact participants, who were tested upon 
two matching tasks requiring respectively retrieval of functional (conceptual) and 
manipulation (action) knowledge about tools. Stimulating the ATL delayed responses 
for the judgments on selecting what items serve the same function, whereas 
introducing stimulation to the IPL resulted in longer responses for the judgments on 
matching what items have the same way of manipulation. A further review of relevant 
neuroimaging evidence will be provided in the second study (Chapter 3), which has a 
specific focus on determining action and conceptual knowledge about tools and 
animals with the use of fMRI. Moreover, in existing research there has been a strong 
interest in investigating a potential category-specific neural differentiation between 
living (such as animals) and nonliving (such as artefacts) things. In relevance to this, 
I will present data in a sub-section of Chapter 3 from an additional analysis 
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performed using VBM that examined the associated neural substrates separately for 
naming performance on two kinds of semantic categories, i.e. living and nonliving 
things, in a group of stroke patients. By comparing the results from this separate 
VBM analysis and the main fMRI experiment (both presented in Chapter 3), I was 
able to draw inferences about whether there is consistent evidence for neural 
differences in the identification of living and nonliving things. 
 
1.4. Dissociation in action processing and recognition-related 
processing 
As mentioned previously, how action information is retrieved may depend on the 
input and the requirements of a task. Correspondingly there are potential functional 
differences within the mechanisms for action processing. A growing body of evidence 
reveals that the classical dorsal route could be subdivided into at least two 
anatomically and functionally distinct sub-systems, namely dorso-dorsal stream and 
ventro-dorsal stream, separated by the intraparietal sulcus (Binkofski & Buxbaum, 
2013; Galletti, Fattori, Gamberini, & Kutz, 2004; Jeannerod & Jacob, 2005; Kravitz, 
Saleem, Baker, & Mishkin, 2011; Tanné-Gariépy, Rouiller, & Boussaoud, 2002). Both 
these dorsal streams are said to be distinct from the ventral stream dedicated to 
processing object-related semantic features. The dorso-dorsal stream is described to 
be responsible for the sensorimotor transformations and online control of actions, 
carrying the similar characteristics traditionally assigned to the dorsal stream in 
Milner and Goodale’s model (1992; 1994). It is a direct visual pathway for action. Its 
damage results in optic ataxia. The ventro-dorsal stream, on the other hand, is 
specialised in processing of sensorimotor information based on the long-term action 
representations and provides core mechanism for skilled actions with objects. It also 
seems to play a pivotal role in space perception and action recognition. Anatomically, 
the ventro-dorsal stream is likely composed of visual areas MT/MST (posterior middle 
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and medial superior temporal cortex) and inferior parietal lobule, which then projects 
to the ventral premotor cortex (Buxbaum & Kalénine, 2010).  
In respect of information processing in skilled actions, a number of studies hitherto 
have attempted to differentiate action stimuli into categories and examine the 
correspondingly associated functional networks (e.g. Hetu, Mercier, Eugène, Michon, 
& Jackson, 2011; Lotze et al., 2006; Villarreal et al., 2008). Among these studies 
there has been an emphasis on the contrast between transitive and intransitive 
gestures. As broadly defined, transitive actions are those that are involved in the use 
of common tools whereas intransitive actions are gestures without the involvement of 
an object (usually conveying a communicative meaning). With particular relevance to 
the scope of this thesis, the third empirical chapter (Chapter 4) will present a study 
that was based specifically on the examination of object-oriented transitive actions 
using fMRI. According to existing literature on movement control and relevant 
neuropsychological findings (Ghafouri, Archambault, Adamovich, & Feldman, 2002; 
Halsband et al., 2001; Jax, Buxbaum, & Moll, 2006), object-oriented actions can be 
classified into two groups depending on the target recipient of the object in use i.e. 
body-referenced and world-referenced (non-body-referenced). The use of body-
referenced objects (e.g. toothbrush, nail clipper) usually targets the body while 
‘world-referenced’ objects (e.g. cutter knife, staple remover) are usually used to act 
(upon another item) functionally in extrapersonal space. The relevant literature and 
theoretical framework will be addressed in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
Similar to the potential dissociation within action processing, recognition-related 
processing is also considered a non-unitary function (Humphreys & Riddoch, 1984; 
Sirigu et al., 1991). In cognitive terms, visual object recognition may involve at least 
the analysis of visual perceptual inputs as well as retrieval of other purely semantic 
information about an object (Humphreys & Forde, 2001; Humphreys, Price, & 
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Riddoch, 1999). One widely used approach to assess object recognition in research 
and in clinical practice requires participants to name a list of common objects (usually 
presented in pictures). Existing cognitive theories of object naming posit that in 
addition to visual perception and retrieval of semantic knowledge, which are more 
relevant to recognition per se, naming an object also demands access to lexical and 
phonological representations along with articulatory procedures (Humphreys, Price, 
& Riddoch, 1999; Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999). A large body of research has 
been devoted to identifying these constituent processing steps and the associated 
neural mechanisms that underlie object naming. Also, comparisons have been made 
between object naming and other visual language tasks such as word reading. Given 
that object naming is very similar to visual language functions including reading and 
sentence construction (to describe a picture), it is surprising that there is limited 
comprehensive account of how object naming is distinguished from other visual 
language tasks at the neuronal level. The last empirical study reported in Chapter 5 
used a lesion–deficit mapping approach (VBM) to examine the cognitive and neural 
relevance between object naming and various visual speech production functions in 
a group of stroke patients. 
 
1.5. Methodological considerations 
As previously mentioned throughout the General Introduction, the most original and 
influential evidence for the dual-route account that dissociates recognition and action 
toward objects, as well as for other accounts of dissociation between different kinds 
of conceptual categories (e.g. animals vs. tools) and between different types of 
actions (e.g. body-referenced vs world-referenced), has come from a collection of 
few single-case and case series studies of neuropsychological patients. These cases 
are rare and patients do not usually have perfectly selective lesions that are 
restricted to one visual stream/or certain brain structures of interest. Put differently, 
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naturally occurring lesions do not respect functional-anatomical boundaries. In large 
group studies, this issue would be less of a problem if lesions were to occur of all 
possible sizes and shapes, because the overlapping and unoverlapping lesions in 
different patients would allow inferences about the functions of common and distinct 
areas. However, this is not often the case, as brain damage such as stroke creates 
characteristic lesions, and some possible lesion configurations only rarely occur. 
Although it cannot be dismissed entirely, this inherent constraint among lesion 
studies in general may be lessened by increasing the size of patient pool studied. 
Recent technological advances in lesion analysis are said to have addressed many 
of the criticisms of the traditional lesion method (for a detailed review on current 
approaches for lesion inference, see Rorden & Karnath, 2004). After all, a major 
advantage of the lesion method in general is that it can draw causal inferences from 
the cognitive/behavioural impacts of lesions, making it an important approach to 
understanding brain functions.  
 
One widely used technique today for systematic group analysis of structural brain 
images is voxel-based morphometry (VBM). VBM is an automated approach that 
relates brain damage to behavioural data for each tested person, on a whole brain, 
voxel-by-voxel basis (Ashburner & Friston, 2000, 2001; Good et al., 2001; Mechelli, 
Price, Friston, & Ashburner, 2005). The advantages of this approach, when 
compared to other common group-level lesion analysis methods such as lesion 
overlap and voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping, are that: (a) it is automated and 
human input is not needed to define a lesion e.g. with naked eyes, thus maintaining 
consistency and objectivity; (b) patients are not grouped dichotomously on the basis 
of their behavioural deficit (impaired or normal) or lesion location (damaged or 
undamaged), thereby retaining potentially informative and meaningful variation in a 
sample and maximising the sensitivity of the correlational technique; (c) correlations 
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between the behavioural deficits and brain structures are computed at a voxel level, 
thereby aggrandising the spatial resolution; and d) the statistical methods (GLM) 
used allow the inclusion of additional variables of no interest to control for factors 
potentially confounding the results. 
 
Advances in neuroimaging techniques over the past few decades have also allowed 
us to track and visualise the changes in neural systems safely in the human in vivo. 
The year 2015 marks almost two decades since the first set of papers was reported 
on the application of fMRI in addressing language-cognitive questions (Binder et al., 
1994, 1995; McCarthy, Blamire, Rothman, Gruetter, & Shulman, 1993). Functional 
neuroimaging has the advantage of studying normal brains, allowing us to directly 
answer questions like how the brain works in everyday situations, which are the core 
subject of interest. With patient-based research we are taking one inferential step 
further from this subject, for example, our deductions about normal function can be 
complicated by re-organisation following a brain injury (Farah, 2004). Also, as 
aforementioned, inferences drawn from the consequences of lesions on 
cognitive/behavioural functions are subject to the characteristics of the lesions in a 
sample such as their shape, size and distribution. The greatest advantage of 
functional imaging is its ability to compensate for this weakness. It is considered a 
better and easier way to probe the functions of specific anatomical structures, even 
though with current imaging techniques some areas are better visualised than others 
(Devlin et al., 2000). Functional imaging studies in principle are more easily 
replicated over lesion-based studies, as naturally occurring lesions of particular types 
may not always be available. Moreover, functional imaging data such as fMRI show 
which brain areas become active when subjects perform cognitive tasks. Yet, a major 
limitation is that the results are only functionally correlational; they do not reveal what 
causal role, if any, is played by a shown activation. Not every activation is necessarily 
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part of a causal network; some areas may become active because they are 
associated or strongly connected with other areas that are causally involved. In this 
thesis the presented studies have used mainly the VBM method to analyse the 
structural brain images (CT) of a large group of stroke patients in a sub-acute stage 
and the fMRI technique to record brain activities in healthy subjects during cognitive 
tasks were performed. The automated analysis of both types of data relies on a 
voxel-wise approach. By comparing the findings yielded from the analyses using the 
same (voxelwise) statistical approach yet with different types (CT, fMRI) of data 
collected from different sources (patients, healthy individuals), we intended to look for 
comparable, complementary evidence when addressing the questions about the 
roles of the dorsal and ventral processing streams in recognition and use of objects.  
 
1.6. Summary of the aim and objectives 
This thesis has a primary aim to examine the roles of the dorsal and ventral brain 
regions in the context of recognition and use of objects. In accordance with this aim, I 
attempted to answer two important questions – 1) Is there a generic dissociation 
between dorsal and ventral contributions to object-related processing? 2) Is 
there further differentiation within each processing stream, i.e. in action and 
recognition-related processing separately? Two empirical studies (Chapters 2 & 
3) in particular have investigated how the brain processes action and conceptual 
knowledge in different object-related tasks, and inferences were made within the 
broad framework of the dual stream account of object processing (Goodale et al., 
1994; Milner & Goodale, 1995). In subsequent studies the work focused on the 
processing of different types of actions in the brain (Chapter 4) and on recognition 
and naming responses (Chapter 5). Each of these chapters also has its unique 
objective: 
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a. Chapter 2 examined the common and dissociable neural substrates (lesions) 
for object recognition and other object-oriented action functions including 
actual object use, pantomimed use and pantomimed gesture recognition in a 
large group of stroke patients, using VBM; 
b. Chapter 3 investigated the functional networks involved in processing of action 
and conceptual knowledge about tools along with animals in neurologically 
healthy individuals, using fMRI; 
c. Chapter 4 looked at the modulatory influence of different types of object-
oriented actions on cerebral activation during action observation, using fMRI in 
healthy participants; and 
d. Chapter 5 compared object naming with other visual speech production 
functions through mapping the shared and distinct lesions in stroke patients, 
using VBM.  
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Chapter 2. Shared and dissociated lesions for deficits at 
recognition and various action functions to objects 
 
2.0. Abstract 
Object processing is a multi-faceted function. Evidence from neuropsychological and 
imaging research suggests that object-related actions are supported by dorsal brain 
structures whilst object identification involves ventral structures. The empirical study 
examined the neural substrates underlying various aspects of object processing: i) 
object recognition from physical form (object recognition), ii) actual use of objects 
(actual use), iii) pantomime of object use (pantomimed use), and iv) recognition of 
objects from pantomimed gestures (pantomimed action recognition). Four 
corresponding object-related tasks taken from BCoS battery were administered to 
247 stroke patients. Clinical CT scans were obtained to assess patients’ grey matter 
(GM) integrity. A principal component analysis (PCA) was performed on the 
behavioural scores of the 4 tasks to isolate the underlying cognitive components. 
PCA identified a shared component (61.3% variance explained), a component 
isolating actual use from the other 3 tasks, a component separating mainly object 
recognition from pantomimed action recognition, and a component isolating 
pantomimed use from the other 3 tasks. Correlations of GM and performances, 
based on the raw task scores as well as the identified principal component scores, 
were tested using voxel-based morphometry. Object recognition alone was 
correlated to the left fusiform; deficits at actual use could be predicted by lesions to 
the left parieto-occipital fissure; deficits at pantomimed use was associated uniquely 
with lesions to the posterior visual cortex; lastly, pantomimed action recognition was 
predicted by GM in the left parietal lobe covering intraparietal sulcus, bi-medial frontal 
areas and thalamus. Taken together, this large-scale patient study provides further 
evidence for dissociation between object-directed actions in dorsal (parietal) 




Our environment is filled with countless objects and tools. Nearly all daily activities, 
from brushing our teeth through eating and drinking to communication, involve 
interaction with objects. Complex interactions with objects potentially involve correct 
identification of the goal items and retrieval of appropriate ‘use’ action knowledge. 
The abilities to recognise an object and to use it depend on the interaction of various 
cognitive processes and neural networks (Hartmann, Goldenberg, Daumüller, & 
Hermsdörfer, 2005; Riesenhuber & Poggio, 2000), though classical 
neuropsychological studies postulate that the neural mechanisms underlying these 
abilities dissociate (e.g., James, Culham, Humphrey, Milner, & Goodale, 2003; 
Riddoch, Humphreys, & Price, 1989). In this study, we attempted to use detailed 
behavioural analysis and function-lesion mapping technique in a large cohort of 
brain-injured patients to answer the following questions: 1) whether there are 
common and dissociable neural mechanisms for recognition and interaction with 
objects and 2) whether action retrieval prompted from different cues and task 
requirements is supported by different neural networks.  
 
According to a seminal dual-pathway model proposed by Milner and Goodale 
(Goodale & Milner, 1992; Goodale et al., 1994), visual object processing can be 
broadly organised into two functionally distinct visual pathways. The ventral pathway 
passes visual inputs originating from the primary visual areas into inferior and more 
anterior regions of occipital and temporal cortex, and supports identification and 
retrieval of conceptual knowledge about an object. In contrast, the dorsal stream, 
projecting from the early visual areas to the dorsal occipital and parietal cortex, is 
thought to play a central role in processing visuospatial information, hence providing 
guidance for actions towards an object (see also Jeannerod, 1994, 1997; Ungerleider 
& Haxby, 1994; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). In line with the dual-pathway account 
for visual processing, retrieval of action knowledge is proposed to be achieved via 
two routes: (i) a direct one from vision to action presumably sustained by the dorsal 
pathway; and (ii) an indirect route, supported by the ventral pathway, and mediated 
by semantic knowledge about objects (Riddoch et al., 1989).  
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Previous neuropsychological evidence, based on single case analyses, supports a 
double dissociation between deficits in visual recognition (i.e. agnosia) and object-
directed action (i.e. apraxia, visual ataxia). Several case reports of patients with 
ventral brain lesions, primarily in occipito-temporal regions, show impaired object 
naming and semantic retrieval despite the preserved ability to produce actions 
towards objects (Hodges et al., 1999; James et al., 2003; Riddoch & Humphreys, 
1987; Yoon et al., 2005). In contrast, some patients with superior parietal damage 
tend to fail in their actions to objects, even though access to semantic knowledge is 
largely undisturbed (Jeannerod, Decety, & Michel, 1994; Riddoch et al., 1989). 
Likewise, the application of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the parietal 
cortex (e.g. targeting the intraparietal sulcus) of healthy individuals also interferes 
their immediate grasping action towards visual stimuli (Cohen et al., 2009; Glover et 
al., 2005; Rice et al., 2006). Furthermore, corroborating findings from functional 
imaging studies supports the functional dissociation of action and object knowledge 
between the two visual streams (Cavina-Pratesi et al., 2007; Shmuelof & Zohary, 
2005; Yoon et al., 2012). These pieces of evidence were already reviewed in more 
details in Chapter 1. 
 
Even though the two visual streams may be specialised for different types of 
information about objects (Milner & Goodale, 2008), recent evidence indicates that 
processes in both streams interact with each other (Creem & Proffitt, 2001; Rossetti 
& Pisella, 2002; Sunderland et al., 2013; Wulff, Laverick, Humphreys, Wing, & 
Rotshtein, 2015). Hodges et al. (2000) found that when patients with semantic 
dementia failed to name a certain item in a given set of objects, they were more likely 
not to be able to use that particular item as well. This suggests that object use may 
depend on access to semantic knowledge to at least some degree (Chao & Martin, 
2000; Silveri & Ciccarelli, 2009). On the other hand, the naming of objects can 
improve after brain-injured patients with a deficit in semantic knowledge are asked to 
use the objects (Morady & Humphreys, 2009). Also, when the experimenter 
demonstrates the correct (versus incorrect) use of the objects, the patients’ naming 
abilities also improve (Morady & Humphreys, 2009). The latter findings especially 
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indicate that underlying processes involved in recognition and action are not entirely 
dissociated as the dual route model would predict.  
 
Group studies of neuropsychological patients also support the involvement of shared 
processes across object identification and action tasks (Buxbaum, Kyle, et al., 2005; 
Negri et al., 2007; Pazzaglia, Smania, et al., 2008). For example, Negri et al. (2007) 
analysed the patterns of association of performance in a group of unilateral brain-
damaged patients (n=37) on object recognition and object use along with other praxic 
tasks. Remarkably reliable correlations were noted between the level of impairment 
in recognising objects and in using them, implying shared brain substrates (lesions) 
underpinning the two functions. However to date, no systematic neuroanatomical 
analysis has been conducted to investigate this in terms of whether there is a 
separation in the neural substrates of the processes, across large groups of patients. 
 
A second issue lies in whether different ways of accessing knowledge about object 
use depends on a shared action processing mechanism. An influential model for 
apraxia holds that there is a common knowledge system (the ‘action lexicon’) for 
object action which is accessed from different modalities (e.g., from the object’s 
name, from sight of the object; Heilman, Rothi, & Valenstein, 1982; Rothi & Heilman, 
2014; Rothi, Ochipa, & Heilman, 1991). Action lexicons are assumed to contain 
representations of complex actions that include schema on how to interact with 
objects. The model predicts that symptomatic dissociations arise between patients 
due to differences in the specific processes required for processing the input (visual, 
verbal) or the output of any given task. On the other hand, damage to the action 
lexicon itself should generate the same problem across modalities. Here we focus on 
identifying shared and dissociated processes across three types of measures of 
action-object knowledge: 1) use of real objects; 2) pantomiming the use of single 
objects; and 3) recognising an object based on pantomime. In the following section, a 
review was provided on some key issues that have drawn wide attention in the 
literature of object-action processing.  
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i. The relation between pantomimed and real object use 
Neuropsychological reports indicate that the processes underlying pantomime and 
real object use are not entirely identical. Action production errors in apraxic patients 
are frequently shown to be more severe during pantomime compared to when real 
objects are involved (Buxbaum, Giovannetti, et al., 2000; Clark et al., 1994; 
Goldenberg & Hagmann, 1998; Goldenberg et al., 2004; Laimgruber et al., 2005; 
Poizner et al., 1990; Wada et al., 1999; Westwood et al., 2001). This may reflect the 
additional feedback provided by the physical properties of the real object during the 
interaction, which is absent for pantomime (Buxbaum, Johnson-Frey, & Bartlett-
Williams, 2005; Chainay & Humphreys, 2001). Tracking with three-dimensional 
motion recordings during tool use, patients with apraxia exhibit characteristically 
impaired performance in both pantomimed and actual execution with disturbed 
movement patterns in a number of spatial and temporal parameters, and some of 
these deficits are ameliorated in real tool use (Clark et al., 1994; Poizner et al., 1995; 
comparable evidence from healthy subjects, Weiss, Jeannerod, Paulignan, & Freund, 
2000). In addition, the group-level analysis has noted a strong link between the 
severity levels of impairment in pantomiming and using real objects (Negri et al., 
2007).  
 
There are a handful of studies that compare directly the neural correlates of real and 
pantomimed object-related movements, using mainly functional imaging 
(Hermsdörfer, Terlinden, Mühlau, Goldenberg, & Wohlschläger, 2007; Imazu, Sugio, 
Tanaka, & Inui, 2007; Króliczak, Cavina-Pratesi, Goodman, & Culham, 2007). 
Hermsdorfar et al. (2007), for example, reported that real tool use and pantomimed 
tool use share a similar widespread functional network encompassing frontal and 
parietal cortices along with some temporal areas, especially during the stages of 
action planning and preparation. In contrast to this, the potentially unique neural 
correlates for pantomimed actions are less consistent. Kroliczack et al. (2007) 
showed that pantomimed movements (relative to real movements) towards simple 
geometric shapes are associated with greater responses in the right medial temporal 
gyrus and superior temporal sulcus. Others using everyday objects and tools as 
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stimuli observed a rather weak relationship between pantomime use and activation in 
the left intraparietal sulcus (when contrasted with actual use of objects) (Hermsdörfer 
et al., 2007; Imazu et al., 2007). Putting the imaging and neuropsychological findings 
together, it may be possible to consider that there are largely overlapping 
representations for real object use and pantomime. 
 
ii. The relation between action recognition and production  
The question of whether action recognition and production are subserved by the 
same neural system has been of particular interest in neuroscience research over the 
past couple of decades. Multiple studies with brain-lesioned patients have 
demonstrated that deficits in gesture production and comprehension are correlated 
and also often associated with common damage in the inferior parietal lobe (IPL) 
and/or inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), possibly along with the posterior temporal lobe 
(Buxbaum et al., 2005; Negri et al., 2007; Pazzaglia et al., 2008).  For example, 
Buxbaum et al. (2005), on testing a group of left hemispheric stroke patients, 
reported a strong specific relationship between the recognition of gestures of object 
use and imitation-based production. Moreover, performance on both tasks could be 
predicted by lesions in the IPL and intraparietal sulcus (Buxbaum et al., 2005). These 
findings are in line with a body of neurophysiological and neuroimaging investigations 
that propose action mirroring in the IPL and IFG, suggesting common processes for 
executing an action and observing the action being made by another person (i.e. 
mirror neurons, for review see Dumont & Ska, 2000; Gazzaniga, 2008; Halsband et 
al., 2001; Heilman et al., 1982; see also Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & Eickhoff, 2010, for a 
meta-analysis). On the other hand, double dissociations have been reported between 
action recognition and production in single cases. There are neuropsychological 
patients who show intact recognition of actions but difficulties in producing the action 
themselves, and vice versa (Bell, 1994; Chainay & Humphreys, 2002; Cubelli, 
Marchetti, Boscolo, & Della Sala, 2000; Rothi, Mack, & Heilman, 1986; for a review, 
see also Mahon & Caramazza, 2005). Importantly, the execution problems in such 
cases cannot be attributed to general motor impairment.  
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It is worth noting that evidence to date for the dissociation and interplay between the 
dorsal and ventral streams as well as between various object-involved tasks mainly 
comes from neuropsychological cases and neuroimaging experiments in healthy 
subjects. Regarding neuroimaging (e.g. fMRI) investigations, activations are revealed 
from all the structures that have a contribution to a task but not all of the activated 
areas may actually be essential to it. Lesion studies in comparison have the potential 
to demonstrate a direct casual relation, making inference about the brain structures 
that are crucial for a task (Rorden & Karnath, 2004). As aforementioned, proposals 
on the neural differentiation for different object-related cognitive abilities often 
emerge from single case reports while functional imaging studies highlight shared 
representations. Studies examining lesion-deficit associations have also been limited 
to a relatively small sample sizes, often relying on descriptive methods (overlay and 
subtraction plots), and usually follow an anatomical hypothesis-driven approach 
(Kalénine, Buxbaum, & Coslett, 2010; Pazzaglia, Pizzamiglio, Pes, & Aglioti, 2008), 
thus ignoring contributions of other potentially relevant brain regions (Price et al., 
2010). There is a dearth of large-scale brain-function (lesion-deficit) mapping 
analysis utilising robust reliability tests to determine the common and distinct neural 
underpinnings of the processes involved in recognising and interacting with objects.  
 
This current study aimed to answer two questions: 1) do recognising an object and 
interacting with it rely on shared or dissociated neural mechanism? 2) are there 
multiple representations for retrieving object-related action knowledge? We use data 
collected on cognitive assessment from 247 ischemic stroke survivors (at the sub-
acute phase) for a clinical trial. The patient sample was rather inclusive to allow 
inferences to be generalised to the population level (see section 2.2.1). 
Behaviourally, continuous measures of performance were taken on a number of 
tasks tapping potentially different object-oriented functions: 1) recognition of an 
object from its structural identity (i.e. line-drawing); 2) abilities to interact with an 
object that were assessed by three tasks - (a) using a real object to achieve a goal – 
e.g. assembling components of objects and operating on them, (b) pantomiming the 
actions related to the use of an object, (c) identifying an object based on a 
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pantomimed action. With the behavioural data, we report the group-level 
relationships between the object-oriented functions and the prevalence of the 
dissociated deficits. We also probed for the potential shared and dissociated 
mechanisms underlying the cognitive functions using principal component analysis 
(PCA). Brain integrity (extent of lesion) was assessed by computed tomography (CT) 
scans, which were collected as part of the patients’ routine clinical examination. We 
related the cognitive measures to the associated lesion substrates by applying 
assumption-free voxel-based morphometric (VBM) analysis throughout the entire 
brain. In particular, we assessed the grey matter substrates associated to deficits for 
each of the object-oriented functions, as well as their common substrates. We further 
mapped the neuroanatomical correlates of the components identified in the PCA 
procedure. This novel approach, which relates the components identified by PCA on 
a large behavioural data-set to the underlying proportion of neural matters using 
VBM, has been demonstrated in recent studies of stroke investigating language 
processing (Butler, Lambon Ralph, & Woollams, 2014; Lau et al., 2015) and working 
memory (Chechlacz, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2014) as well as other disorders such 




The present study included a sample of 247 patients (128 female, average age: 
70.43y ± 14.51std, ranging between 26 and 93 years) selected from the database of 
the Birmingham University Cognitive Screen (BUCS; http://www.bucs.bham.ac.uk) 
trial. All patients who took part in the clinical trial were recruited from 12 stroke units 
across hospitals in the West Midlands, UK. At the time of participation, the patient 
was at a sub-acute stage (< 120 days post stroke), physically stable and able to 
maintain concentration for approximately an hour to complete the cognitive battery 
(judged by a trained assessor of the multi-disciplinary stroke team). Of the 532 cases 
with clinical CT scans available in the BUCS database, we applied for further 
analyses the same exclusion criteria as depicted in Chapter 5 (Lau et al., 2015) to 
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remove cases with poor quality CT scans (n= 37), abnormally large ventricles (n=4) 
and/or stroke due to haemorrhage (n=42), as well as patients who were non-right-
handed (n=54), and/or who were scanned more than 120 days post stroke (n=1) or 
on the same day (within 24 hours) of their stroke (n = 114). Furthermore, we 
excluded patients who did not at least complete both tests of object naming and 
actual object use (n=33). This resulted in a final total of 247 patients. Out of this 
selected sample, as identified by their clinicians, 32.4% had left-localised lesions, 
30.8% right lesions, 14.2% bilateral lesions, and the rest had no noticeable damage 
or missing information. As reported in Chapter 5 (where the current 247 patients 
makes up 88.2% of that sample), lesions of the patients covered both hemispheres 
with maximum overlaps in the right MCA territory (refer to Figure 5.1). 
 
All patients provided written informed consent conforming to the ethics protocols 
approved by the UK National Health Service ethics committee, the local NHS trusts 
and the Birmingham University ethics procedures.  
 
2.2.2 Behavioural Measures  
Patients’ abilities to recognise and interact with objects were examined using the 
BCoS Cognitive Screen (Humphreys, Bickerton, Samson, & Riddoch, 2012a; 
http://www.bcos.bham.ac.uk), which was developed to examine comprehensively five 
core ‘domains’ of daily cognitive functions, namely i) language, ii) attention and 
executive functions, iii) memory, iv) praxis and v) number processing. During the 
cognitive examination, assessors were blind to the specific condition of the patient 
and the location of any lesion. On average, patients included in the current analysis 
were tested 25 days post stroke (with 67.6% tested within the first month after 
stroke).  
 
Object Recognition (ObjR) 
Recognition of man-made objects was assessed by a picture naming test, which 
contained also living things, in BCoS; here, we focused only on the naming of the 7 
man-made items. In order to represent a variety of semantic categories, the man-
26 
made items consisted of hand tools (2), kitchen utensils (1) and other household 
implements (4). In order to detect word production problems sensitive to stimulus 
length, some items had a long name (being composed of 6 to 9 letters) and some a 
short name (3 to 5 letters). Stimuli were grey-level, shaded hand drawings presented 
one at a time. A maximum of 15 seconds were allowed per item for the patient to give 
a response. Each correct naming response carried one point and the maximum score 
for naming the made-made artefacts was 7. Chapter 5 (Lau et al, 2015) also reports 
further details about this picture naming test. 
 
Actual Object Use (AOU) 
The patient’s ability to interact with actual objects was examined by a task that 
required a sequence of actions with multiple objects (i.e. a torch and two batteries) in 
order to achieve an indicated goal (i.e. lighting the torch). Prior to the start of the test, 
the target objects, together with distractor objects (e.g. a box of matches, a glue 
stick), were aligned along the vertical midline in front of the participant. Multi-modal 
instructions were used to eliminate confounds from unimodal comprehension deficits, 
verbally (oral and written): “Please light the torch. All the things you need are on the 
table in front of you.” and pictorially: illustrated by a photograph of a lit-up torch. To 
successfully complete the sequence of actions towards the goal, this task demanded 
selection of the target objects presented among distractors, as well as correct 
manipulation and spatial orientation of the target objects. An explicit list of criteria 
was devised to ensure consistency of online scoring of the patients’ actions. The 
step-by-step 12-item checklist of acceptable performance described the correct 
selection of objects, the spatial orientation of the components of the objects, the 
sequencing of steps, goal attainment and appropriate problem solving. A flawless 
performance would score a total of 12 points. To minimise irrelevant effects of 
hemiplegia, testing could be conducted with the patient’s unaffected rather than 
affected limb, and the examiner was allowed to support the performance of patients 
in non-critical ways (i.e. patients could instruct the examiner to hold the torch body for 
them and then they inserted or gestured the action of inserting batteries into the 
torch).  
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Pantomimed Object Use (POU) 
Pantomime was tested in a gesture production task, which also contained a number 
of items on intransitive communicative gestures (i.e. gestures that do not entail object 
use) but they were not examined in the current analysis. Upon verbal command (in 
writing and the examiner’s oral announcement), the participant was requested to use 
only one hand (usually the less affected hand, to avoid interference from any primary 
motor deficits) to demonstrate the use of three everyday objects (i.e. glass, salt 
cellar, hammer). The names of the objects were introduced one at a time. A score of 
2 was given for accurate performance on each pantomime of object use; 1 for a 
recognisable but poorly executed actions, and 0 for unrecognisable actions or 
incorrect performance. Therefore, the maximum possible score for the three object 
items was 6 points.  
 
Pantomime Recognition (PanR) 
Recognition of pantomimed gestures related to object use was assessed in a gesture 
recognition test in BCoS. Again this test also included a number of items (intransitive 
communicative gestures) which were not examined in the current analyses. The 
three items on ‘object use action’ were acted out one at a time by the examiner and 
then the participant was asked to make a choice from four available options for their 
response. The multiple-choice options were presented as written words and read 
aloud by the examiner. The given options corresponded to 1) the name of the target 
object (e.g., lighter), 2) the name of a semantically related object (e.g. match), 3) the 
name of an object with visually related action (e.g. gun), and 4) the name of an object 
with dissimilar/unrelated action (e.g. torch). One point was given for correct 
recognition, giving a maximum possible score of 3 for this section. 
 
For further information about the three action tasks, refer also to Bickerton et al. 
(2012). 
 
Other tests of general cognitive state 
Two orientation tests examined respectively (1) the patient’s access to personal 
information (semantic autobiographic knowledge such as name, age, highest 
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education qualification and etc.) and (2) his/her orientation in time and space (e.g., 
Where are you right now? What month is it?). Both tests consisted of open verbal 
questions. There were 8 questions for personal information and 6 for orientation in 
time and space. In the orientation in time and space test specifically, there was a 
multiple choice (four choice responses) to be presented in the case of a non-
response or an error response made by the patient to the initial question, or in the 
case where aphasia prevented a verbal response to the open question. A maximum 
of 15 seconds was allowed per item for the patient to give a response. These 
measures were included as covariates of no interest in the VBM analysis to mask out 
the potential differences in baseline cognitive state among patients.  
 
2.2.3. Neuroimaging Assessment 
Acquisition of brain images 
For each patient, computed tomography (CT) images were collected as part of the 
standard clinical procedures in the National Health Service. The scans were 
achieved in different hospitals using one of these scanners: Siemens Sensation 16, 
GE Medical System LightSpeed 16 or LightSpeed plus. The CT images were 
provided in digital DICOM format after they had been anonymised by the hospitals. 
These images covered the whole brain with an in-plane resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 mm2 
and a slice thickness of 4-5 mm.  
 
CT scans provide an undistorted image of the tissue density and as such have a 
clear biological interpretation. However changes in tissue density, especially due to 
ischemic stroke, may be underestimated on a CT scan, at least when the scan is 
conducted within the first 24 hours after a stroke (Mohr et al., 1995). Therefore, in the 
current study, we included only patients who had their CT taken at least 24 hours 
post stroke. Also, to account for possible changes in lesions following a stroke, the 
analysis models included as a covariate the interval (in days) between the stroke and 
the CT scan. On average the CT scans of the current sample were taken 7.19 days 
after stroke, with 72.9% of cases within one week of the stroke. 
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Pre-processing of brain images 
To ensure only good quality data were included, the quality of the CT scans was first 
assessed visually (e.g. to check for head movement and other image artifact). After 
screening out the bad quality scans (see description in section 2.2.1 Subjects), the 
CT images were pre-processed using SPM8 (Statistical Parametric Mapping, 
Welcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, United Kingdom; 
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~spm). Pre-processing began with conversion of the images into 
Nifti format and initial normalisation, based chiefly on skull shape, to an in-house CT 
template in the standard MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) space (similar to 
Ashburner & Friston, 2003) so as to optimise other procedures that followed. Other 
pre-processing procedures included further normalisation, based on a modified 
unified-segmentation algorithm (Ashburner & Friston, 2005; Seghier, 
Ramlackhansingh, Crinion, Leff, & Price, 2008), and smoothing, using a 12-mm full-
width-at-half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel (Worsley & Friston, 1995). A full 
protocol of the pre-processing steps is detailed in Methods of Chapter 5. The pre-
processed GM maps were then ready for use in the VBM analyses to explore voxel 
by voxel the relationship between brain lesions and behavioural performance.  
 
2.2.4. Data Analysis 
Behavioural measures 
All patients completed at least both tests of object recognition and actual object use. 
Missing data on the other two object-related tests were replaced by the averages of 
the group (only one subject did not complete both tests of pantomimed use and 
pantomime recognition). To examine the relationships among all the tests, a non-
parametric Spearman-rank correlation (two-tailed) analysis was carried out.  
 
Principal component analysis (PCA) was performed using Matlab 7.9 (The 
MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) to isolate the shared and dissociate components 
underlying the four ‘object’ tests. In short, PCA reveals latent variables by projecting 
the data onto a new (geometric) ‘space’ defined by the components. Each new 
component is a linear combination of the weighted original scores. Higher loading 
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(weight) indicates greater contribution of a specific task to the component. The 
directional signs (±) of the loadings are only meaningful when comparing the 
contribution of each task to the component. If all signs point to the same direction 
(e.g. all ‘+’s), the component reflects a shared latent variable underlying all tasks. If 
the signs are opposite, it indicates that component dissociates between tasks. Since 
there is a difference in the maximum scores of the tests (object recognition: 14; 
actual object use: 12; pantomime object use: 6; object gesture recognition: 3), we re-
scaled linearly the raw scores on each test so that they ranged between the values of 
0 – 84 (the least common multiple value of all maximum scores). We entered in PCA 
the re-scaled scores of the 247 patients on the four object tests and then extracted 
component loadings (i.e. coefficients) and eigenvalues in the outputs of PCA. 
Individual performance scores on each principal component were also derived and 
used in the VBM analyses.  
 
Voxel-based morphometry (VBM)  
All reported VBM analyses were performed (using SPM8) on the brain images from 
the 247 patients to determine the neuroanatomical correlates of different object-
related abilities and the shared and dissociable components. Random effects 
analyses were conducted within the general linear model framework (Kiebel & 
Holmes, 2003) and correlations between the behavioural measures and the integrity 
of brain tissues were computed (Ashburner & Friston, 2000).  
We created two separate general linear models. First, we identified the lesions 
unique for each type of object-oriented cognitive deficits by including in a model the 
patients’ raw scores on the four object tasks so that the VBM analysis of a particular 
task would control for the performance on the other three tasks (analyses 1b-e). Also, 
to determine the common regions shared by object recognition and other object-
oriented praxic abilities, we performed in the same model a global null (conjunction) 
analysis on the four object tasks (analysis 1a). A test for conjunction evaluates the 
joint refutation of multiple null hypotheses (i.e. the hypothesis that there is no effect), 
and an observed conjunction of ‘activations’ allows one to infer a conjunction of one 
or more effects (Friston, Holmes, Price, Büchel, & Worsley, 1999; Friston, Penny, & 
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Glaser, 2005). In other words, a conjunction analysis can be used to determine 
whether multiple tasks activate the same region(s) of the brain. In particular, ‘global 
null hypothesis’ analysis (an algorithm that uses the minimum T statistic by SPM) is a 
less stringent approach for testing for a potential conjunction. Second, we examined 
the neuroanatomical correlates of the rotated scores on the principal components 
derived from PCA. This model included all principal components including a shared 
component and others that dissociate the object tasks from each other (analysis 2a-
g).  
 
All analyses included the following measures as covariates of no interest: age, 
gender, years of education, interval between stroke and CT scanning, interval 
between stroke and cognitive testing, and measures of general cognitive state (see 
above).  Inclusion of these covariates allowed us to control for various confounding 
factors that might have potential impact on cognitive performance or the image of the 
brain (lesion). For completeness, in the tables of results we report all clusters with the 
amplitude of voxels surviving Z-score > 2.58 (uncorrected across the whole brain) 
and an extent threshold of at least 350 voxels (SPM suggested that . However, we 
focus on discussing the results where there was a significant effect at p<0.05 cluster-
level corrected for multiple comparisons. The brain co-ordinates throughout are 
presented in the standardised MNI space. Anatomical labelling was based on the 
Anatomical Automatic Labelling toolbox (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) and the 
Duvernoy’s Human Brain Atlas (Duvernoy, Cabanis, & Vannson, 1991). 
 
2.3. Results 
2.3.1. Behavioural Results 
The demographic data of the group, their performance on the object tests and the 
correlations between them are summarised in Table 2.1.  
 
Performance on all the four object-oriented tasks was weakly associated with age 
(rs= -0.147 to -0.210, all p<0.05) and years of education (rs= 0.133 to 0.237, all 
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p<0.05). In addition, individuals who performed worse on an object task also had 
poorer overall ‘orientation’, measured in terms of their knowledge of personal 
information (rs 0.381 to 0.531, all p<0.001) and time and space (rs 0.260 to 0.294, all 
p<0.001). Assessment on the ‘time and space’ measure was based on multiple- 
choice tests and hence did not rely on speech production. What is more important, 
the current study observed reliable and positive inter-correlations among the four 
object-oriented tasks (p<0.001 in all pairs), indicating potentially similar underlying 
mechanism across the tasks. 
 
Table 2.1: Summary of demographic data, average performance scores on the 
object-related tests and their inter-correlations 












Age in years 70.43 
(14.51) 
-0.147* -0.210** -0.138* -0.189* 
Years of education 10.90 
(2.55) 
0.237** 0.133* 0.133* 0.140* 
Orientation: Personal 
Info. (Max. score=8) 
7.31 
(1.66) 
0.531** 0.381** 0.509** 0.461** 
Orientation: Time & 
Space (Max. score=6) 
5.49 
(0.99) 
0.292** 0.294** 0.260** 0.293** 




/ / / / 
















0.443** 0.308** 0.459** / 




As an attempt to examine the neuro-cognitive components underlying the various 
types of object-oriented cognitive functions, we ran a PCA on the re-scaled data of 
the four object tasks (Table 2.2). We note that PCA on a data-set that is not normally 
distributed (a characteristic of inclusive neuropsychological data) is primarily driven 
by the tails of the distribution, i.e. the impaired patients. This property ensures that 
the component primarily reflected the variability in patient symptoms. PCA revealed 
that all the four tasks loaded on the first component with loadings ranging between 
0.4 and 0.6. This first component, related to shared object (and action) 
representations, accounted for 61.31% of the variance. A second component, PC2, 
explained 17.45% of the data and had a dominantly high loading from actual object 
use that is set apart alone in one direction from the other three tasks. PC2 may 
emphasise, in one direction, the online control of action and spatial orientation of the 
hand in reference to the object (perhaps as well as sequential and procedural 
planning) required specifically in actual object use while contributing to other tasks 
that demand more internal representation (potentially from memory) in the other 
direction. A third component, PC3, specifically separated object recognition from line 
drawing and from pantomimed action. PC3 distinguished the processes engaged in 
recognising an object from its structural form (shape) and from the use- related 
action. A final component, PC4, dissociated pantomimed object use from all the other 
tasks and explained 9.09% of the data. It is also likely that PC4 picks up on the 
additional demands of pantomimed use on internal representation of action and/or 





Table 2.2: Principal Component Analysis: the principal component coefficients 









Tasks The ‘shared’ 
mechanisms 
Actual Object 










    
Object 
Recognition 
0.532 -0.369 0.717 -0.257 
Actual  
Object Use 
0.557 0.800 -0.076 -0.208 
Pantomimed 
Object Use 
0.471 -0.111 -0.094 0.870 
Pantomime 
Recognition 
0.430 -0.459 -0.686 -0.365 
Explained 
variance 
61.31% 17.45% 12.15% 9.09% 
 
 
To further explore the presence of shared deficits and dissociations among object- 
related cognitive functions (as indicated by the principal components), we looked into 
the patterns of patient performance across the four object tasks. For each task, we 
made a count on the number of patients who obtained a full score versus those who 
failed to do so. We note that it may be a stringent approach to classify patients based 
upon whether they were able to attain full-score performance. However, given that 
the very few tested items in each of the object-oriented tasks were rather common to 
ordinary individuals, it can be argued that the approach can still provide useful 
information for understanding the sub-group behaviours of our present patient 
sample. As reported in Table 2.3, nearly 20% of the patients were unable to perform 
fully on naming objects but were intact in the other three tasks that involved action 
retrieval. In contrast, it was relatively rare to have patients who showed the opposite 
pattern of performance (only about 1%). Further analysis showed that performance 
varied among the object-oriented action tasks as well. For example, altogether at 
least 22% of the patients performed sub-optimally on actual object use but perfectly 
on pantomimed use, and about 12% the other way round (irrespective of whether full- 
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score performance was attained for object and pantomime recognition). More than 
16% of the group were intact at pantomimed use despite recognition of pantomimed 
actions being sub-optimal; while about 13% exhibited the opposite pattern. Finally, 
around 13% of the patients showed perfect full-score performance while 14% had 
sub-optimal performance on all the four object-related tasks. 
 













Shared mechanism: consistency across all object-related cognitive tasks 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 33 13.35% 
x x x x 36 14.57% 
Dissociation between object recognition and object-oriented action tasks 
✓ x x x 2 0.80% 
x ✓ ✓ ✓ 49 19.84% 
Dissociation among object-oriented action tasks,  




x ✓  ✓  9 3.64% 
✓  ✓  x 9 3.64% 
✓  x ✓  5 2.02% 
✓ x x 0 0 
x ✓ x 2 0.8% 
x x ✓ 2 0.8% 
Dissociation among object-oriented action tasks,  






x ✓  ✓  31 12.55% 
✓  ✓  x 16 6.48% 
✓  x ✓  9 3.64% 
✓  x x 15 6.07% 
x ✓  x 14 5.67% 
x x ✓  15 6.07% 
‘✓ ’’ signifies full-score (optimal) performance on the task; ‘x’ signifies that full-score 
performance is not achieved (sub-optimal performance) 
 
2.3.2. Neuroimaging Results 
Here, we report the results from the two types of VBM analyses: model 1 – based on 
the re-scaled raw scores on the object-related cognitive tasks; and model 2 – based 
on individual scores on the principal components, (a) correlation with the ‘shared 
representation’ component, (b)-(g) correlation with other components that dissociated 
the object tasks from each other.  
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Model 1: Correlation with the object-related cognitive tasks 
The results are illustrated pictorially in Figure 2.1.  
To test whether there was a shared neurocognitive mechanism across all object 
related tasks, as suggested by the PCA analysis, we computed a global null analysis 
on the four tasks. This revealed a significant positive relationship with a cluster of 
voxels in the left hemisphere. In particular, performance (or symptom severity) on the 
collection of these tasks was significantly associated with the density of grey matters 
in the inferior post-central sulcus, the secondary somatosensory area (S2) and part 
of the mid superior temporal gyrus (Table 2.4, Analysis 1a).  
 
 
Table 2.4: VBM analysis (Model 1) – grey matter substrates of deficits in object 
related functions as assessed by the test scores 
 Cluster  Peak  Coordinates  Brain structures (location) 
 Size  (Z-score)  x y z   
Global Null (Analysis 1a) 
 874**  3.52  -63 -15 27  Left M-IPCG extending into S2 
   3.34  -63 -16 4  Left mid STG 
Object Recognition (Analysis 1b) 
 2322**  4.61  -22 -36 -18  Left PmTG including fusiform gyrus 
 1887**  3.5  -66 -46 0  Left STG and STS 
   3.35  -62 5 12  Left M-IFG 
Actual Object Use (Analysis 1c) 
 1889**  3.97  -9 
 
-61 27  Bilateral mPOC (precunus, cuneus, 
parieto-occipital fissure) 
 901  3.81  -4 -57 -20  Cerebellum (vermis) 
 615  3.98  -45 27 -12  Left IFG 
Pantomimed Object Use (Analysis 1d) 
 3068**  4.25  15 -94 4  Right mOC (V1 and extrastriate areas) 
Pantomime Recognition (Analysis 1e) 
 2518**  3.52  -34 -45 33  Left IPS and neighbouring areas 
 1898**  3.48  -12 -10 13  Left thalamus 
 1891**  3.83  -4 45 10  Bilateral anterior cingulate cortex 
 431  3.1  20 -25 10  Right posterior thalamus 
 416  3.25  -28 3 42  Left postcentral gyrus 
 371  3.09  42 -30 51  Right postcentral gyrus 
Abbreviations: M-IPCG, mid to inferior postcentral gyrus; S2, secondary 
somatosensory cortex; STG, superior temporal gyrus; PmTG, posterior medial 
temporal gyrus; STS, superior temporal sulcus; M-IFG, mid and inferior frontal gyri; 
mPOC, medial parieto-occipital cortex; mOC, medial occipital cortex; V1, primary 
visual cortex; IPS, intraparietal sulcus; SPL, superior parietal lobule; IPL, inferior 
parietal lobule; VBM, voxel-based morphometry. **significant at p<0.05, one-tailed 
test, whole brain FWE-corrected (extent threshold: 350 voxels).  
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Figure 2.1. VBM analysis (Model 1): Neuroanatomical correlates of performance 
scores on the four object-oriented tests (FWE-corrected cluster-level threshold: 
p<0.05). 
 
The lesioned areas associated with deficits are coloured according to the level of significance 
in the VBM analysis, where brighter colours represent higher t-values. The numbers in 
brackets indicate peak MNI coordinates. Across each row, the first two images are T1-
weighted MR images (sagittal and axial views) overlaid with statistical parametric map (SPM) 
generated from the VBM analysis, for better display. To further illustrate the possible use of 
CT data in lesion–function mapping analysis, the SPM is plotted on the CT image (the right-
most image in each row) of the same axial view. Abbreviations: L, left; R, right; PCG, 
postcentral gyrus; STG, superior temporal gyrus; mPOC, medial parieto-occipital cortex; 
mOC, medial occipital cortex; IPS, intraparietal sulcus; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex. 
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Deficits at visual object recognition (relative to AOU, POU and PanR) were uniquely 
correlated to lesions to a number of left hemispheric regions. These included the 
medial temporal cortex including the fusiform gyrus, as well as the superior temporal 
gyrus and superior temporal sulcus, extending to the posterior part of inferior and 
middle frontal gyri (Table 2.4, Analysis 1b). Performance on actual object use was 
uniquely related to the bilateral medial parieto-occipital cortex encompassing the 
precuneus, cuneus and parieto-occipital fissure (Table 2.4, Analysis 1c). It is worth 
noting that a large cerebellar cluster was also observed though it didn’t reach the 
FWE-corrected threshold. Inability to pantomime object use was associated with 
decreased density of neural substrates extensively in the right medial occipital cortex 
(including V1 and the extrastriate areas) (Table 2.4, Analysis 1d). The analysis of 
pantomime recognition yielded an ensemble of mainly left hemispheric regions that 
encompassed the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and the neighbouring superior and 
inferior parietal areas, thalamus, and anterior cingulate cortex (Table 2.4, Analysis 
1e).  
 
As the brain images were acquired in multiple hospitals using a number of different 
scanners, this might pose an effect on the quality of the data obtained. To account for 
these differences from data acquisition, we carried out additional analyses taking ‘the 
site of administration’ (i.e. in which clinic the patient was admitted) as an extra 
covariate, and there were no major changes on the patterns of results (Appendix A).  
 
GLM model 2: Correlation with the principal components 
These VBM analyses correlated each brain voxel to individual scores generated from 
the PCA procedure (Table 2.5 & Figure 2.2). Performance on the shared component 
(PC1) was correlated reliably with voxels in the right medial occipital cortex. Another 
large cluster centred on the left postcentral gyrus, extending to cover S2 and the mid 
superior temporal gyrus, was also identified, although it did not survive the cluster-
level threshold. (Note that these parietal and temporal areas were also observed in 
the global null conjunction analysis of all the four object tasks, Table 2.4). 
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The second component, PC2, dissociated actual object use from the other three 
tasks. PC2 revealed the isolated neural substrates subserving processes specifically 
involved in actual object use and was associated with lesions to the medial parieto-
occipital cortex (Table 2.5 & Figure 2.2, Analysis 2b). This result overlaps with the 
lesion map yielded in the analysis of the unique deficits at the actual object use task 
(Table 2.4, Analysis 1c). The VBM result for the negative correlation with PC2 is also 
reported in Table 2.5 (Analysis 2c), although no clusters reached the FWE-corrected 
significance.  
 
The third component, PC3, polarised object recognition (in the positive direction) and 
pantomime action recognition (in the negative direction). The positive correlation of 
PC3 unveiled structural correlates unique for the processes specifically engaged in 
recognising objects (but not in recognising actions). This analysis identified the right 
posterior-most occipital lobe and left fusiform gyrus (Table 2.5 & Figure 2.2, Analysis 
2d). The left fusiform gyrus, in particular, was also observed in the VBM of the unique 
performance on the object recognition task (Table 2.4, Analysis 1b). The negative 
correlation with PC3 showed an isolated neural network subserving the specific 
processes in recognising object-oriented pantomimes. This network encompassed 
mainly the left IPS and the surrounding parietal areas, together with the right 
postcentral gyrus at a lower statistical threshold, p=0.1 (FWE-corrected) (Table 2.5 & 
Figure 2.2, Analysis 2e). In particular, the left IPS (and nearby areas) was also seen 
in the analysis of the unique performance on pantomime recognition (Table 2.4, 









Table 2.5: VBM analysis (Model 2) – grey matter substrates of deficits associated 
with the principal components. 
 Cluster  Peak  Coordinates  Brain structure (location) 
 Size  (Z-
score) 
 x y z   
+ve correlation with PC 1: Shared processing (Analysis 2a) 
 1882**  4.09  8 -76 12  Right medial occipital cortex 
 1031  3.24  -66 -13 -5  Left mid superior temporal gyrus 
   3.15  -64 -21 15  Left postcentral gyrus 
 515  3.61  -51 6 -18  Left anterior temporal pole 
          
+ve correlation with PC2: uniquely relevant to Actual Object Use (Analysis 2b) 
 1812**  3.62  -6 -66 28  Bilateral mPOC (precuneus, cuneus, 
POF) 
 1542*  3.75  -4 -57 -20  Vermis extending into left cerebellum 
 677  4.03  -42 29 -12  Left inferior frontal gyrus 
 378  3.21  45 -70 -29  Right cerebellum 
          
-ve correlation with PC2 (Analysis 2c) 
 773  3.98  -38 -33 28  Left TPJ, IPL 
          
+ve correlation with PC3: uniquely relevant to Object Recognition (Analysis 2d) 
 2929**  4.21  9 -96 16  Right posterior-most occipital cortex 
 1793**  4.2  -22 -37 -17  Left PmTG including fusiform gyrus 
 844  3.56  6 -45 31  Right precuneus, PCC 
 671  3.1  -39 -81 -12  Left basal occipital cortex 
 429  3.44  14 -46 -27  Right Cerebellum 
 366  3.29  -12 -55 -33  Left Cerebellum 
          
-ve correlation with PC3: uniquely relevant to Pantomime Recognition (Analysis 2e) 
 1969**  3.49  -27 -66 42  Left IPS and neighbouring SPL and 
IPL 
 1568*  3.64  45 -30 51  Right PCG 
 706  3.54  -12 -42 60  Left superior parietal area 
 554  3.09  -10 -12 49  Left middle cingulate cortex 
 397  3.1  -28 3 49  Left precentral gyrus 
          
+ve correlation with PC4: uniquely relevant to Pantomimed Use (Analysis 2f) 
 2609**  4.33  16 -94 4  Right mOC (V1 and extrastriate 
areas) 
 532  3.3  -15 -94 15  Left posterior occipital cortex 
          
-ve correlation with PC4 (Analysis 2g) 
 1329  3.75  -3 48 6  ACC, mPFC 
 795  3.01  -4 3 6  Left anterior thalamus; basal ganglia 
Abbreviations: mPOC, medial parieto-occipital cortex; POF, parieto-occipital fissures; TPJ, 
temporo-parietal junction; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; PmTG, posterior medial temporal 
gyrus; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; IPS, intraparietal sulcus; SPL, superior parietal 
lobule; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; PCG, postcentral gyrus; mOC, medial occipital cortex; 
ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex. **significant at p<0.05; 
*p<0.1, one-tailed test, whole brain FWE-corrected (extent threshold: 350 voxels).  
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Figure 2.2. VBM analysis (Model 2): Neuroanatomical correlates of the principal 
components (FWE-corrected cluster-level threshold: p<0.05). 
 
Refer also to the notes under Figure 2.1 for further guidelines on viewing the images. 
Abbreviations: L, left; R, right; PCG, postcentral gyrus; mPOC, medial parieto-
occipital cortex; mOC, medial occipital cortex; pmOC, posterior-most occipital cortex; 
IPS, intraparietal sulcus. 
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PC4 isolated pantomimed object use (in the positive direction) from the other three 
tasks. The positive correlation with PC4 highlighted the right medial visual cortex 
covering V1 and extrastriate areas (including the cuneus, calcarine and lingual gyrus) 
which can be considered to support specifically the processes involved in 
pantomimed use but not the other three object-related functions tested (Table 2.5 & 
Figure 2.2, Analysis 2f). These areas mirrored the output from the VBM of unique 
performance on the pantomimed object use task (Analysis 1d). The negative 
correlation with PC4 highlighted the neural substrates associated with processes 
(e.g., attending to the external stimuli) that were specifically needed across object 
recognition, actual object use and pantomime recognition (but not pantomimed use). 
However, specific neural substrates, such as the anterior cingulate cortex and 
thalamus, failed to survive the FWE-corrected threshold (Table 2.5, Analysis 2g).  
 
2.4. Discussion 
The present study has unveiled the common and dissociable cortical regions 
underlying object recognition and object-directed action, and it also showed that the 
neural structures subserving action retrieval tend to differ depending on the 
requirements of the task. To the best of our knowledge, this study features the 
largest cohort of stroke patients examined with a series of object-oriented recognition 
and action tests, and is the first to report data yielded from automated brain-function 
mapping analysis using VBM on the whole brain of patients without pre-selected 
types of lesions (e.g. based on specific lesion locations) and apraxic deficits. 
 
In the group-level behavioural analysis, reliable correlations were observed between 
scores of performance on all the object-related cognitive tasks studied. This suggests 
there are common representations for object-related knowledge. These results are in 
keeping with other correlational analysis studies looking at object-related and limb 
praxic abilities (Buxbaum, Kyle, et al., 2005; Negri et al., 2007; Pazzaglia, Smania, et 
al., 2008). Meanwhile, similar to the case-level analysis performed in the study of 
Negri et al. (2007), there were a noticeable number of patients in the present study 
43 
exhibiting dissociations in performance across tasks (Table 2.3). On this basis, we 
provide additional evidence that corresponds to previous single-case and case series 
reports claiming to show dissociations between object recognition and object use 
actions (e.g. James et al., 2003; Riddoch et al., 1989; Yoon et al., 2005), between 
actual and pantomimed object use (e.g. Buxbaum et al., 2000; Clark et al., 1994; 
Goldenberg & Hagmann, 1998), as well as between action recognition and execution 
(e.g. Chainay & Humphreys, 2002; Mahon & Caramazza, 2005). 
 
2.4.1. The Common Neural Substrates 
In accord with the behavioural inter-correlations among the four object tasks, the 
PCA revealed a component (PC1) that explained more than half of the total observed 
variance, and which contained almost equal contributions from all the tasks. This 
‘shared’ component is likely to capture a common object (and action) representation 
system. When the four tasks were analysed together in the global null conjunction 
analysis, a reliable association was noted with neural substrates in the post-central 
gyrus (S1) covering also S2. These brain areas were observed also in the VBM of 
the shared component (though not attaining FWE-corrected significance). 
Additionally, the shared component was also reliably correlated to the grey matter 
density in the right medial occipital cortex. We recognise the possibility that this 
shared component might reflect also general cognitive impairment rather than solely 
object (and action) representations. In a recent study (Chen et al., 2016) published 
by our group that also included patients (N=239) taken from the BCoS clinical trial, 
we showed a shared principal component for five tests of praxis (covering actual 
object use, gesture production, gesture recognition, along with meaningless gesture 
imitation and complex figural pattern copy). A VBM analysis on this component 
identified the right middle frontal gyrus [MNI coordinate of the peak: 28, 9, 48] and 
thalamus [22, -33, 16] as well as the left postcentral [-51, -10, 40] and inferior parietal 
[-52, -43, 40] gyri, which are quite different from the brain areas associated with our 
shared component here. Bringing these together with our current findings in 
comparison, we argue that the shared component found in the present analysis still 
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reflects some representations that are shared yet specifically relevant to the four 
object-oriented tasks.  
 
The involvement of common brain substrates in the visual cortex is not surprising 
since most tasks included in this study required visual perception and recognition of 
familiar stimuli (e.g., objects, object-use gestures). The extensive extent of the 
occipital structures associated with the ‘shared’ component are likely to constitute 
areas providing higher order visual information to several streams to accomplish 
different tasks. Moreover, parts of these occipital areas are potentially engaged in 
visual-mental imagery (Klein, Paradis, Poline, Kosslyn, & Le Bihan, 2000; Kosslyn et 
al., 1999; Kosslyn, 2005; for alternative explanations, see also Bridge, Harrold, 
Holmes, Stokes, & Kennard, 2012) that facilitates the pantomime of object use. We 
note that fMRI results indicate that portions of the medial occipital lobe are activated 
during both visual perception and imagery (Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004).  
The functions of the cortical somatosensory system are manifold including but not 
limited to providing proprioceptive information for action-related processes, as well as 
tactile input if actual interaction with an object is involved (Dijkerman & de Haan, 
2007). Many studies now demonstrate that the somatosensory cortex (S1 and S2) is 
also modulated by vision of actions (Avikainen, Forss, & Hari, 2002; Cross, Hamilton, 
& Grafton, 2006; Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, & Keysers, 2007; Grèzes, Tucker, 
Armony, Ellis, & Passingham, 2003; Meyer, Kaplan, Essex, Damasio, & Damasio, 
2011; Molnar-Szakacs, Kaplan, Greenfield, & Iacoboni, 2006; Oouchida et al., 2004; 
Raos, Evangeliou, & Savaki, 2007; Rossi et al., 2002). Based on single-subject 
analyses of unsmoothed fMRI data, Gazzola and Keysers (2009) identified 
overlapping somatosensory and inferior parietal neural correlates that are 
responsible for execution and observation of object-related hand movements in all 
their participants (in monkeys, Evangeliou, Raos, Galletti, & Savaki, 2009; Raos, 
Evangeliou, & Savaki, 2004; Raos et al., 2007). In comparison to unfamiliar items, 
passive viewing and (visual) perceptual discrimination of familiar graspable objects 
(that do not demand explicit action knowledge) were also shown to recruit the 
somatosensory and other parietal regions (Creem-Regehr & Lee, 2005; Smith & 
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Goodale, 2015). A possible interpretation is that graspable objects ‘potentiate’ 
actions and trigger action representation processes even when the goal of a task is 
not to directly interact with the object (Grèzes et al., 2003; Tucker & Ellis, 2001). 
Recent research on multisensory integration posits that cross-modal connections, 
(and/or the presence of multimodal areas in sensory-motor structures) enable 
activation of content-relevant representations in these areas when familiar 
manipulable objects are viewed (Dijkerman & de Haan, 2007; Smith & Goodale, 
2015; Zhou & Fuster, 2000).  Further work is needed to ascertain the specific role of 
this shared representation especially in object recognition. 
 
2.4.2. The Dissociated Object-related Neural Mechanisms 
To determine the dissociated neural substrates for each object task, we incorporated 
the scores of performance on all the tasks into the same GLM model so that the VBM 
analysis of an object task would mask out the effects of the other three tasks, i.e. 
revealing the unique lesions correlated to that particular task. We then compared the 
results with those associated with the principal components that revealed 
dissociation between tasks (accompanied by the specific underlying processes). 
 
Here we will discuss our results by focusing on the contrasts of different object-
oriented cognitive functions that have been of great interest for debates in the 
existing literature.  
 
Object recognition versus object-oriented actions 
Classical neuropsychological cases show that damage to primarily different cortical 
areas results in differential deficits at recognising everyday objects vs. at guiding 
hand movements to interact with objects. Our data corroborate with these cases by 
showing that almost 20% of our patient sample had outstanding full-score 
performance on all the object-oriented action tasks (i.e. actual use, pantomimed use 
and pantomime recognition) but not on object recognition (although it was more rare 
to have patients who exhibited the reverse pattern of performance). We also 
demonstrated that lesions uniquely correlated to object recognition and other action 
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tasks are reliably dissociable. In addition to posterior visual cortex, which likely 
provides visual input to several streams (see section 2.4.1), the ability to recognise 
an object from its physical form was associated with ventral brain structures 
encompassing the fusiform gyrus, together with the superior temporal and inferior 
frontal cortex. In contrast, the overall ability to interact with objects relied on areas 
within the dorsal stream. In particular, actual object use (relative to other tasks) was 
related to the parieto-occipital structures; pantomimed use was uniquely related to 
the cuneus; pantomime recognition was uniquely linked to the intraparietal sulcus 
(IPS), as well as the thalamus and anterior cingulate cortex. These findings are also 
in correspondence with the literature on functional imaging (Cavina-Pratesi et al., 
2007; Shmuelof & Zohary, 2005; Yoon et al., 2012) and temporary brain stimulation 
techniques (Cohen et al., 2009; Glover et al., 2005; Rice et al., 2006), that have 
documented the neural distinction between ventral and dorsal pathways respectively 
for object recognition and object-related actions.  
 
Object recognition versus pantomime recognition 
With particular relevance to visual recognition, PC3 polarises the processes that are 
unique for recognising object identity and (object-oriented) pantomime in diverging 
directions. Together with the corresponding VBM analyses of this principal 
component, our results demonstrate that the neuro-cognitive components underlying 
visual recognition differ depending on the type of stimuli attended (Analyses 2d & 
2e). Similar findings have been presented by Shmuelof and Zohary (2005) who 
examined observed object manipulation in a series of fMRI experiments that 
employed various display techniques (i.e. contralateral representation, task-related 
activation, and fMRI signal adaptation). These authors found converging evidence 
across all the techniques that supports functional specialisation of the ventral and 
dorsal areas: the fusiform gyrus (ventral) serves a role in the processing of object 
identity while the vicinity of the intraparietal sulcus (dorsal) is actively engaged in 
viewing of object grasping motions (Shmuelof & Zohary, 2005). The present study 
based on analyses of patients’ lesions show complementary evidence on structural 
differentiation within these same brain regions between deficits at object and action 
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recognition. It is also noteworthy that our task on recognition of pantomime action did 
not have any actual objects ‘to use’ and hence no additional cues provided from the 
object-hand interaction as in Shmuelof and Zohary’s study. 
 
The medial aspect of the ventral occipitotemporal cortex, including the fusiform 
gyrus, has often been implicated in processing meaningful visual inputs and forms 
such as familiar objects, faces, and words (Bar et al., 2001, 2006; Bookheimer, 
Zeffiro, Blaxton, Gaillard, & Theodore, 1995; Dien, 2009; Herbster, Mintun, Nebes, & 
Becker, 1997; Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006; Malach, Levy, & Hasson, 2002; McCarthy, 
Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997; Moore & Price, 1999). There are at least two proposals 
on the organisation of the ventromedial occipitemporal cortex. One is that different 
stimulus categories may recruit distinct specific sub-regions of this structure 
(Dehaene, Le Clec’H, Poline, Le Bihan, & Cohen, 2002; McCandliss, Cohen, & 
Dehaene, 2003). Alternatively, other researchers posit that objects are represented 
by distributed patterns of connected activation in a collection of feature detectors 
within the region (Haxby et al., 2001; Price & Devlin, 2003; Starrfelt & Gerlach, 2007). 
Regardless of how exactly objects are represented, a stroke that typically affects 
widespread brain areas may impair the processing of various categories of visual 
stimuli simultaneously. These stimulus types, however, do not generalise to hand 
actions as our results show that the deficits at recognising actions were uniquely 
correlated to lesions situated more dorsally in the parietal areas, which support the 
formation of internal motor representation (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). This 
will be further discussed in the later section.  
 
It has also brought to our attention that activations in the lateral (ventral) occipito-
temporal cortex are nearly ubiquitous in neuroimaging literature on object perception 
(Grill-Spector, Kourtzi, & Kanwisher, 2001; Grill-Spector, Kushnir, Hendler, & Malach, 
2000; Kanwisher, Chun, McDermott, & Ledden, 1996), yet they were not observed in 
our analyses of patients’ performance on object recognition. However, in this aspect 
our (null) results are in line with other neuropsychological studies that report that 
brain damage confined to these brain areas do not always lead to evident semantic 
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impairment (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009). A possible reason for such 
discrepancies in findings between lesion studies (including ours) and neuroimaging 
experiments may lie in the different paradigms employed – in studies with patients 
the ability to recognise objects is often assessed using an object naming task while 
functional imaging studies uses a variety of tasks such as passive viewing, stimulus 
categorisation and matching to examine object recognition (Bar et al., 2001; Kim, 
Biederman, Lescroart, & Hayworth, 2009). Regarding the functional role of the lateral 
occipito(-temporal) cortex (LOTC), recent literature has suggested that these lateral 
ventral areas are sensitive to the structural aspect (e.g. shape) but not so much to 
the semantic aspect of objects (Kim et al., 2009; Zannino et al., 2009). This may be 
why lesions to LOTC is not critical for causing deficits at object naming, which likely 
taps more into semantic/lexical processes. Above all, conclusions based on null 
results are still subject to further confirmation. 
 
Performance on object recognition (based on the test scores; Analysis 1b) was also 
found to correlate with lesions to the STG and IFG. These frontotemporal areas have 
been linked to phonological aspects of spoken language and the anterior part of the 
STG, as part of the anterior temporal lobe, has been argued to subserve semantic 
processing (Butler et al., 2014; Lau et al., 2015). The specific involvement of these 
frontotemporal areas in the object recognition task may reflect the demands on 
correct naming of the objects. Potentially for the same reason, these areas were 
absent in Analysis 2c (the VBM of PC3, which directly contrasted object recognition 
and pantomime recognition) because our task on pantomime recognition also had 
demand on name and phonological retrieval in order to correctly identify the objects 
that the experimenter pretended to use.  
 
Actual object use versus pantomimed use 
Corresponding to the clinical cases documented in the literature on apraxia, showing 
differential levels of impairments in using real objects and pantomiming (e.g. 
Buxbaum et al., 2000; Clark et al., 1994; Goldenberg & Hagmann, 1998), the current 
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study showed that more than 30% of the patients performed differently in our tasks 
on actual and pantomimed object use.  
 
We also found dissociable neuroanatomical correlates of actual and pantomimed 
use. Actual object use, when dissociated from all other tasks, was uniquely related to 
grey-matter integrity in the medial parieto-occipital cortex (mPOC) (Analysis 1c & 
Analysis 2b) while the unique neural substrates of pantomime were located more 
inferiorly and posteriorly in an extensive area of the medial occipital cortex (Analysis 
1d & Analysis 2f). To succeed in the actual use task, patients needed to reach for 
and grasp the appropriate items as well as to orient and position the items properly to 
assemble the final product. According to the conventional view that characterises 
arm motion, the POC (macaque visual area V6 and visuomotor area V6A) projecting 
to the dorsal premotor cortex forms a dorsomedial parieto-frontal circuit, which 
specialises in arm transport (i.e. moving the hand toward the goal object; Connolly, 
Andersen, & Goodale, 2003; Filimon, Nelson, Huang, & Sereno, 2009; Prado et al., 
2005). While it has been shown that part of the mPOC may be specifically 
responsible for regulating arm transport (by controlling for the hand-grip motions) 
(Cavina-Pratesi et al., 2010), other studies indicate that V6A neurons also code 
multiple dimensions ranging from location, motion direction to wrist orientation and 
grip postures (Fattori et al., 2010; Fattori, Pitzalis, & Galletti, 2009; Galletti, Kutz, 
Gamberini, Breveglieri, & Fattori, 2003). Our object-use task was the only one that 
involved actual interaction (contact) with objects and that may be why lesions to the 
medial mPOC were especially detrimental to this task. In keeping with previous 
studies, damage to the mPOC, or disruption to the dorsomedial pathway, likely 
results in problems with processing target location (Marzocchi, Breveglieri, Galletti, & 
Fattori, 2008; Prado et al., 2005), arm position (Breveglieri, Kutz, Fattori, Gamberini, 
& Galletti, 2002), online movement corrections (Galletti et al., 2003; Grol et al., 2007), 
and hand shape to match the physical features of the object, all of which are pivotal 
to successful object use. 
 
50 
In the pantomimed use task, patients were assessed for the ability to retrieve from 
memory and act out the actions related to the use of some common objects that were 
neither in sight nor in hand. The unique and reliable association between deficits at 
pantomime and damage to posteromedial occipital cortex is likely because 
pantomime, unlike the other object and action retrieval tasks in this study, was not 
supplied with multiple external cues (e.g. visual, haptic) and tended to be particularly 
vulnerable to the dysfunction of visual-mental imagery. As aforementioned (Section 
2.4.1), the visual cortex (Brodmann areas 17 and 18), including the cuneus and 
lingual gyrus on the medial side, has been active during visual imagery, shown 
mainly in fMRI studies (see for a review (Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001; 
Thompson & Kosslyn, 2000). For example, Klein and colleagues (2000) were able to 
chart clearly increased neural responses in area 17 of all their subjects during the 
formation of visual mental images.  
 
Past studies of object use (actual and pantomimed) often implicated an extensive 
network of frontal and parietal areas in the procedures of action representation 
(possibly including motor imagery), planning, programming and actual execution 
(Brandi et al., 2014; Króliczak & Frey, 2009). These areas did not emerge as the 
unique neural substrates for either of the object use tasks in this study. One might 
argue it is due to a lack of sufficient patients with certain lesion types. This is unlikely 
to explain the whole picture, however, since there was a reliable link observed 
between pantomime recognition and the inferior parietal and prefrontal substrates (to 
be discussed in the next part). Another interpretation would be that both pantomimed 
and actual object use tasks rely largely on the same network for action execution and 
this potentially explains why the frontal and other parietal areas are not uniquely 
observed in the analysis of each object use task. Consistent with this idea, recent 
fMRI findings indicated that a widespread overlapping network is shared between 
actual tool use and pantomimed use and the potential neural dissociation between 
the two types of action execution is only detectable at a less stringent threshold 
(Hermsdörfer et al., 2007; Imazu et al., 2007; Króliczak et al., 2007).  
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Pantomimed use versus pantomimed recognition 
From the detailed behavioural analysis, altogether close to 30% of our patients 
performed optimally in either the task of pantomimed use or pantomime recognition, 
but not the other. This is in accord with the double dissociation observed between 
action execution and recognition in previous single-case reports (for a review, see 
Mahon & Caramazza, 2005). As discussed in the last section, the unique association 
between pantomimed use and the integrity of the posteromedial occipital cortex is 
likely due to the additional demand on visual-mental imagery, especially when 
external cues in the environmental are limited. In contrast, the ability to recognise 
actions pertinent to object use was specifically vulnerable to infarction in the left IPS 
and the surrounding parietal areas (Analyses 1e and 2e), possibly along with the 
anterior cingulate gyrus and thalamus (Analysis 1e). The findings regarding 
pantomime recognition are in keeping with the extensive parieto-frontal cortical circuit 
that is actively engaged during action observation (forming part of the human’s 
‘mirror neuron system’) (Fabbri-Destro & Rizzolatti, 2008; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 
2010). 
 
The representations for skilled object-related actions may be inherently 
distinguishable from those underlying non-object-related actions. In a group of left 
hemispheric stroke patients, Buxbaum and collaborators (2005) found a strong 
specific association between performance on the tasks of object-related (transitive) 
gesture recognition and production (in comparison with a much weaker relationship 
between transitive recognition and non-object-related (intransitive) gesture 
production). In addition, deficiencies in spatial aspects of transitive gesture 
recognition as well as hand posture recognition were reliably attributable to the 
lesions located in the inferior parietal lobe (IPL) and IPS (Buxbaum, et al., 2005). The 
specific involvement of the left parietal lobe in representing object-related actions has 
already been reflected in research on somatotopic organisation. Buccino et al. (2001) 
demonstrated that the posterior parietal lobe was activated in a somatotopic manner 
only when viewing object-related actions (but not other non-object-related actions) 
performed by the mouth, hand and foot. Finally, when considering recognition and 
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production together, Heilman and colleagues (1982) found that lesions to the IPL are 
disruptive to the capabilities of both discriminating and executing an action; on the 
other hand, patients with more anterior brain lesions, e.g. frontal lobe, that spared the 
IPL exhibit deficits only at action production. These authors posit that while the more 
frontal damage is especially detrimental to action production, the left IPL may store 
the motor schema for a given object-related action, which is activated both in 
recognition and production of the action (Heilman et al., 1982). Putting these results 
together with our findings, we argue that even though the IPS and nearby parietal 
areas are involved in both recognition and production of object-related actions, the 
lesions to this parietal area disrupt recognition more adversely while action 
production is sustained by a supposedly more widespread network and partial 
damage to this network may be readily compensated by other or contralateral 
regions (Heuninckx, Wenderoth, & Swinnen, 2008; Hoeren et al., 2014).  
 
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and thalamus were also shown to relate to 
pantomime recognition in the VBM of the task scores. The cingulate cortex is richly 
connected with the thalamus, parietal and other cortical areas (Cohen, 2014). These 
brain regions are considered to be parts of a distributed attention system (Buchel et 
al., 1998). With particular regard to action, the ACC has been implicated in the 
cognitive control of motor behaviour, specifically, through facilitating selection of 
appropriate actions or action plans that are consistent with task goals (Posner, 
Petersen, Fox, & Raichle, 1988; Posner & DiGirolamo, 1998). Recent neuroimaging 
evidence also regards the ACC as part of the mirror mechanism even though it tends 
to respond mostly if the observed action is emotion-evoking (de Vignemont & Singer, 
2006; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Morrison, Peelen, & Downing, 2007). It is 
possible then that the ACC as well as the thalamus plays an important role in 
selecting the target response among distractors following the formation of the 
representation for an attended visual stimulus, required in but not limited to action 
recognition. This may be why these areas were not picked up in analysis 2e (VBM 
analysis of PC3, the component that specifically isolated pantomime recognition from 
object recognition). 
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2.4.3. Final Remarks 
The previous sections have focused on the specialisations of various brain structures 
along the dorsal and ventral streams; however we do not disregard the evidence that 
favours the close interaction between the dissociable object processing streams in 
influencing our decisions on perception and action (e.g. (Cloutman, 2013; van 
Polanen & Davare, 2015). As mentioned in the Introduction, some patients with 
semantic deficits following a brain injury are reported in the literature to improve in 
naming objects after they are allowed to have direct interaction with the stimuli 
(Morady & Humphreys, 2009). On the other hand, while the dorsal stream plays a 
major role in the control of action with online visual feedback, a delayed grasp that 
does not take place immediately following the presentation of the object is arguably 
sustained by memory, and can be thought to also involve the ventral stream (Cohen 
et al., 2009; Milner & Goodale, 2008). What is more, structural connections between 
the (ventral) inferotemporal areas and the (dorsal) parietal areas have been 
discovered in monkeys and human subjects (Borra, Ichinohe, Sato, Tanifuji, & 
Rockland, 2010; Ramayya, Glasser, & Rilling, 2010). Taken together, we propose 
that, although a clear division of labour exists between the dorsal and ventral brain 
structures, the reality is likely to be much more fluid and the dissociable streams tend 
to work largely interdependently with each other in guiding us to react to stimuli in the 
environment.  
 
Relevant methodological considerations regarding the clinical trial that this study was 




As a summary, our results indicate that there are shared and dissociable cortical 
components of object recognition and object-directed actions. Common neural 
substrates, potentially subserving both object and action representation, were 
associated with the postcentral gyrus (including S1 and S2) and the posterior visual 
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cortex. The ability to recognise objects was uniquely affected by lesions to the ventral 
fusiform gyrus, possibly along with the inferior frontal and superior temporal cortex, 
while overall object-oriented actions were related to brain damage located more 
dorsally. These data accord with the conventional dorsal-ventral dissociation 
proposal between recognition and actions towards objects (Goodale et al., 1994). 
What is more, there was evidence of dissociation in the neural substrates supporting 
action retrieval depending on the demands of the task. Specifically, deficits at actual 
object use were uniquely associated with medial parieto-occipital lesions; while the 
ability to pantomime was uniquely impaired by lesions to the posteromedial occipital 
cortex; in contrast pantomime recognition was affected distinctively by infarctions in 
the inferior parietal lobe (and IPS), potentially together with the medial orbitofrontal 





Chapter 3. Dissociating action and conceptual knowledge in 
object categories 
3.0. Abstract 
Existing neuropsychological and functional imaging studies demonstrate neural 
differentiation between action and conceptual (functional) knowledge about 
manipulable artefacts. To further explore whether this differentiation could be 
generalised to other semantic categories, the fMRI study presented in this chapter 
used a factorial design to examine the neural activation for the processing of two 
types of knowledge in relation to a potential category-specific dissociation (animals 
vs tools). Twenty healthy subjects were presented with pictures of animals and tools 
and were required to make judgment depending on action or conceptual knowledge 
about each presented item. Regardless of the category, action decision (> 
conceptual decision) induced greater activity in the left parietal (anterior parts of the 
superior and inferior lobules along with the intraparietal sulcus) and premotor (dorsal 
and ventral areas) cortex and the left posterior temporal brain region. In contrast, 
conceptual (> action) decision across animals and artefacts uniquely activated mainly 
the midline brain structures including the posterior cingulate gyrus (PCG), as well as 
the left anterior temporal lobe. The main effects of object category largely mirrored 
the effects of knowledge type: animals (> artifacts) were associated with increased 
activity in the bilateral posterior (temporo-)occipital cortex, PCG and left anterior 
temporal pole. Conversely, artifacts (> animals) were uniquely linked to greater 
activity in the left frontoparietal action network. These results suggested that the 
representation of artefacts is strongly linked to the processing of action knowledge 
while the representation of animals is associated to the processing of conceptual 
knowledge. In a follow-up study, we compared performance on recognition of living 
things (animals, vegetables/fruits) versus nonliving things (tools and graspable 
household implements) using a test of picture naming in a group of stroke patients. 
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The voxel-based morphometric analysis on these patients’ clinical brain scans 
showed that deficits for identifying living things were linked specifically to lesions to 
the superior aspect of the left anterior temporal pole and the nearby inferior frontal 
gyrus, together with various parts of the occipital cortex. On the other hand, deficits 
for nonliving items were associated with the damage to the posterior temporal cortex 
and the inferior parietal lobule. Taken together, we observed comparable results from 
the two studies suggesting dissociable representations between living things/animals 
and nonliving things/tools, broadly construed. Still, such a category-specific 
dissociation can be explained by the different types of processing (or the kinds of 





When acquiring the concept of an object, we learn about how it looks, where it is 
usually found/situated, what it is used for or what its role is in our life and the 
environment, and what its name is. We also try to categorise and relate object 
concepts to other existing concepts. There is evidence showing that the cortex in as 
young as infants activates differentially in response to concepts belonging to 
contrasting categories (Quinn, Schyns, & Goldstone, 2006). As human adults, we 
become very efficient in classifying things into separable groups and identifying 
deviants to a group. The major focus of this study rests on the comparison between 
different types of knowledge in relation to living and non-living entities, which is 
consistent with the widespread interest in the literature to determine the possible 
neural segregation of the two kinds of entities.  
 
Since the series of seminal papers by Warrington and colleagues on the selective 
breakdown of semantic knowledge (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 1987; Warrington 
& Shallice, 1984), there has been a growing collection of neuropsychological cases 
with category-specific deficits, who suffer a disproportionately severe impediment to 
the retrieval of concepts of particular categories. Among these cases, a broad-based 
distinction between living and non-living entities is commonly observed, with the 
majority of patients showing selective deficits for living or animal kinds but relatively 
normal ability to recognise and name non-living, man-made objects (De Renzi & 
Lucchelli, 1994; Gainotti & Silveri, 1996; Lambon Ralph, Howard, Nightingale, & Ellis, 
1998; Pietrini et al., 1988; Sartori, Job, Miozzo, Zago, & Marchiori, 1993; Sartori & 
Job, 1988; Silveri & Gainotti, 1988; Wilson, Baddeley, & Kapur, 1995). Such 
semantic deficits for living things have been noted most often for patients who have 
herpes simplex virus encephalitis (HSVE), and it has often been associated with 
damage to bilateral antero-medial and inferior temporal lobes (Gainotti, Silveri, 
Daniel, & Giustolisi, 1995; Pietrini et al., 1988; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983). Albeit 
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rare, the reverse pattern of dissociation (i.e., worse performance on nonliving than 
living items), has also been documented (Capitani, Laiacona, Mahon, & Caramazza, 
2003; Gainotti, 2000; Hillis & Caramazza, 1991; Hillis, Rapp, Romani, & Caramazza, 
1990; Sacchett & Humphreys, 1992; Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 1987). The 
deficits for man-made artefacts are claimed to link to extensive, predominant left 
frontoparietal lesions (Gainotti et al., 1995; Hillis et al., 1990; Sacchett & Humphreys, 
1992). 
 
The wealth of neuropsychological reports showing dissociated deficits has been 
treated as an important source of evidence to inform us about the internal 
organisation of stored semantic knowledge. The semantic concept is likely an 
isolable system at both the functional and neuroanatomical level. As proposed by the 
domain/category-specific model (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Shelton & Caramazza, 
1999), the conceptual system is maintained by dedicated neural machinery that has 
evolved, as a result of (evolutionary) selective pressure, to comprise 
neuroanatomically distinct content-specific domains for quick and effective 
processing of items in categories relevant for survival. Other researchers (Gainotti, 
2000; Gainotti, 2006; Humphreys & Forde, 2001; Snowden, Thompson, & Neary, 
2004; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) argue that 
categorical distinctions are not the first-order principle for the organisation of 
semantic concepts, but instead arise as a consequence of the types of knowledge 
stored and retrieved. Another approach does not distinguish between different types 
of stored knowledge but stresses that the categorical effect emerges as a by-product 
of interaction of the intrinsically non-categorical aspects of conceptual 
representations (Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp, & Romani, 1990; Devlin, Gonnerman, 
Andersen, & Seidenberg, 1998; Garrard, Ralph, Hodges, & Patterson, 2001; Tyler & 
Moss, 2001). Among these interpretations, a dominant, influential theoretical 
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framework, known as the perceptual-functional property model (Warrington & 
Shallice, 1984), emphasises the differential contribution of various ‘types of 
knowledge’ particularly perceptual and functional information to formation of semantic 
memory. The central idea of this model is that sensory/perceptual features, referring 
to what things look like (e.g. form, motion, colour) can be segregated from functional 
properties, associated to what things are used for or the context of usage. It is 
generally assumed that perceptual features (primarily visual) are a critical property 
for representing living things such as animals, fruits and vegetables (e.g. foxes have 
inverted triangular faces), while functional knowledge is more important for 
differentiating man-made artefacts  (e.g. spanners are used for tightening /loosening 
screws) (Cree & McRae, 2003; McRae, Cree, Seidenberg, & McNorgan, 2005). In 
this view, selective damage to the neural substrates that independently store either 
perceptual or functional information tends to have a disproportionate impact on 
different object categories. This property-based model has subsequently been 
revised to highlight the importance of the dominant channel of experience (e.g. 
perceptual, motor, functional-associative) associated with the acquisition, storage 
and retrieval of the concept (Warrington & McCarthy, 1987). With particular relevance 
to tools, it is assumed that the dominant channel of experience includes both 
functional and motor (action) information.  
 
Influenced strongly by the property-based theory, past neuropsychological studies 
have attempted to establish links between different property attributes (focusing 
primarily on perceptual and functional-associative) and particular categories of 
objects. However, the studies do not always provide consistent findings. Several 
papers report that patients with category-specific difficulties for living things show 
equal impairments for (visual) perceptual and functional attributes of living things, 
and are unimpaired for both attribute types of nonliving things (Caramazza & Shelton, 
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1998; Laiacona, Barbarotto, & Capitani, 1993; Laiacona, Capitani, & Barbarotto, 
1997; Lambon Ralph et al., 1998; Samson, Pillon, & De Wilde, 1998). Moreover, in 
those cases with disproportionate deficits for nonliving entities where in-depth 
assessments on perceptual and functional properties are reported, the results 
suggest either no reliable difference between the two types of properties (Moss & 
Tyler, 2000), or a pattern in reverse direction against the prediction by the 
perceptual-functional account (Lambon Ralph et al., 1998). Early neuroimaging 
experiments also failed to always exhibit a specific correspondence in terms of neural 
overlap between the living domain and the demands on perceptual information as 
well as between the nonliving things and functional knowledge (Cappa, Perani, 
Schnur, Tettamanti, & Fazio, 1998; Mummery, Patterson, Hodges, & Price, 1998; 
Thompson-Schill, Aguirre, Desposito, & Farah, 1999), except for the study of Phillips 
et al. (2002). The latter study (Phillips, Noppeney, Humphreys, & Price, 2002) 
examined perceptual and action properties (note that these are different from 
functional properties; see below) in both living (fruits and vegetables) and nonliving 
things (tools). They found that even though there was no specific link between 
perceptual knowledge and the representation of living things, a correspondence 
between action knowledge and the representation of tools was apparent, with neural 
overlap mainly in the left posterior middle temporal area (It is worth mentioning that 
Phillips et al.’s study required a response for every experimental trial in both 
perceptual and action tasks, which might have attenuated the unique activations in 
the fronto-parietal action/motor areas. See below for more information regarding 
action knowledge). 
 
Humphreys and Forde (2001) posit that indeed semantic representation is multi-
faceted and hierarchical, and that deficits even for one class of object could arise 
from multiple levels of processing, from (structural) perceptual to purely semantic 
61 
(e.g. non-sensory functional-associative knowledge). In the case of artefacts, an 
important distinction has been drawn between action and functional knowledge 
(Buxbaum, Veramontil, et al., 2000; Sirigu et al., 1991). In particular, action 
knowledge (e.g. what the effective manipulation movements are, whether fine hand 
motion is needed) is consistently shown to facilitate the retrieval of tool concepts 
(Ferreira, Giusiano, Ceccaldi, & Poncet, 1997; Morady & Humphreys, 2009; Sirigu et 
al., 1991). For instance, upon viewing the correct use of objects demonstrated by the 
researcher, patients are less likely to make mistakes in naming those items 
compared to when the objects are used incorrectly (Morady & Humphreys, 2009). 
Ferreira and colleagues (Ferreira, Giusiano, & Poncet, 1997) reported in a group of 
patients, all with infero-temporal infarcts, that performance on naming and 
comprehension tasks was impaired for animals but relatively normal for tools and 
actions. This suggests that tools and actions share similar conceptual 
representations to a certain extent. While action information is shown to have a major 
contribution to the representation of artefacts, its contribution to the concepts of living 
things has been largely underestimated (Cree & McRae, 2003; Tyler & Moss, 1997). 
This is rather puzzling as in real life living kinds, especially animals, can be 
characterised by the motions they carried out (e.g a kangaroo skipping, a fox 
sprinting, a seagull gliding), that are central to our understanding of this category but 
which are often ignored in analyses of their properties.  
  
What is more, what are defined as functional features have not been entirely clear. 
Research on object knowledge and categories tends to focus on the object function 
and sometimes the context of usage, owing to the presumed link between the 
functional property and non-living things. Yet it is worth noting that the term functional 
can be conceptualised as broadly as any abstract propositional properties of objects 
that do not belong to the perceptual and motor domains (Martin & Chao, 2001). This 
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interpretation is in agreement with the ‘encyclopaedic’ information, specified by 
Humphreys and Forde (2001) as the type of conceptual knowledge that is not 
acquired by direct sensory experience with stimuli and is accessed regardless of the 
modality of the input. Such information about living things such as lions are mammal, 
they eat meat, live in the wild and can be found in Africa, is no stranger to us. 
However, this kind of knowledge again has so far been under-emphasised within the 
living domain (though see Cappa et al., 1998; Mummery et al., 1998; Thompson-
Schill et al., 1999). In the current study, we examined the neural representations of 
action and non-sensorimotor conceptual knowledge across different categories of 
objects.  
 
Insights about the neural bases of action and conceptual (functional) knowledge 
come from neuropsychological studies and neuroimaging investigations of tool 
concept and tool use. Some apraxic patients with frontoparietal lesions have been 
reported to be more impaired specifically when asked to match man-made objects on 
the basis of their manner of manipulation (water faucet and doorknob) than on the 
basis of their function (doorknob and door handle) (Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002; 
Buxbaum, Veramontil, et al., 2000). By contrast, patients with bilateral temporal 
damage have a profound impairment of object knowledge yet retain the ability to 
manipulate or gesture appropriately for those items they fail to identify (Buxbaum, 
Schwartz, & Carew, 1997; Hodges et al., 1999; Lauro-Grotto, Piccini, & Shallice, 
1997; Sirigu et al., 1991). A recent study using repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation also shows that temporary disruption over the inferior parietal cortex 
leads to slower responses during action judgement while stimulation over the anterior 
temporal lobe causes similar effects for functional judgements (Ishibashi, Lambon 
Ralph, Saito, & Pobric, 2011; see also, Pelgrims, Olivier, & Andres, 2011; Pobric, 
Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2010). Furthermore, evidence from brain imaging 
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experiments gives further credence to the possible neural segregation of the two 
types of knowledge. Increased activation during the retrieval of action knowledge, 
relative to the object function, has been observed in a left frontoparietal network 
which may include the intraparietal sulcus, the inferior parietal lobule, and the 
premotor cortex, possibly as well as the posterior middle temporal gyrus (Boronat et 
al., 2005; Canessa et al., 2008; Q. Chen, Garcea, & Mahon, 2015; Kellenbach, Brett, 
& Patterson, 2003). The opposite comparison (function > action knowledge) has 
been associated with greater activation in the retrosplenial cortex/parieto-occipital 
sulcus (part of the posterior cingulate cortex) and the lateral anterior inferotemporal 
cortex (Canessa et al., 2008; Q. Chen et al., 2015).  
 
Despite the growing literature devoted to determine the neural mechanisms 
underpinning the processing of action and conceptual (functional) knowledge in tools, 
to our knowledge none of them have looked at how these kinds of knowledge are 
represented in animals (as well as other living categories). This is in contrast to the 
fact that, as aforementioned, animals also have many characteristic motions and we 
are not unfamiliar with the basic factual knowledge about them. The experiment 
presented here (3A-Study1), therefore, examined the neural organisation of action 
and non-sensorimotor conceptual representations across the categories of animals 
and manipulable artefacts using functional imaging. A factorial design that crossed 
semantic category with type of knowledge was adopted - we used common 
constrained decision tasks that tap the two types of information (i.e. action 
knowledge: ‘Whether this thing performs /is performed typically with vertical (arm) 
motion?’; conceptual knowledge: ‘Whether this thing is from outside Europe 
originally?’) for both animals and artefacts. This then allowed a direct comparison of 
the differences in brain activation related to object category and class of knowledge 
respectively. Regarding the conceptual knowledge in particular, we asked a question 
64 
that is not about the object function as it might be fundamentally more related to the 
category of artefacts. Correspondingly, to ensure that the tasks are equal for animals 
and artefacts at the level of difficulty, a separate pilot study was run to carefully yet 
objectively select the stimuli to be used in the fMRI study (see 3A.2. Methods). On 
the basis of the past neuropsychological and neuroimaging findings reviewed here, 
we predicted greater frontoparietal activity during the overall processing of action 
knowledge and greater ventral and anterior temporal activity during overall 
processing of conceptual knowledge. There might be potential difference in neural 
representation for animals and man-made artefacts as well. In accordance to the 
well-documented neuropsychological observations, the dorsal structures might also 
be more tuned to artefacts while the ventral occipito-temporal areas might be 
relatively more responsive to animals. 
 
To look further into the potential dissociation in neural representations between living 
and nonliving things (broadly construed), a separate analysis was performed using 
VBM to examine the associated neural substrates for naming performance on the 
two kinds of semantic categories separately, in a group of stroke patients (3B-
Study2). We compared the results of the VBM analysis and the fMRI experiment (3A-
Study 1) and determine whether there was consistent evidence for neural differences 




3A.2. Study 1 – An fMRI Experiment: Methods 
3A.2.1.	  Subjects	  
Twenty self-reported right-handed participants (13 females) between the age of 18 
and 30 years old (mean age = 23.7 years, SD = 3.33) took part in the experiments. 
All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and none reported having a history of 
neurological or psychiatric symptoms. Written informed consent was obtained from 
all participants and the study was approved by the Research Ethics Board of the 
University of Birmingham, UK.  
 
3A.2.2.	  Stimuli	  
Initially, a long list of animal and artefact items was generated. As judgment on the 
geographical (continental) origin and the characteristic movement of the object was 
required in the experiment, it was important to select items that could be consistently 
classified on these two dimensions. To this end, a pilot survey was conducted with 20 
individuals (completely different from the group actually taking part in the fMRI 
experiment). The respondents were asked to indicate for each item whether they 
thought it originated from Europe or not (“the continental origin”), and whether it 
typically functioned with a vertical movement or not (“the characteristic movement”). 
Based on the respondents’ ratings items were selected that had the highest rate of 
agreement on the two dimensions. The final stimulus set for the main experiment 
was composed of 120 items: 60 animals and 60 artefacts, of which not more than 
10% of the items in each category were classified as originating from outside of 
Europe and 10% as typically moving vertically. Animals included mainly land 
mammals as well as some birds and insects while artefacts were highly manipulable 
man-made items including hand tools, kitchen tools, cleaning tools, stationery and 
household items. Average agreement on continental origin classification was 94.4% 
(range=65-100%) for the animals and 97.3% (range=60-100%) for the artefacts. 
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Average agreement on vertical movement classification was 85.9% (range=55-100%) 
for animals and 86.9% (range=60-100%) for artefacts.  Further t-test analysis 
confirmed that the two types of stimuli did not differ in participants’ continental origin 
classification (t=-1.805, p=0.074) and vertical movement classification (t=-0.423, 
p=0.673).  
 
To create the actual stimulus set (120 items) used in the fMRI experiment, we 
downloaded coloured photographs from the web. The photos depicted either an 
animal (60) or an artefact (60) in a static position (without alluding to any particular 
actions or motions). The photos were edited to be ~450 x ~450 pixel, with the object 
presented in the centre against a white background (i.e. the original background was 
removed in order to minimise any potential contextual cues). To further evaluate the 
stimuli, we asked another 10 individuals to rate the images on two visual and two 
conceptual properties. On a scale from 1 to 5, these individuals indicated for each 
item in the photo their opinions on its general (visual) familiarity (‘How often do you 
see, come in contact with or think about this item?’) and visual representativeness 
(‘To what extent does this image represent the item concerned?’), as well as how 
familiar they were with the item conceptually (‘To what extent are you familiar with 
the non-visual features of this item?’) and whether the item had a clear characteristic 
motion (‘Is there a characteristic or typical motion associated with how this item 
moves/is moved?’). The responses indicated that the animal and artefact stimuli were 
matched on general familiarity (p=0.610) and visual representativeness of the image 
(p=0.726). On the other hand, participants were conceptually more familiar with 
artefacts (4.38 ± 0.40) than with animals (3.77 ± 0.72; t(9)=4.727, p<0.05), and 
participants described the artefacts (4.64 ± 0.19) as having a clearer characteristic 
motion than the animals (3.92 ± 0.47; t(9)=5.98, p<0.05). These data suggest that 
while visually the two categories of stimuli did not differ, there appeared to be a 
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familiarity bias and bias on motion knowledge favouring the artefacts at the 
conceptual level.  
 
3A.2.3.	  Design	  and	  Procedure	  
A full factorial within-participant design was adopted, with the following factors: 
Knowledge/Task type (action knowledge, conceptual knowledge) and Semantic 
category (animals, artefacts). The non-sensorimotor conceptual knowledge task 
prompted the participants to contemplate the semantic characteristics of an object 
and specifically required them to decide whether an item is foreign to Europe. In 
other words, to detect an animal that is not originally living in the natural habitat of 
Europe (e.g. kangaroo, camel) or an artefact not socially recognised as originating 
from Europe (e.g. maracas, chopsticks). The action knowledge task prompted 
participants to engage in processes related to action perception and specifically 
required them to make a judgement on whether an object item typically performed a 
vertical motion. Participants had to detect an animal that moved around primarily with 
vertical motion such as hopping (e.g. kangaroo, grasshopper), or an artefact that is 
used functionally by primarily moving one’s forearm vertically up and down (e.g. 
maracas, hammer). The expected occurrence of these target images was rare (~10% 
in each task). Task was manipulated across blocks, with four blocks for each task, 
and the order of the blocks was randomised. The same stimuli set was used for both 
tasks. Each block started with presenting the phrase “Respond only to the objects 
that are from outside Europe” or “Respond to the objects that typically perform 
vertical (arm) motion” for 5 sec. In addition, an inter-stimulus fixation shape was used 
to remind participants of the relevant task (“O” for from outside Europe and “V” for 
vertical movement). Semantic category was manipulated as an event (i.e. both 
animals and artefacts were presented in the same block). There were 13-15 events 
in each block appearing in a random order. Each event began with a 500-msec 
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fixation, followed by a stimulus image for 2500 msec. Events were separated by an 
inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 500-4000 msec. The stimuli presented for each 
participant in each task were randomly chosen from the 120-item list. There were at 
least 26 different events (items) for each of the 4 conditions (2 tasks X 2 stimulus 
categories), with around 3 events being the targets that require an actual response. 
Thus, for each participant a different subset of stimuli was randomly presented in 
each task but this was counterbalanced across participants. It is noteworthy that the 
target events were rare and the actual events of interest (i.e. non-target stimuli) did 
not require a response; hence, any responses in motor-associated regions cannot be 
simply attributed to hand movements. The experiment was realised using the open 
source software package PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007, 2008), written in Python language 
(http://www.psychopy.org). The experiment was run in two fMRI scans. Prior to the 
actual experiment, a practice session using a different set of stimuli (with 8 animals 
and 8 artefacts) was conducted and all participants indicated that they understood 
the tasks at the end of the practice. 
 
3A.2.4	  MRI	  Data	  Acquisition	  
A 3-Tesla Phillips Achieva scanner and a 32-channel phase-array head coil (sense 
factor =2.05) placed inside Birmingham University Imaging Center were used to 
acquire all MRI images. Functional whole brain scanning generated BOLD, contrast-
weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence images (38 slices, 2.5 × 2.5 mm in-
plane resolution, 2-mm thick, 1-mm gap between slices, flip angle 80°, TE = 35 msec, 
TR = 2400 msec). The EPI images were acquired in an ascending interleaved order. 
Before actual data acquisition, 4 dummy/preparation scans were run and they were 
not included in further analyses. We also obtained a field map of the same geometry 
as the EPI and a T1-weighted high-resolution (1x1x1mm3) scan for each subject for 
anatomical localisation. 
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3A.2.5	  MRI	  Data	  Analysis	  
The data were analysed with SPM12 (Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, London; www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~spm). Preprocessing of the data 
included correction of head motion (Ashburner & Friston, 2003a) and distortion-by-
motion interactions, taking also into account the correction of magnetic field 
inhomogeneities (spatial realignment and unwrapped; Andersson, Hutton, Ashburner, 
Turner, & Friston, 2001). This was followed by co-registering the structural image 
(T1) to the EPI data; and then segmenting the structural and EPI data based on a 
multi-channel approach. The segmented grey and white matter images were used to 
generate a DARTEL template, to which the EPI images of all the subjects were 
warped on. Finally the DARTEL template and the EPI images were normalised to 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) standard space (Ashburner & Friston, 2003b), 
re-sliced to 3 × 3 × 3 mm voxels, and smoothed by using a Gaussian kernel of a 
resolution of 9 x 9 x 9mm to account for residual intersubject differences and to 
comply with the continuity assumption of random field theory (Worsley & Friston, 
1995).  
 
Summary statistics (Penny, Holmes, & Friston, 2003) using the general linear 
framework were performed to test the reliability of the effects across participants 
(Kiebel & Holmes, 2003). First, at the individual level the effect of each condition was 
estimated across the two scan sessions. For each participant, we generated a model 
that included the stimulus’ onset in each trial of the four different experimental 
conditions (2 stimulus categories x 2 tasks). The ‘catch’ trials were modelled 
separately to ensure that the results were not affected by the requirement to make a 
motor response to these trials. To account for the delay in the hemodynamic function, 
these regressors were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response 
function. Finally, the six realignment parameters, the order of the scan (first or 
second), and the harmonic modelling of slow fluctuations in the signal (low-pass 
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frequency) with a cut-off of 1/128 Hz (typically associated with biological and scanner 
noise) were also included in each subject’s model. To test for consistent effects 
across individuals, a random effect analysis was conducted, treating participants as a 
random variable. In this second-level analysis, maps depicting the effect size per 
condition were treated as repeated measures and the subject effect was also 
modelled.  
 
We report here all the results where there was a significant effect at p<0.05 cluster-
level corrected for multiple comparisons with the amplitude of voxels surviving Z-
score >3.1 uncorrected across the whole brain and an extent threshold of at least 50 
voxels (the ‘expected voxels in a cluster’ by chance estimated by SPM is 4). 
Anatomical labelling was achieved with reference to the Anatomical Automatic 
Labeling toolbox (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) and the Duvernoy Human Brain Atlas 
(Duvernoy et al., 1991). The descriptive bar plots in the figures are based on the 
estimated effect size (beta values) computed in the general linear model. These 
values were extracted from a 6-mm-radius sphere centred on the group peaks. 
 
3A.3. Study 1 – An fMRI experiment: Results 
3A.3.1.	  Behavioural	  Results	  
The accuracy of target detection in the fMRI participants was 94.2% (SD=.011) for 
the conceptual task and 85.2% (SD=.024) for the action task. Regardless of the 
tasks, the accuracy of detecting the artefact items (91.3%, SD=.017) was slightly 
greater than the animal items (88.1%, SD=.019). A two-way repeated-measure 
ANOVA yielded significant main effects of Knowledge type [F(1,19)=24.65, p<0.0001] 
and Semantic category [F(1,19)=4.54, p=0.046] in reference to the p-threshold of 
0.05 (though the effect of Semantic category is arguably small relative to that of 
Knowledge type). The Category*Knowledge interaction was also shown to be 
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significant [F(1,19)=6.634, p=0.019] since the artefact items were responded most 
accurately in the conceptual task (97.6%, SD=0.09) compared to all other conditions 
([Animals, Conceptual]=90.8%, SD=0.017; [Animals, Action]=85.5%, SD=0.027; 
[Artefacts, Action]=85.0%, SD=0.026). An ANOVA on reaction times revealed a 
slightly different pattern of results. A main effect of semantic category was found 
[F(1,18)=11.46, p=0.003] due to shorter RTs for animals (1.230 sec, SD=0.039) than 
for artefacts (1.429 sec, SD=0.049). In contrast, there was no significant difference 
[F(1,18)=2.881, p=0.107] in RTs between the conceptual (1.287 sec, SD=0.045) and 
the action (1.372 sec, SD=0.038) knowledge tasks.  
 
Putting both sets of measure together in comarison, there appears a trade-off 
between accuracy and speed across the stimulus categories, in which animal items 
were processed more quickly yet target detection accuracy was slightly more 
compromised than the artefact items. Similarly, there was an indication of a trade-off 
for the knowledge type, as overall reaction times were comparable between the two 
types of knowledge but responses in the conceptual task were more accurate than in 
the action task.  
 
3A.3.6	  Neuroimaging	  Results	  
The main effects of knowledge type (Table 3.1, Figure 3.1) 
The type of the task had an impact on neural activity. The task tapping non-
sensorimotor conceptual knowledge, compared with action knowledge decision, was 
associated with greater responses in the left anterior temporal gyrus as well as along 
the inferior section of the bilateral parieto-occipital fissures (POF) and the adjacent 
posterior cingulate gyrus (PCG). In addition, trials requiring conceptual knowledge 
uniquely activated an area in the middle cingulate gyrus (MCG; it can still be 
considered as part of the posterior half of the cingulate cortex) and the posterior end 
of the insula gyrus bilaterally, the right angular gyrus, the right superior frontal gyrus, 
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and the bilateral ventromedial prefrontal cortex.  
 
 
Table 3.1: The main effects of knowledge type 
 Cluster  Peak  Coordinates  Activated brain regions 
 Size  (Z-score)  x y z   
Conceptual knowledge > Action knowledge 
 159**  5.48  33 -15 9  Right insular cortex (overlay putamen) 
 737**  4.82  -9 -60 6  Bilateral inferior POF & PCG 
 147**  4.7  21 45 42  Right superior frontal gyrus 
 133**  4.5  -3 63 -12  Bilateral ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
 62**  4.32  -63 -6 -15  Left anterior middle temporal gyrus 
 111**  4.28  -60 -12 15  Left insular cortex 
 50**  4.11  -9 0 51  Bilateral mid-cingulate gyrus 
 86**  4.11  51 -60 33  Right angular gyrus 
Action knowledge > Conceptual knowledge 
 979**  6.65  -60 -36 36  Along the left PostCS covering nearby 
SPL, IPL and IPS 
 236**  6.45  -57 -60 -6  Left posterior middle & inferior 
temporal lobe 
 197**  6.42  -45 3 24  Left ventral premotor cortex 
 232**  5.25  -21 3 57  Left dorsal premotor cortex 
 81**  5.19  27 -66 -30  Right cerebellum crus 1 
 234**  4.67  -51 42 0  Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
Abbreviations: POF,parieto-occipital fissure; PCG, posterior cingulate gyrus; PostCS, 
postcentral sulcus; SPL, superior parietal lobule; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; IPS, 
intraparietal sulcus. **significant at p<0.05, one-tailed, whole brain FWE-corrected 
 
 
Conversely, the task demanding the retrieval of action knowledge (relative to 
conceptual knowledge) modulated activity in a fronto-parieto-temporal network in the 
left hemisphere. In the parietal cortex, increased activation was noted along the 
postcentral sulcus (PostCS) reaching anteriorly into the postcentral gyrus and 
posteriorly into the superior and inferior parietal lobules (SPL; IPL), plus the anterior 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS). In the temporal cortex, increased activation was found in 
the lateral posterior middle and inferior gyri; greater frontal activity was also recorded 
in separated areas of the dorsal and ventral part of the premotor cortex (dPMC; 
vPMC), along with a cluster in the left ventrolateral prefrontal lobe. Moreover, the 
action knowledge decision task also led to an increase in right cerebellar activity. 
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Figure 3.1. The main effects of knowledge type 
 
SPM blobs overlaid on a T1 single-subject template. Foci showing stronger responses in the 
action decision task are depicted in green; foci showing stronger responses in the conceptual 
decision task are depicted in red. The bars show the averaged effect size extracted from a 6-
mm sphere around the group maxima. Error bars depict SEMs. *Asterisk indicates significant 
difference (t-test, corrected for multiple comparisons). R = right; L = left; 1 = Posterior 
Cingulate Gyrus; 2 = Middle Cingulate Gyrus; 3 = L posterior Middle Temporal Gyrus; 4 = L 
Intraparietal Sulcus; 5 = L dorsal Premotor Cortex. 
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The main effects of semantic category (Table 3.2, Figure 3.2) 
Viewing animals (versus artefacts) elicited extensive activity in the posterior occipital 
cortices bilaterally, covering the primary visual areas and extending dorsally into 
other extrastriate regions and ventrally into the basal temporal cortex. In addition, 
greater activity to animals was recorded in the left lateral anterior temporal pole, as 
well as along the bilateral POF and the neighbouring PCG. Note that increased 
activations in the anterior temporal and PCG regions were also reported (in the last 
section) when participants were specifically engaged in the conceptual knowledge 
decision (regardless of the kind of the stimulus presented) (cf. Figures 3.1 & 3.4). 
 
Table 3.2: The main effects of semantic category 
 Cluster  Peak  Coordinates  Activated brain regions 
 Size  (Z-score)  x y z   
Animals > Artefacts 
 2999**  >8.0  6 -93 9  Bilateral posOC that extend 
ventrally into the basal surface of 
posTC  
 423**  4.51  12 -51 12  Bilateral inferior POF & PCG 
 84**  4.13  -54 0 -21  Left lateral anterior temporal pole 
Artefacts > Animals 
 1051**  7.32  -33 -48 63  Along the left PostCS covering 
nearby SPL, IPL and IPS 
 304**  >8.0  -48 -63 0  Left posterior middle & inferior 
temporal lobe 
 172**  5.89  -45 3 24  Left ventral premotor cortex 
 132**  5.85  -27 -9 54  Left dorsal premotor cortex 
 56**  4.81  36 -36 45  Right intraparietal sulcus 
Abbreviations: posOC, posterior occipital cortex; posTC, posterior temporal cortex; POF, 
parieto-occipital fissure; PCG, posterior cingulate gyrus; PostCS, postcentral gyrus; SPL, 
superior parietal lobule; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; IPS, intraparietal sulcus. **significant at 







Figure 3.2. The main effects of semantic category 
 
SPM blobs overlaid on a T1 single-subject template. Foci showing stronger responses to 
animals are depicted in magenta; foci showing stronger responses to artefacts are depicted 
in blue. Also refer to Figure 3.1. for other guidelines on viewing the images. R = right; L = left; 
1 = Bilateral posterior Occipital Cortex; 2 = Posterior Cingulate Gyrus; 3 = L posterior Middle 
Temporal Gyrus; 4 = L Intraparietal Sulcus; 5 = L dorsal Premotor Cortex 
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In contrast, the processing of manipulable artefacts (relative to animals) led to 
augmented neuronal responses in a left parieto-frontal network and the posterior 
temporal lobe. Specifically, a stronger parietal response was shown along the 
PostCS and its surrounding structures encompassing the postcentral gyrus as well 
as the anterior section of the SPL, IPL, together with IPS. In the frontal lobe, greater 
activation was located in the dPMC and vPMC. In the temporal lobe increased 
activation was noted in the lateral posterior part of mainly the inferior and middle gyri. 
Interestingly, this left fronto-parieto-temporal network corresponded largely to the one 
observed (in the last section) when participants were specifically involved in action 
knowledge judgments (regardless of the kind of the stimulus presented) (cf. Figures 
3.1 & 3.4). Additionally, a small area covering the right IPS was also found more 
activated during observation of artefacts.   
 
The interaction effects (Table 3.3, Figure 3.3) 
Finally, the analyses also revealed regions that were sensitive to the interaction 
between knowledge type and sematic category. Considering only the artefacts in 
particular, accessing conceptual knowledge compared to action knowledge 
augmented activity in the anterior temporal lobe, the posterior end of the insular 
cortex and the angular gyrus bilaterally. Stronger neuronal responses were also 
revealed in the inferior part of POF extending into the PCG and MCG when the task 
particularly demanded conceptual knowledge (versus action knowledge) about 
artefacts. On the other hand, retrieval of action knowledge (relative to conceptual 







Figure 3.3. Semantic-category-By-knowledge-type interaction 
 
SPM blobs overlaid on a T1 single-subject template. Foci showing stronger knowledge type 
effects (action > conceptual) in artefacts compared with animals are depicted in green; foci 
showing the reversed pattern are depicted in red. Also refer to Figure 3.1. for other 
guidelines on viewing the images. R = right; L = left; 1 = Posterior Cingulate Gyrus; 2 = L 
angular gyrus; 3 = L Insula; 4 = L Anterior Temporal Lobe; 5 = L ventral Premotor Cortex 
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Table 3.3: Knowledge-type-by-sematic-category interaction 
 Cluster  Peak  Coordinates  Activated brain regions 
 Size  (Z-score)  x y z   
Int: Artefacts, Conceptual > Action & Animals, Action > Conceptual 
 535**  4.91  36 -12 9  Right posterior insular cortex 
   4.78  48 -51 33  Right angular gyrus 
 824**  4.76  6 -18 36  Bilateral mid to PCG & inferior 
POF 
 212**  4.26  -54 -9 6  Left posterior insular cortex 
   4.21  -51 0 -18  Left anterior temporal lobe 
 133**  4.09  -45 -54 33  Left angular gyrus 
 85**  3.82  51 -9 -12  Right anterior temporal lobe 
Int: Artefacts, Action > Conceptual & Animals, Conceptual > Action 
 84**  4.16  -45 6 24  Left ventral premotor cortex 
Abbreviations: PCG, posterior cingulate gyrus; POF, parieto-occipital fissure.  





Figure 3.4. Overview of the fMRI results. All main effects and interaction effects are 




3B.2. Study 2 – A VBM study: Methods 
3B.2.1.	  Subjects	  
The analysis performed in this section was based on the behavioural data and 
structural scans of the same 247 patients reported in Chapter 2. 
 
3B.2.2.	  Stimuli	  
All patients were administered a naming test comprising a set of black-and-white line 
drawings of living and nonliving items, from the BCoS Cognitive Screen. There were 
7 living things including 2 animals, 3 fruits and 2 vegetables. Comparably there were 
7 nonliving artefacts consisting of 2 tools, 1 kitchen implement and 4 other household 
implements. Further information about this naming task (including detailed 
administration and scoring procedures) is reported in Chapter 5. For the analysis in 
this section, we computed for each patient two naming scores, one on each kind of 
semantic entity (living and nonliving).  
 
3B.2.3.	  Imaging	  Analysis	  
Details about the acquisition and preprocessing procedures on the patients’ brain 
images have been described in Chapter 2.  
In the VBM analysis, a covariate-only statistical model was created in SPM8 to 
evaluate at each voxel the correlations between naming scores on each type of 
semantic category and grey matter volumes. Results would be interpreted as lesions 
(i.e. brain regions in terms of clusters of voxels) in which voxel-level signal intensities 
in the cluster were significantly correlated with the naming deficits. We entered in the 
same model the two naming scores from each patient so that the analysis of a 
particular type of semantic category would control for performance on the other. The 
following measures were also included as nuisance covariates: age, gender, years of 
education, interval between the dates of stroke and CT scan, interval between the 
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dates of stroke and cognitive testing, and measures of general cognitive state.  
Statistical parametric maps were computed with a voxel-wise threshold of p<0.005 
(uncorrected across the whole brain) and a cluster volume of at least 300 voxels 
(expected voxels per cluster by chance as predicted by SPM is 165).  
 
3B.3. Study 2 – A VBM study: Results 
3B.3.1.	  Neuroimaging	  Results	  
The general naming effect is discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis, which has a 
specific focus on patients’ naming impairment and its relation to other speech 
production impediments.   
 
Category-specific effects 
The unique deficits for living things were correlated to lesions in various parts of the 
left occipital cortex including a cluster in the most inferior basal area, one in the 
lateral superior section of BA18, and one centred on the superior part of the medial 
parieto-occipital sulcus. Apart from the visual areas, living things were also 
associated with the superior aspect of the left anterior temporal pole extending into 
the nearby insula and inferior frontal gyrus. Comparably, the fMRI experiment in 
Study 1 (Section 3A.3) also observed greater activity in the anterior temporal lobe 
and the visual cortex in response to animals (relative to manipulable artefacts), 
though the exact foci appear to be slightly different.  
 
Performance on the nonliving items was uniquely linked to the grey matter integrity in 
the left posterior superior and middle temporal gyri, the inferior parietal lobule, and a 
cluster in the posterior end of the medial temporal cortex extending into the 
surrounding white matters. Besides, nonliving items were found to be associated with 
the right thalamus. These results are summarised in Table 3b.1 and illustrated 
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pictorially in Figure 3B.1. The left posterior temporal lobe and the inferior parietal 
lobule in particular were also shown to be more activated for manipulable artefacts 
(contrasted with animals) in the fMRI study reported in Study 1 (Section 3A.3). 
 
Table 3B.1: Results of the VBM correlation analysis. Neuroanatomical correlates of 
the naming deficits for living vs. nonliving things 
 Cluster  Peak  Coordinates  Activated brain regions 
 Size  (Z-
score) 
 x y z   
Living > Nonliving 
 1365  3.82  -30 -79 -21  Left basal occipital cortex extending 
into cerebellum 
 996  4.48  -9 -73 48  Left superior parieto-occipital sulcus 
 965  3.31  -38 12 -15  Left superior ATP extending into 
insula and inferior frontal cortex 
 760  3.27  -33 -84 16  Left occipital lobe (BA18) 
Nonliving > Living 
 735  3.36  -22 -60 10  Left medial posterior temporal cortex 
extending into nearby white matters 
 701  3.11  12 -7 27  Right thalamus 
 612  3.75  -64 -34 31  Left inferior parietal lobe 




Figure 3B.1: The VBM results. Neuroanatomical correlates of naming deficits for 
living vs. nonliving things 
 
Abbreviations: ATP, anterior temporal pole; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; bOC, basal occipital 
cortex; IPL, inferior parietal lobe; pMTG, posterior middle temporal gyrus; L, left; R, right. 
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3.4. Discussion 
The current study used a factorial design to evaluate the neural representation of 
action and conceptual knowledge across two types of semantic entities, namely 
animals and artefacts. 
 
Our key imaging results indicated that some cerebral regions were preferentially 
activated during retrieval of a specific type of knowledge tapped by each 
experimental task. Moreover, close correspondence was observed between a 
particular kind of semantic category and a specific type of knowledge, instantiated at 
the neural level. By comparing the patterns of neural activations, our data suggest 
that processing of animals tends to be more weighted towards retrieval of conceptual 
knowledge, which is mediated mainly by the anterior temporal and PCG activations. 
On the other hand, processing of artefacts is likely more reliant on retrieval of action 
knowledge, mediated primarily by the activities in a frontoparietal network and the 
posterior temporal lobe.  Refer to Figure 3.4.  
 
3.4.1.	  The	  Neural	  Differentiation	  between	  Action	  and	  Conceptual	  Knowledge	  
The unique effect of action retrieval 
In direct comparison with conceptual decision, action decision highlighted a left 
frontoparietal cerebral network comprising separated areas in the dorsal and ventral 
PMC and the more anterior part of the SPL, IPL and IPS, as well as the posterior 
temporal cortex. Correspondingly, the analysis of interaction effects also revealed the 
ventral PMC for action over conceptual decision when only the artefact entities were 
considered.   
 
Broadly speaking, the extensive involvement of the premotor and parietal cortices, 
forming the major part of the dorsal network (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Goodale et al., 
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1994), is in keeping with their associated roles in action organisation and 
sensorimotor transformation underlying object use. This view was initially propelled 
by neuropsychological observations of double dissociations between object-directed 
actions and semantic knowledge of objects (Hodges et al., 1999; James et al., 2003; 
Jeannerod et al., 1994; Riddoch et al., 1989; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987). Evidence 
from neurophysiological investigations also confirm that the frontoparietal network is 
constituted of a mosaic of areas, with each receiving and processing specific sensory 
signals (see Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001 for a review). As a whole the network forms 
internal motor representations, preparing for actual execution and allowing for 
understanding of actions (Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001). 
 
A more recent proposal posits that there is more than one dorsal stream. This idea 
stems from the observation of two parallel dissociable parieto-frontal circuits in 
macaque monkeys, with the dorso-dorsal pathway leading from visual area V6 over 
the superior parietal lobule towards the dorsal premotor cortex and the ventro-dorsal 
pathway running from areas MT/MST (middle temporal and medial superior temporal 
areas) through the inferior parietal lobule to the ventral premotor cortex (Rizzolatti & 
Matelli, 2003; Rossetti, Pisella, & Vighetto, 2003). The dorso-dorsal pathway is 
relevant for quick ‘online’ sensorimotor control of the postural alignment of different 
body parts while the ventral-dorsal pathway is thought to contain long-term 
representations specialised for the processing of learned, skilled movements such as 
tool use. The widespread premotor and parietal activations during our action 
judgment task likely reflect involvement of multiple ongoing functions related to action 
processing. In this task participants selected and responded to animals and artefacts 
that typically move with certain patterns (repetitive vertical movements). They had to 
retrieve the stored action engrams (motor or movement blueprint, Rijntjes et al., 
1999) of the characteristic movements of animals and of the skilled manual actions 
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with tools, and they might also have formed corresponding motor imageries or 
performed mental simulation. A recent fMRI and multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) 
study shows that patterns of activity within the premotor and parietal cortex 
differentiate between different types of imagined actions, suggesting that these 
regions represent or carry information regarding the content of motor imagery 
(Pilgramm et al., 2015). During action observation, there are also specific premotor 
and parietal activation sites that respond strongly when limb actions differ in terms of 
their action goals (Lorey et al., 2014). The intraparietal sulcus in particular is often 
associated with grasp execution (Binkofski et al., 1998; Frey, Vinton, Norlund, & 
Grafton, 2005), observation (Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti, 1996) and imagery 
(Shikata et al., 2003). It has also been implicated in representation of intended action 
goals. Viewing actions with repeated goals compared to novel goals decrease 
neuronal response in IPS (Hamilton & Grafton, 2006), and disruption to this area 
using TMS slows down correction of hand action to conform to a new goal (Tunik, 
Frey, & Grafton, 2005). Considering that our participants were likely to contemplate 
how animals move typically for locomotion and how tools are moved usually for 
function, the IPS along with other areas in the frontoparietal network may provide an 
important contribution to relevant goal-guiding processing in the current action task.  
 
The lateral posterior temporal lobe (LPTL), especially the middle part, is also 
sensitive to action-related information (Fiez, Raichle, Balota, Tallal, & Petersen, 
1996; Kable, Kan, Wilson, Thompson-Schill, & Chatterjee, 2005; Martin, Haxby, 
Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995; Warburton et al., 1996). It is activated when 
actions are observed, for example when individuals view hand gestures in motion 
pictures compared to static images (Decety et al., 1994; Grezes, 1998), or even 
when actions are implied, for instance when still images capturing athletes running 
and objects falling are contrasted with similar images which are not suggestive of any 
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motion (Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000; Senior et al., 2000). Moreover, its functional 
activity is shown stronger when the retrieval of action knowledge is demanded over 
perceptual-size knowledge across tools, fruits and vegetables (Phillips et al., 2002). 
Damage to LPTL and IPL (as well as other premotor and parietal regions) results in 
impaired performance on tests of action concepts (Tranel, Kemmerer, Adolphs, 
Damasio, & Damasio, 2003). The LPTL together with the IPL and vPMC, as part of 
the hypothesised ventro-dorsal route, are likely working together to facilitate the 
performance and representation of skilled movements (Buxbaum & Kalénine, 2010; 
Buxbaum, Kyle, Grossman, & Coslett, 2007; Vingerhoets, 2008). 
 
Altogether these results are in line with other functional imaging findings that also 
show greater activity mainly in the premotor and parietal cortex when action concepts 
are emphasised relative to functional concepts of tools (Boronat et al., 2005; 
Canessa et al., 2008; Q. Chen et al., 2015; Kellenbach et al., 2003). Yet, one novel 
aspect is that our action knowledge decision task did not emphasise only the hand 
motions (in tool use), since for animal entities participants needed to retrieve the 
action representations related to the animal’s locomotion, which involves more 
motion of the lower limbs (or the whole body). Therefore, adding to the existing 
literature that is predominated by investigations on hand and arm motions, our data 
affirm that the action representation network would also accommodate the more 
general bodily movements.  
 
Greater activation for action retrieval was noted in the right cerebellum in our study, 
as well as in the study of Phillips et al. (2002), which compared action relative to 
perceptual-size retrieval. Phillips et al. (2002) attributed the cerebellar activity to a 
non-specified cognitive component of general task performance rather than a specific 
effect of action knowledge retrieval. Here, we specifically propose that the greater 
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cerebellar activity during action conditions is possibly due to the processes related to 
motor imagery, be it automatically or deliberately generated. Internally simulated 
hand movement has been shown to activate the (ipsilateral) right cerebellum (Naito 
et al., 2002), which has an implicated role in kinesthetic sensation (illusion) (Bastian, 
Martin, Keating, & Thach, 1996; Haggard, Jenner, & Wing, 1994). 
 
The unique effect of conceptual retrieval 
In the opposite contrast, conceptual judgment (versus action) recruits uniquely more 
midline structures such as the mid- and posterior cingulate gyrus and the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, as well as the left anterior temporal lobe and other 
temporoparietal areas. Except for the prefrontal brain areas, our analysis of the 
interaction effects also generated very similar pattern of activations for conceptual 
over action judgment for the artefacts alone. The findings of greater activations in the 
PCG and anterior temporal lobe, in particular, corroborate well with past fMRI studies 
when functional properties were more emphasised than action properties of tools 
(Canessa et al., 2008; Q. Chen et al., 2015).  
 
The PCG has been associated with episodic memory processing (Andreasen et al., 
1995; Grasby et al., 1993; Henson, Rugg, Shallice, Josephs, & Dolan, 1999; 
Maddock, Garrett, & Buonocore, 2001) and damage to this structure results in verbal 
memory deficits (Valenstein et al., 1987). In addition, the link between PCG activity 
and episodic encoding is observed in functional imaging studies (Shallice et al., 
1994). Based on Bar and Aminoff (2003)’s proposal, the PCG has a specific role in 
analysing and possibly forming abstract contextual associations of tools but Chen et 
al. (2015) argued that PCG is also involved in processing object function (the 
purpose for which a tool is designed). Our study tends to suggest that the information 
analysed by the PCG may be as broad as encyclopaedic knowledge that includes 
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also an animal/object’s place of origin (or habitat) in additional to object function.  
 
Elevated activation in the anterior temporal lobe during conceptual compared with 
action judgment is in agreement with the central role of this region for representing 
abstract conceptual knowledge (Bozeat, Lambon Ralph, Patterson, Garrard, & 
Hodges, 2000; Garrard & Carroll, 2006; Jefferies & Lambon Ralph, 2006; McClelland 
& Rogers, 2003; Rogers et al., 2004; Spitsyna, Warren, Scott, Turkheimer, & Wise, 
2006). Previous neuropsychological cases have shown gross conceptual 
impairments in patients with anterior temporal lobe neurodegeneration (semantic 
dementia) or infection (herpes simplex encephalitis), who usually retain relatively 
intact ability to act with common objects (Bozeat et al., 2002; Buxbaum et al., 1997; 
Hodges et al., 1999; Lauro-Grotto et al., 1997). It has been suggested that ATL 
serves as a semantic hub that integrates modality-specific information distributed 
over the whole brain (for example from the PCG) through its diffuse modality-specific 
circuits (Binney, Embleton, Jefferies, Parker, & Ralph, 2010; Lambon Ralph & 
Patterson, 2008; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007). Considering that the factual 
concept about the geographical origin of an animal or a tool may arise from or trigger 
retrieval of various features of that animal or tool (e.g. camouflage body colour and 
roaring sound of a lion, slender bodies of chopsticks to hold noodles), our current 
data fit well with the proposed role of the ATL as a semantic integration hub.  
 
(Pre-)frontal and other activations 
Beyond the premotor cortex, specific (pref)-frontal activations were also observed for 
each decision task and these activations are likely due to differential demands 
imposed by the task. We observed left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) for 
action (relative to conceptual) judgment, which does not correspond with previous 
studies that found greater VLPFC activations for tasks demanding more semantic 
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inputs (Fiez et al., 1996; Gabrieli, Poldrack, & Desmond, 1998), but it is consistent 
with other studies that also found similar activations for a variety of (generic) non-
semantic tasks (Duncan & Owen, 2000). Some researchers have proposed that the 
left VLPFC may serve a more general purpose in facilitating execution of various 
cognitive tasks rather than contributing specifically to accessing semantic memory 
(Kan, Kable, Van Scoyoc, Chatterjee, & Thompson-Schill, 2006; Thompson-Schill, 
2003). Zannino et al. (2009) argued that increased activity in this region is likely 
linked to task difficulty. This is somewhat supported by our accuracy data, in which 
participants are less accurate overall when making judgment involving action 
knowledge compared to conceptual knowledge (given that the response times for the 
two types of judgment are more or less the same). 
 
Conceptual judgment (vs action judgment) activated the right superior frontal gyrus 
and the bilateral ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). Although some past fMRI 
studies have reported the involvement of the superior frontal gyrus in semantic 
decision tasks such as judgment about persons (Mitchell, Heatherton, & Macrae, 
2002), naming of unique persons (Damasio, Tranel, Grabowski, Adolphs, & Damasio, 
2004), and matching animal words (minus action words) (Kable et al., 2005), the 
activations are usually confined to the left hemisphere. Further investigation is 
needed to verify whether and how this particular area in the right brain functions to 
facilitate conceptual retrieval. On the other hand, VMPFC has been previously 
implicated in response inhibition and stimulus-based switching of attention 
(Szatkowska, Szymańska, Bojarski, & Grabowska, 2007). Its damage can lead to 
utilisation behaviour, with which individuals have difficulty controlling the impulse to 
manipulate objects that are in their sight, at an ‘inappropriate’ time (Lhermitte, Pillon, 
& Serdaru, 1986; Lhermitte, 1983; Shallice, Burgess, Schon, & Baxter, 1989). With 
respect to memory retrieval, it has been suggested that this medial frontal structure 
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plays a pivotal role in suppressing irrelevant memories (Schnider, 2003; Treyer, 
Buck, & Schnider, 2003). Another possible explanation for the involvement of the 
ventromedial frontal cortex during our conceptual decision task is related to other 
increased activations also observed in some parts of the PCG and the (right) angular 
gyrus. Indeed, these structures altogether make up the so-called ‘default mode 
network’ (Greicius et al., 2008; Vincent et al., 2006), which is usually seen to be 
attenuated during a cognitively demanding, external task. Our accuracy data showed 
that participants responded less accurately during action decision compared to 
conceptual decision, implying that the action decision task may be more challenging 
to them. Consequently, these structures were shown relatively more activated during 
our conceptual task, which might be less demanding to the participants. Still, it is 
worth noting that, similar to the PCG and the ventromedial frontal cortex (whose 
potential roles in the retrieval of semantic memory have been discussed above), the 
angular gyrus is also mentioned in the studies of conceptual processing, word 
reading and comprehension, and memory retrieval (Seghier, 2012).  
 
3.4.2.	  The	  Category-­‐Specific	  Representations	  and	  their	  Relation	  with	  Type	  of	  
Knowledge	  	  
By comparing and matching the patterns of neural activations, we noticed 
correspondence between particular kinds of semantic category and specific types of 
knowledge retrieval.  
 
Neural system related to representation of artefacts 
In line with the property-based model for categorical specificity that emphasises 
differences between particular type of knowledge for animals (living things) and 
artefacts (nonliving things), our data showed that the retrieval of action knowledge 
and representation of manipulable artefacts have considerably large degree of neural 
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overlap in the left premotor-parietal network and posterior temporal lobe (Figure 3.4). 
Moreover, strikingly comparable results from the VBM study reported in Study 2 
(Section 3B.3, Figure 3B.1) also found that lesions to the posterior temporal lobe and 
a cluster in the inferior parietal lobule uniquely impaired naming of the nonliving 
(including mostly artefacts) category. The distinctive association between artefacts 
and their action knowledge is supported by behavioural data. Compared with 
contextual decision (Is this item found in the kitchen?), subjects make quicker 
response for action decision (Do you use this item with a pouring or twisting action?), 
suggesting preeminent access to action information about artefacts (Chainay & 
Humphreys, 2002). In addition, an accumulation of functional imaging experiments 
have shown activations in the premotor and inferior parietal brain areas by mere 
observation of object images or names (Chao & Martin, 2000; Chao, Weisberg, & 
Martin, 2002; Gerlach, Law, Gade, & Paulson, 2002; Grafton, Fadiga, Arbib, & 
Rizzolatti, 1997). The common explanation is that seeing a manipulable object 
automatically potentiates ‘use’ action, likely preparing the system for planning and 
executing the actual use of the object (Creem-Regehr & Lee, 2005; Grèzes et al., 
2003; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Tucker & Ellis, 1998).  
 
Neural system related to representation of animals 
Our study also found additive effect of animals and conceptual knowledge in the left 
anterior temporal lobe and PCG. In particular, damage to the left anterior areas in 
particular was also shown to specifically affect naming of the living things (relative to 
nonliving things) in the VBM analysis (Study 2, Section 3B.3, Figure 3B.1). As 
previously discussed, the anterior temporal lobe is involved in combining multiple 
semantic features, which are processed in other specific cerebral areas. The extent 
of its activation is proportional to the demand on semantic integration. Stimuli that 
potentially have more features in their semantic representations instigate greater 
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anterior temporal activity than their counterparts (Rogers et al., 2006; Zannino et al., 
2009). For example, Rogers et al. (2006) showed that the anterolateral temporal 
cortex is most strongly recruited when subjects perform specific classification 
(matching a dog with its specific name, ‘Labrador’) relative to more general 
classification (matching the dog with its superordinate name, ‘animal’). The specific 
tasks can be said to induce retrieval of more features for identifying the specific name 
of the stimulus. It has been suggested that representation of animals may require a 
greater degree of semantic (/featural) integration (see also Tranel, Logan, Frank, & 
Damasio, 1997), since neighbouring category members of animals (tiger, lion, 
leopard) are believed to have more semantic overlaps than tools (Devlin et al., 1998; 
McRae & Cree, 2002; Tyler, Moss, Durrant-Peatfield, & Levy, 2000) and hence 
relying more heavily on anterior temporal activity (Devlin et al., 2002). On the other 
hand, the PCG is not generally thought to be responsible for semantic integration but 
it specialises in the retrieval of episodic and encyclopedic information. Its involvement 
here, however, still supports that representation of animals, relative to tools, tends to 
have more conceptual emphasis.  
 
Increased neuronal responses in the occipital and occipito-temporal areas were 
unique for the animal trials, which is consistent with the notion that (photos of) 
animals tend to carry more visual-perceptual features compared with man-made 
objects (Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996; Perani et al., 1995). Similarly, 
damage to extensive areas in the visual cortex and the occipito-temporal cortex was 
linked to naming deficits specifically for the living entities, as reported in the VBM 
analysis (Study 2, Section 3B.3, Figure 3B.1). In past studies, this greater visual bias 
for animals was no longer seen when the complexity of visual input is controlled 
(Moore & Price, 1999) or when the stimuli are written words (Cappa et al., 1998; 
Mummery et al., 1998). We note that even had we controlled for the visual familiarity 
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and representativeness of the stimulus in the current study, the pictures of animals 
might still be more visually complex by nature than the pictures of artefacts. 
However, the conceptual question we asked required purely factual information and 
could not be retrieved from the visual-perceptual properties of the stimulus. For this 
reason, these visual and visual association areas were not noted in the analyses of 
conceptual (versus action) judgment and, by contrast, the increased ATL and PCG 
activations were arguably brought on by mainly purely conceptual processes.  
 
Lastly, comparing the two studies presented in this chapter, there were several areas 
that showed activation in the fMRI experiment that did not appear in the lesion 
analysis, or vice versa. The reasons for the differencing results can be multifold, 
including but not limited to the use of different tasks, stimuli and samples in the two 
studies. In the fMRI study healthy young adults were recruited to complete tasks on 
categorisation of animals and tools while in the lesion study stroke patients, who 
were also older adults, identified a variety of living and nonliving things in a naming 
task. Still, despite these various discrepancies, the overlapping brain areas identified 




The fMRI study reported in this chapter used a factorial design to investigate the 
relationship between different types of knowledge and different kinds of semantic 
entities. Our key findings converge with previous observations that a frontoparietal 
network is actively involved in action representation while medial brain areas and the 
anterior temporal lobe facilitates processing of conceptual knowledge. Yet, our 
investigation specifically demonstrated that these differential cerebral involvements 
between different types of knowledge are not confined to artefacts (tools) but can be 
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generalised across semantic categories (i.e. artefacts and animals). Moreover, based 
on the similarity of the pattern of neural activation, we concluded that representation 
of artefacts is heavily dependent on processing of action information whereas 
representation of animals tends to rely more on retrieval or integration of conceptual 
knowledge. This last result provides further support for the property-based theory for 
category-specific differentiation (Warrington & McCarthy, 1987; Warrington & 
Shallice, 1984). In a separate lesion study, we compared performance on recognition 
of living things versus nonliving things using a test of picture naming in a group of 
stroke patients. The voxel-based morphometric analysis on these patients’ 
behavioural and brain scan data revealed very comparable results as the main fMRI 
study. Overall, we provide convergent evidence across the two studies for 
dissociable neural representations between living things/animals and nonliving 
things/tools, broadly construed. 
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Chapter 4. A neural dissociation between body-referenced 
and world-referenced actions 
 
4.0. Abstract 
Previous neuropsychological studies documented some patients whose imitation 
performance were quite severely disturbed, particularly with gestures related to using 
a body-referenced object (toothbrushing) rather than those related to using a world-
referenced object (hammering). This fMRI study evaluated the modulatory effect of 
different types of action on cerebral activation during action observation. Twenty 
healthy individuals (the same sample reported in Chapter 3) were presented with a 
series of movies that showed a performer using two kinds of objects (i.e. body-
referenced, world-referenced). In each of these demonstration movies, the object 
could be used by the performer either in a meaningful (common) or a meaningless 
(uncommon) way. The main effects of object kind showed involvement mainly in 
different parts of the (parieto-)occipital cortex for the two different kinds of objects 
used, with an exceedingly greater extent of involvement in these areas for world-
referenced ( > body-referenced) objects. Moreover, the meaningfulness of action 
modulated neural responses in the anterior regions of bilateral parietal lobes and the 
right dorsal premotor cortex, which were more responsive during the observation of 
meaningless, compared with meaningful, actions. In contrast, meaningful action (> 
meaningless action) did not lead to any reliable activations. There were also 
interaction effects – viewing of the meaningful, typical use of world-reference (> 
body-referenced) objects uniquely elevated activity in the posterior visual cortex. On 
the other hand, viewing of the meaningful, typical use of body-referenced (> world-
referenced) objects excited bilaterally the posterior superior temporal sulcus and a 
lateral inferior occipital area (i.e. the occipital face area, OFA), as well as the 
posterior cingulate cortex.  
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4.1. Introduction 
Our daily life revolves around man-made objects with almost each of them created to 
serve (a) specific purpose(s) and used with a unique action. Mapping the neural 
network subserving actions associated with objects has been a key focus in 
neuroscience research over the past few decades. While a large body of literature 
has been devoted to determine the differential brain areas engaged in specific 
aspects of object use and actions, there is an absence of studies that directly 
compare various types of object-directed actions. 
 
Frames of reference for movement control 
One consideration in movement control concerns with the frame of reference, in 
which motor actions are guided and monitored (Blouin et al., 1993; Colby, 1998; 
Feldman & Levin, 1995; Paillard, 1991; Soechting & Flanders, 1992). In particular, an 
extrinsic frame and an intrinsic frame have always been brought into comparison. In 
the extrinsic frame for control, movements are specified in relation to locations in 
external space, such as the amplitude and direction of a movement path, and 
potentially have a particular emphasis on the hand and the limb (Gordon, Ghilardi, & 
Ghez, 1994; Vindras & Viviani, 1998). On the other hand, the intrinsic frame for 
control specifies movements in relation to body position, such as the changes in 
shoulder and elbow joint angles during reaching (Orban de Xivry et al., 2011; Reina, 
Moran, & Schwartz, 2001; Rosenbaum, Meulenbroek, Vaughan, & Jansen, 2001). 
Movement control is a dynamic process and it is generally held that both intrinsic and 
extrinsic frames are used, with the most appropriate one to be given more emphasis 
for a specific task (Kawato, 1996; Van Thiel, Meulenbroek, & Hulstijn, 1998). For 
instance, Ghafouri and colleagues (2002) demonstrated that movements to 
stationary items are guided in a frame relevant to the environment while movements 
to items moving along with the trunk are guided in a body-associated frame. 
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Critically, the nervous system is capable of adapting our behaviours through 
switching between different frames of reference depending on the task demands, 
within a reasonably short period of time (Ghafouri et al., 2002). 
 
Neuropsychological evidence suggesting different types of (object-related) 
actions 
Evidence from neuropsychological research also supports the view that different 
reference frames are brought into play according to the requirements of the task. 
Patients with ideomotor apraxia are commonly impaired in imitating body-referenced 
(meaningless) movements (Goldenberg & Hagmann, 1997; Sunderland, 2007), such 
as placing the palm on the nose, while maintain relatively normal performance on 
grasping static objects (Buxbaum, Johnson-Frey, et al., 2005; Haaland, Harrington, & 
Knight, 1999; Hermsdörfer, Ulrich, Marquardt, Goldenberg, & Mai, 1999). Such a 
unique pattern of impaired (and intact) action production can be explained by the 
different coordinate frames involved when performing the two types of action. 
Producing body-referenced (meaningless) movements may be more reliant on an 
intrinsic control process, for example stressing the coordination of joint rotations e.g. 
at elbow and shoulder, whereas grasping objects in the environment tends to focus 
on the trajectory of the hand movement between the starting position and that of the 
object, an extrinsic control property. Computational models taking these motion 
parameters into account have been shown to simulate the reaching action with 
success (Bullock & Grossberg, 1988; Bullock, Grossberg, & Guenther, 1993). On this 
account, patients with ideomotor apraxia are likely to possess intact extrinsic 
coordinate control but suffer with deficits in utilising intrinsic coordinate control, thus 
leading to more remarkable difficulties at performing body-referenced (meaningless) 
actions. Jax, Buxbaum and Moll (2006) assessed movement production in two 
groups of brain-injured patients, one with and one without ideomotor apraxia (IMA). 
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Based on lesion subtraction analysis, the IMA group was shown to have significantly 
greater damage in the inferior parietal lobule and the superior temporal lobe than the 
non-IMA group. Behaviourally, these authors showed that the IMA patients not only 
were more impaired overall in all movement imitation tasks, but, in keeping with the 
intrinsic control account, also showed disproportionately worse performance in 
producing movements to body-relative targets (e.g. grasping the earlobe) than to 
object-relative targets in the environment (e.g. grasping the handle of a mug). 
Similarly, Halsband et al. (2001) asked patients with parietal or premotor lesions to 
imitate pantomimed gestures (i.e. gestures demonstrating how an object is usually 
used in a common, typical way, without the actual object in hand). Among these 
patients, those with damage in the left parietal cortex were most severely disturbed 
on imitation performance, particularly with gestures acted on their own body (tooth 
brushing) rather than with gestures acted out in extrapersonal space (hammering). 
The last two studies in particular suggest directly a potential distinction in the 
mechanisms underlying the use of body-referenced and non-body-referenced (or 
world-referenced) objects. 
 
Representation of the other person’s action 
Early models of apraxia have noted that patients can exhibit not only deficits in action 
production but also in comprehension (e.g., Heilman, Rothi, & Valenstein, 1982; 
Rothi, Ochipa, & Heilman, 1991; Rothi, Heilman, & Watson, 1985). Evidence 
supporting this view is found in recent studies that have reported a strong, reliable 
correlation between action perception and production in groups of brain-damaged 
patients (Buxbaum, Kyle, & Menon, 2005; Negri et al., 2007; Pazzaglia, Smania, 
Corato, & Aglioti, 2008; and Chapter 2 of this thesis), although there is also evidence 
that these abilities can be dissociated (Negri et al., 2007; Chapter 2 of this thesis). In 
healthy individuals it has been shown that observation of actions related to object use 
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triggers generation of internal motor representation. In a simple object categorisation 
task devised by van Elk and collaborators (2009), participants viewed photos of an 
actor holding a common object and they were asked to decide for each presented 
object whether it would typically be used by being brought towards the body (e.g. 
microphone) or not (e.g. pair of pincers). A special manipulation in van Elk el al.’s 
study was that the participants made their response by moving their forearm to press 
a button that was located either near or far from their body. These participants 
showed quicker responses by means of the movement most typically associated with 
using the object, for example they responded more quickly to an image of pincers 
with a movement away from their body (to press a further button). The results 
suggest that categorisation of the object tended to implicitly co-activate the 
corresponding inner motor programme, which was compared online with the actual 
arm movement.  
 
The effect of action type 
It is likely that, if the use of different types of objects relies on distinct underlying 
mechanisms, the distinction may also be present when viewing the actions 
associated with the different objects. Action observation has been linked to cortical 
processing across an extensive portion of the brain, comprising the premotor cortex, 
regions of the parietal and temporal lobes including the inferior parietal lobule, 
superior temporal sulcus, and temporoparietal junction, in fMRI studies using passive 
viewing, stimulus discrimination and viewing to imitate (Buccino et al., 2004; Calvo-
Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard, 2006; Grèzes, Costes, & Decety, 
1999; Grèzes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 2003; Hermsdörfer et al., 2001; Lotze 
et al., 2006). Due to the complex nature of an action stimulus and its processing, 
several past studies have attempted to differentiate the stimuli into different 
categories as well as examining the associated neural networks (e.g. Hetu, Mercier, 
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Eugène, Michon, & Jackson, 2011; Lotze et al., 2006; Villarreal et al., 2008). Many of 
them have primarily focused on the contrast between transitive (i.e. object-involved) 
and intransitive (i.e. non-object-involved) communicative gestures.  
 
Of specific interest to the current investigation is a study by Lotze and colleagues 
(2006). The authors have compared neural responses to three types of action-related 
videos, showing: 1) a performer using a ‘body-referenced’ object (e.g. toothbrush) on 
the face/or the upper torso, 2) motion of an isolated hand using a ‘world-referenced’ 
object (e.g. key), 3) expressive gestures that do not involve an additional object (e.g. 
hitchhiking). In particular, the use of body-referenced objects, when contrasted with 
world-referenced objects, induced greater activation in the bilateral posterior superior 
temporal sulcus (STS), the nearby structures and a right inferior frontal area. For the 
opposite comparison, no specific activation site was reported. It is important to point 
out that the two types of object-directed actions studied in Lotze et al.’s experiment 
were not only different in the kinds of object used and the corresponding actions 
performed, but they also differed in the presence of the actor’s face and the 
accompanied facial features and expressions (i.e. only present in the videos of body-
referenced object use). Thus, it can be argued that any neuronal difference can be 
due to these baseline differences in the stimuli in addition to the different types of 
objects used. For example, studies of face perception in healthy individuals have 
shown that the STS is sensitive to faces and other face-related attributes more than 
non-face stimuli (Haxby et al., 1999; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; 
Narumoto, Okada, Sadato, Fukui, & Yonekura, 2001; Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore, & 
McCarthy, 1998). Furthermore, for a similar reason, the fundamental difference 
between the two types of stimuli in characteristics of no interest could have 
attenuated the specific functional activation for the use of world-referenced objects. 
de Jong and colleagues (2001) assessed cerebral activity with positron emission 
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tomography when participants underwent a target selection and a finger selection 
task. Target selection required precise location specification and visual guidance of 
the hand in space to reach specific target locations and finger selection stressed 
body scheme representation needed in the production of specific finger postures. 
Contrasting target selection to finger selection, a stronger neuronal response was 
found to distribute over the extrastriate visual cortex, extending along the dorsal 
stream into the parieto-occipital sulcus and reaching as far as the posterior parietal 
cortex (de Jong, van der Graaf, & Paans, 2001). It can be argued that the use of 
world-referenced objects will tap target selection in space and also rely more on 
visuomotor control.  
 
In addition to the kind of object used in performing an action, another important 
characteristic of observed actions is their meaningfulness. Behavioural experiments 
generally show that viewing odd, atypical and often meaningless actions to objects 
(i.e. when an object is held in a manner different from its typical use) has an adverse 
impact on individuals’ reactions in making action-related decisions about objects 
(Bach et al., 2005; van Elk, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2009; Yoon et al., 2005). For 
example, when a hammer is grasped with an awkward handgrip, participants would 
take longer time to decide whether the hammer can be used for chopping (Yoon et 
al., 2005). Similarly, when a microphone is held at an odd goal position (e.g. near the 
ear rather than the mouth), participants would be slower to make a judgment on 
whether the microphone is typically moved toward the face (when it is being used) 
(van Elk et al., 2009). Indeed it has been proposed that access to action-related 
information about an object is directly influenced by the concomitant presentation of a 
correct or incorrect action applied to the object (van Elk et al., 2009). A mismatch 
between the object’s action representation retrieved from memory and an actually 
observed action seems to pose greater demand on the processing system involved, 
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resulting in longer time to generate a response.  
 
Broadly speaking, observation of meaningful and/or meaningless actions has been 
shown to also recruit part of the fronto-parietal action-perception network. Among the 
studies that directly compare neural activations when meaningful and meaningless 
movements are viewed, some have reported greater premotor and/or parietal (IPS) 
activations for meaningless movements (Decety et al., 1997; Hetu et al., 2011; 
Schürmann et al., 2005; Willems & Hagoort, 2007), whereas others have not found 
such differences (Cunnington, Windischberger, Robinson, & Moser, 2006) or shown 
increased activity in the premotor (Villarreal et al., 2008) or parietal (Yoon et al., 
2012) cortex during observation of meaningful movements. A number of studies have 
made specific comparisons between meaningful object-related hand actions and 
meaningless hand actions (Decety et al., 1997; Hetu et al., 2011; Villarreal et al., 
2008; Yoon et al., 2012). Among these studies meaningful actions usually 
demonstrate the most typical way to use a common object (with or without the actual 
object in hand), while the meaningless actions in comparison are either random 
movements (without an object) that carry no meaning to the participant or unusual 
actions performed with an object that are not appropriate to make it work functionally. 
Again no consistent pattern of results has been observed across these studies (see 
Table 4.1 for a summary of their results), but some (two out of four) have revealed 
greater activations for meaningless actions in both the parietal lobe (including the 
IPL) and the premotor gyrus, predominantly in the right hemisphere (Decety et al., 






Table 4.1. Summary of findings from the functional imaging studies that directly 
compared meaningful object-related actions with meaningless actions. Here, a 
particular focus is given to the fronto-parietal network. 
Meaningful (MF) > Meaningless (ML) Meaningless > Meaningful 
1. Decety et al., 1997 (PET)  
(Pantomimed actions 
> Unknown sign language gestures) 
(Unknown sign language gestures 





(x y z) Z 
 
L  inferior frontal gyrus, R medial frontal cortex, 
L middle temporal gyrus, Bi hippocampus, L 
cerebellum 
R-IPL 46 -48 44 4.89* 
L-SPL -28 -56 44 3.78 
R-SPL 22 -72 44 4.79* 
R-PreCG 
(vPMC) 
44 4 36 3.98 
 As well as the bilateral occipital & right temporal 
gyrus activations 
2. Hetu et al., 2011 (fMRI)  
(Pantomimed actions  
> ML hand movements) 
(ML hand movements  





(x y z) Z 
 
No significant activation was observed. 
L-IPL -48 -33 45 11.77 
R-IPL 35 -45 53 8.20 
R-IFG (inc. 
vPMC) 
57 9 24 6.87 
R parietal 57 -21 30 10.43 
Also, activations in Bi middle temporal gyrus, L 
precuneus, L middle occipital  
3.Villarreal et al., 2008 (fMRI)   
(Pantomimed actions  
> ML hand movements) 
(ML hand movements  
> Pantomimed actions) 
Brain Areas Brain Areas 
R Occipitotemporal & L dlPFC This contrast was not explicitly reported.  
4. Yoon et al., 2012 (fMRI)  
(Congruent, typical use with objects  
> ML, incongruent actions with objects) 
(ML, incongruent actions with objects 
> Congruent, typical use with objects) 
Brain Areas 
Co-ordinate 
(x y z) Z Brain Areas 
#L-IPL −51 −55 52 4.05  
^Bi-inferior posterior occipital cortex (including 
lingual gyrus and calcarine) 
#R-IPL 54 -55 49 3.87 
As well as Bi-Putamen, L-ITG/FFG, L-STS, L-
SFG 
Abbreviations: L, left; R, right; Bi, bilateral; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; SPL, superior parietal 
lobule; PreCG, precentral gyrus; vPMC, ventral premotor cortex; IFG inferior frontal gyrus; 
dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; ITG, inferior temporal gyrus, FFG, fusiform gyrus, STS, 
superior temporal sulcus, SFG, superior frontal gyrus. The four studies reviewed here all 
applied very different statistical thresholds - *1. Decety et al. (1997): activated foci above a 
Z-threshold of 4.25 correspond to a corrected p<0.05 for multiple comparisons; 2. Hetu et al. 
(2011): the analyses reviewed here were performed with a p<0.0001 (uncorrected) and a 
cluster volume threshold of 10 voxels by these authors; 3. Villarreal et al., (2008): the 
statistical threshold of their analysis was set at p<0.001 (uncorrected); 4. Yoon et al. (2012): 
#the statistical threshold for the “meaningful > meaningless” contrast was set at p <0.05 
(uncorrected), ^the “meaningless > meaningful” contrast that was significant at cluster level 
p<0.05 ((FDR-corrected). 
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In the present study, we used fMRI to examine the cerebral activation when watching 
two kinds of objects being used. One kind was categorised as  ‘body-referenced’ 
objects (e.g. toothbrush, nail clipper) since typically they are used functionally upon 
or close to the body. The other kind was classified as the ‘world-referenced’ objects 
(e.g. cutter knife, staple remover), which are typically used to act (upon another item) 
functionally in extrapersonal space. Consistent with a number of previous fMRI 
investigations on nonverbal communication and object-use actions (den Ouden, Fix, 
Parrish, & Thompson, 2009; Lotze et al., 2006; Yoon et al., 2012), we used short 
video clips to present dynamic and realistic stimuli to our participants. Dynamic 
motion pictures, as compared to static images, have a potential advantage of 
heightening activation in the brain regions responsible for processing and producing 
explicit body movements, as well as being more comparable to the motions in 
everyday scenarios (den Ouden et al., 2009; Saggar, Shelly, Lepage, Hoeft, & Reiss, 
2014). To minimise the potential confounds due to simply the presence/absence of a 
face as well as the related facial and emotional features, our video clips involving 
body-referenced objects and world-referenced objects both presented hand 
movements together with the performer’s face and upper half of the body (in contrast 
to Lotze et al., 2006). Meanwhile, the video recordings were carefully controlled to 
ensure that the clips are different only in the objects being used and the 
accompanying actions of interest. The action to the object was also manipulated to 
gain a better understanding of how actions related to different kinds of objects are 
processed. We manipulated the meaningfulness of the action, that is, objects could 
be used in a meaningful (cutting with a cutter knife) or meaningless (spinning a cutter 
knife on the table) manner. To engage the attention of the participants, this study 
required them to focus on and compare the movement carried out with the object and 
respond specifically to certain trials i.e. those in which the performed movement was 
similar as in the last trial.  
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We hypothesised that, matching with the findings of Lotze et al. (2006), the use of 
body-referenced objects would be associated with greater activity in the STS, 
whereas actions involved in using world-referenced objects would rely on the 
visuomotor pathway. As for the influence of the meaningfulness of the action, we also 
expected different patterns of activations between meaningful and meaningless 
actions, with elevated activation for meaningless actions in at least some parts of the 
action-perception network.  
 
4.2. Materials and Methods 
4.2.1.	  Subjects	  
The participants were the 20 individuals who also took part in the previous fMRI 
experiment on action and conceptual knowledge decision about animals and 
artefacts (Chapter 4).  
	  
4.2.2	  Stimuli	  
Colour videos of an individual using a common everyday man-made object (or tool) 
were recorded with a digital camera. The actions were carried out by a male and a 
female performer matched for age group, ethnicity and garments, sitting behind a 
long table. The actor and the actress were guided to act on the same set of objects 
one by one, starting with smoothly picking up the object that was initially placed on 
the table and then using it. Their movements were cross-checked to ensure that they 
are the same to each other. The performers remained a neutral facial expression 
while acting and always performed with the right hand. The actor and actress were 
naïve with regard to the subsequent use of the videos. 
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There were a total of 40 objects (and tools) - half of them were designed to be used 
typically upon the body (i.e. body-referenced objects; e.g. razor, toothbrush, 
tweezers, hairbrush, hairdryer, nail clippers, nail file) and half to be used typically in 
external space (i.e. world-referenced objects, e.g. pen, spatula, paint brush, hammer, 
screwdriver, spanner, iron). All objects were used in both a meaningful and a 
meaningless manner (see Figure 4.1 for examples). In the meaningful condition, the 
performers carried out an action that was consistent with the typical way the object is 
used (e.g., trimming nails with a nail clipper); in the meaningless condition, an action 
was performed but not appropriate to manipulate the concerned object in order to 
make it work functionally (e.g., rotating a nail clipper above the head). As a brief 
summary, a full factorial within-participant design was used, with two factors:  Object 
Type (body-referenced objects, world-referenced objects) and Meaningfulness of the 
action (meaningful, meaningless). 
 
All the videos, each lasting for about 3.5 sec, were edited using the free software 
Window Media Maker. To ensure that the participants were clear which object was 
going to be used in the video, there was a colour photo of the object at the beginning 



















Figure 4.1. Demonstration of the experiment 
 
(a) The experiment began with the 5-sec instruction “Respond to the movies that show a 
similar action as the last one”. After that, each trial started with a fixation cross (1s), followed 
with a photo of the object to be used (1s) and then a video of a performer using an object 
(~3.5s). Between two consecutive trials, there was a blank screen for a jittered time interval 
of 0.5s - 4s; (b1) an example of the performer using a cutter knife in a meaningful manner 
(cutting with it); (b2) an example of the performer using a cutter knife in a meaningless 
manner (spinning it on the table) 
	  
	  
4.2.3	  Task	  and	  Procedure	  
Participants were asked explicitly to pay attention to the actions carried out by the 
two performers in a list of movie clips that were presented during the fMRI 
experiments, and they had to respond only when they thought the hand movements 
in two consecutive movies were similar (regardless of who the performer would be). 
For example, participants would respond to the clip showing a person using a paint 
roller on the table, after viewing the use of an iron. 
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Before the actual experiment, a list of videos (mixed across Stimulus type and 
Meaningfulness of the action) was randomly generated for each participant using a 
script written in Python, which took 75% of all the possible stimuli (160 altogether). 
This procedure was done because we tried to include as many different object kinds 
across participants as possible while having to balance with the time constraint due 
to limited scan time allocated to each participant. The list was then randomly split into 
two sub-lists, each consisting of the stimuli that were to be presented in an fMRI 
session. The experiment was run in two fMRI scans and each lasted for 6.96 
minutes. The experiment started with the instruction “Respond to the movies that 
show a similar hand movement as the last one” for 5 seconds. At the beginning of 
each trial, there was a fixation cross (1000 msecs) in the middle of the screen, 
followed by a colour photo of the object to be used for 1000 msecs, and then a 
~3500-msec movie of object use (see Figure 4.1). Participants were instructed to 
give their judgment during the interval in which the movie was on the screen. Trials 
were separated by a jittered inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 500-3500 msecs. The 
experiment was programmed and controlled with PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007, 2008).  
 
Overall, around 27 to 30 trials were presented for each of the 4 conditions (2 Object 
Types x 2 levels of Meaningfulness of the action). It is worth noting that the target 
events were rare (on average, < 5 out of 60 trials in one scan) and the actual events 
of interest (i.e. non-target ones) did not require a response; hence, any responses in 
motor-associated regions cannot be simply attributed to hand movements. A practice 
session, using a different set of stimuli, was run before the actual experiments to 




4.2.4	  MRI	  Data	  Acquisition	  
The same MRI scanner and configuration settings reported in Chapter 3 were applied 
to acquiring the EPI scans for this current experiment. 
 
4.2.5	  MRI	  Data	  Analysis	  
The data were pre-processed and analysed with SPM12 
(www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~spm). The pre-processing procedures included correction of 
head motion, distortion-by-motion interactions, and magnetic field inhomogeneities; 
followed by co-registration of the structural image (T1) to the EPI data; and then 
segmentation of the structural and EPI data based on a multi-channel approach. The 
segmented grey and white matter images were used to create a DARTEL template, 
to which the EPI images of all the subjects were warped on. Finally the DARTEL 
template and the EPI images were normalised, re-sliced and smoothed. This protocol 
of data pre-processing was the same to that applied to the fMRI study in Chapter 3. 
 
Summary statistics (Penny et al., 2003) using the general linear framework were 
performed to test the reliability of the effects across participants (Kiebel & Holmes, 
2003). First, at the individual level we estimated the effect of each condition across 
the two scan sessions. For each participant, we generated a model that included the 
event onset for each trial for the four different experimental conditions (2 × 2; Object 
type x Meaningfulness of action). The ‘catch’ trials were modelled separately to 
ensure that our results were not affected by the requirement to make a motor 
response to these trials. To account for the delay in the hemodynamic function, these 
regressors were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function. 
Finally, the model included the six realignment parameters, the order of the scan 
(first or second), and the harmonic modelling of slow fluctuations in the signal (low-
pass frequency) with a cut-off of 1/128 Hz (typically associated with biological and 
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scanner noise). To test for consistent effects across individuals, a random effect 
analysis was conducted, treating participants as a random variable. In this second-
level analysis, maps depicting the effect size per condition per participant were used 
as the independent variables, and dependency between conditions was assumed.  
 
The results reported comprise all the significant effects at p<0.05 cluster-level 
corrected for multiple comparisons with the amplitude of voxels surviving Z-score > 
3.1 uncorrected across the whole brain and an extent threshold of at least 50 voxels 
in a cluster. Anatomical labelling was achieved with reference to the Anatomical 
Automatic Labeling toolbox (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) and Duvernoy’s Human 
Brain Atlas (Duvernoy et al., 1991). The descriptive bar plots in the figures (Figures 
4.3 – 4.5) are based on the estimated effect size (beta values) computed in the 
general linear model. These values were extracted from a 6-mm sphere centred on 
the group peaks. 
 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1	  Neuroimaging	  Results	  
In general, the participants showed good understanding of the task (observed in the 
practice). As the target occurrence was rare (<5 out of 60 trials in each scan), for 
each participant there wasn’t a sufficient number of target trials for performing any 
meaningful analysis of the behavioural data. 
 
fMRI effects for all action stimuli 
In order to determine all the neural activations involved in overall action 
comprehension, a separate analysis was conducted that computed for each 
participant at the first-level analysis a specific contrast [1 1 1 1], taking all conditions 
into consideration. A contrast image generated for each participant was then used in 
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the group statistics, calculated as random effects analysis, at the second level (which 
takes variance between participants into account). All types of action related to using 
objects elicited increased activation in the bilateral occipito-temporo-parietal cortices 
reaching into V3, V5, the fusiform gyrus (in the medial temporal lobe), and the lateral 
superior and inferior parietal lobules (as well as the intraparietal sulcus). In addition, 
the premotor cortex extending into the opercular and triangular gyrus (BA 44, 45) 
was also activated bilaterally for all conditions (See Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2). These 
results are largely consistent with the overall gesture effects reported in the study of 
Lotze et al. (2006).  
 
Table 4.2: The effect for all object-directed action conditions 
 Cluster  Peak  Coordinates  Activated brain regions 
 Size  (Z-score)  x y z   
 8193**  > 8.00  33 -69 -15  Bilateral occipito-parieto-temporal 
cortices including V3, V4, V5, FFG 
in the inferior temporal lobe, and the 
lateral parietal lobules (BA 7, 39, 
40) encompassing the IPS 
   7.69  -51 -69 0  
 743**  6.19  -45 6 21  Left PMC extending into the IFG 
(superior bank of the opercular 
gyrus, BA44) 
 549**  5.35  42 9 30  Right PMC extending into the IFG 
(superior bank of the opercular and 
triangular gyrus, BA 44,45) 
Abbreviations: FFG, fusiform gyrus; IPS, intraparietal sulcus; PMC, premotor cortex; IFG, 
inferior frontal gyrus. **significant at p<0.05, whole brain FWE-corrected.  
 
 






The main effects of Object Type 
Viewing actions with world-referenced objects (relative to body-referenced objects), 
irrespective of whether they were meaningful or meaningless, induced extensive 
activity bilaterally in the medial occipital cortices covering the cuneus and lingual 
gyrus, reaching into V3/V3A and the parieto-occpital fissure. Additionally, greater 
activity due to watching actions with world-referenced objects was also found in the 
posterior ends of the bilateral insular gyri and the left prefrontal cortex. Conversely, 
actions involving the body-referenced objects (compared to world-referenced objects) 
instigated a stronger neural response only in a small area in the posterior cuneus, 





Table 4.3: The man effects of object type 
 Cluster  Peak  Coordinates  Activated brain regions 
 Size  (Z-score)  x y z   
Body-referenced > World-referenced 
 79**  4.83  6 -93 12  Posterior tip of bilateral cuneus 
(above calcarine) 
World-referenced > Body-referenced 
 2420**  6.98  12 -81 -9  Bilateral medial occipital cortices 
including lingual and the more 
anterior portion of cuneus, 
reaching V3/V3A and the parieto-
occipital fissure 
   5.93  -12 -81 -12  
 85**  4.41  42 -21 21  Posterior end of the right insula 
 56**  4.23  -30 45 9  Left frontopolar prefrontal cortex 
 89**  3.84  -42 -33 21  Posterior end of the left insula 






Figure 4.3. The main effects of the object type in use 
 
SPM blobs overlaid on a T1 single-subject template. Foci showing stronger responses in the 
body-referenced object conditions are depicted in red; foci showing stronger responses in the 
world-referenced object conditions are depicted in green. The bars show the averaged effect 
size extracted from a 6-mm sphere around the group maxima. Error bars depict SEMs. 
*Asterisk indicates significant difference (t-test, corrected for multiple comparisons). R = right; 
L = left; 1 = posterior Occipital Cortex; 2 = medial Occipital Cortex; 3 = R Insula; 4 = L Insula; 
5 = L Prefrontal Cortex. 
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The main effects of Meaningfulness of the action 
Overall, observation of meaningful actions to objects revealed no specific activation 
site when compared to meaningless actions. In contrast, meaningless action 
observation (relative to meaningful action) led to augmented activation in the right 
dorsal premotor cortex and a cluster in the right parietal lobe, covering the anterior 
parts of the superior and inferior parietal lobules together with the intraparietal sulcus. 
Also, greater activity was recorded in the anterior portion of the left superior parietal 




Table 4.4: The main effects of meaningfulness 
 Cluster  Peak  Coordinates  Activated brain regions 
 Size  (Z-score)  x y z   
Meaningful > Meaningless 
 -  -  - - -  None 
Meaningless > Meaningful 
 140**  5.49  27 -6 60  Right dorsal premotor cortex 
 401**  5.37  39 -33 51  A cluster posterior to the right 
postcentral sulcus, covering the 
anterior portions of the SPL, IPS 
and IPL 
 58**  4.83  -33 -45 -30  Left cerebellum 
 165**  4.26  -21 -54 63  Left anterior SPL 
Abbreviations: SPL, superior parietal lobule; IPS, intraparietal sulcus; IPL, inferior parietal 










Figure 4.4. The main effects of meaningfulness of the action 
 
SPM blobs overlaid on a T1 single-subject template. Foci showing stronger responses in the 
meaningful action conditions are depicted in yellow (NONE); foci showing stronger 
responses in the meaningless action conditions are depicted in blue. Also refer to Figure 4.3. 
for other guidelines on viewing the images. R = right; L = left; 1 = L Superior Parietal Lobe; 2 
= R Intraparietal sulcus; 3 = R dorsal Premotor cortex; 4 = L Cerebellum. 
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The interaction effects 
The analyses also revealed regions that were sensitive to the interaction between 
Object type and Meaningfulness (Figure 4.4). Concerning only the meaningful 
actions in particular, increased neural response was noted in the bilateral posterior 
superior temporal sulcus [pSTS; also regarded as a part of the broadly defined 
temporo-parietal junction, TPJ, in some literature (Geng & Vossel, 2013)], bilateral 
lateral surface of the inferior occipital cortex [a region referred to as the occipital face 
area (Pitcher, Walsh, & Duchaine, 2011)], and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) 
for meaningful use of body-referenced objects (compared to world-referenced 
objects). On the other hand, observation of meaningful actions to world-referenced 
objects (relative to body-referenced objects) led to elevated activity in a cluster in the 
medial visual cortex including the posterior parts of both the cuneus and lingual 
gyrus. These results are presented in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5: Stimulus-by-meaningfulness interaction 
 Cluster  Peak  Coordinates  Activated brain regions 
 Size  (Z-score)  x y z   
INT: Meaningful, Body-referenced > World-referenced  
& Meaningless, World-referenced > Body-referenced 
 96**  5.27  36 -90 -6  Right MOG/LOS 
 97**  4.82  -33 -87 -9  Left MOG/LOS 
 60**  4.58  -42 -63 27  Left posterior STS 
 51**  4.39  48 -63 27  Right posterior STS 
 135**  4.12  0 -51 27  Posterior cingulate cortex 
INT: Meaningful, World-referenced > Body-referenced  
& Meaningless, Body-referenced > World-referenced 
 508**  5.69  -12 -81 -12  Posterior medial occipital 
cortex, reaching cuneus, lingual 
Abbreviations: MOG, middle occipital gyrus; LOS, lateral occipital sulcus; STS, superior 





Figure 4.5. Stimulus-by-meaningfulness interaction 
 
SPM blobs overlaid on a T1 single-subject template. Foci showing stronger object type 
effects (body-referenced > world-referenced) in meaningful compared with meaningless 
actions are depicted in red; foci showing the reversed pattern are depicted in green. Also 
refer to Figure 4.3. for other guidelines on viewing the images. R = right; L = left; 1 = L 
posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus (STS); 2 = R pSTS; 3 = L Lateral Inferior Occipital 




The objective of this study was to explore the possible modulating role of different 
types of movement towards objects on brain activation during action observation in a 
group of healthy subjects. 
 
We used a two-way factorial design, simultaneously evaluating the influence of two 
movement characteristics, namely the kind of the object involved and the 
meaningfulness of the action – this distinguishes our study from past imaging 
investigations that included only a single factor (Lotze et al., 2006; Villarreal et al., 
2008; see also, Hetu et al., 2011; Yoon et al., 2012). Our results show that viewing 
actions that involve different kinds of objects recruited mainly distinct parts of the 
(parieto)-occipital brain. Moreover, the meaningfulness of the action modulated 
neuronal response, with the anterior regions of bilateral parietal lobes and the right 
dorsal premotor cortex, which were more responsive during the observation of 
meaningless compared to meaningful actions. In contrast, meaningful actions did not 
induce an enhanced response within or outside the fronto-parietal network. Our 
results also indicate an interaction effect between the kind of the object used and the 
meaningfulness of the action on brain activity. In particular, watching the meaningful, 
typical use of body-referenced objects (in contrast to world-referenced items) excited 
bilaterally the pSTS and a lateral inferior occipital area (i.e. the occipital face area, 
OFA), as well as the PCC. In the opposite comparison, observation of the 
meaningful, typical use of world-referenced (relative to body-referenced) objects was 
uniquely associated with elevated activity in the posterior part of the visual cortex. 
 
Before further elucidating what these specific results mean, we first consider the 
overall activation associated with viewing all different object-directed actions in the 
present study. As a whole, action observation (irrespective of any specific conditions) 
led to extensive activation in areas of the occipital and occipito-temporal cortex 
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(including V3, V4, V5, and fusiform gyrus), the frontal eye fields, the premotor and 
inferior frontal gyri, and most of the parietal lobe in both hemispheres. These areas 
largely correspond with the patterns of the overall gesture effect shown by Lotze and 
collaborators (2006), who also studied object-related actions along with emotive 
(communicative) gestures. In particular, the involvement of the premotor and parietal 
cortex is in line with the notion that these structures form part of the dorsal pathway 
for action processing (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Goodale et al., 1994) and also of the 
mirror neuron system for action representation (Fabbri-Destro & Rizzolatti, 2008; 
Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010).  
 
4.4.1	  Distinctions	  between	  Different	  Kinds	  of	  Objects	  in	  Use	  
Viewing the use of different kinds of objects, irrespective of whether the action 
performed was meaningful or meaningless, activated mainly distinct parts of the 
(parieto)-occipital cortex. While observation of actions to body-referenced objects 
uniquely recruited a small area in the posterior-most medial visual cortex, actions 
performed to world-referenced objects elevated neuronal responses in a 
considerably larger portion of the rest of the occipital cortex spreading dorsally to 
reach the parieto-occipital fissure.  
 
The greater extent of involvement of the occipital and parieto-occipital areas for the 
world-referenced objects is likely owing to an increased focus on visual guidance in 
motor control associated with the typical use of this kind of object for acting on a 
target in external space. Specifically, the neighbouring regions of the superior POS 
have been considered to constitute part of the dorsomedial parieto-frontal circuit 
subserving arm transport, i.e. moving the hand toward the target location (Cavina-
Pratesi et al., 2010; Connolly et al., 2003; Filimon et al., 2009; Prado et al., 2005). 
These areas are also implicated in coding other movement-related dimensions such 
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as location specification, motion direction, wrist orientation and grip postures (Fattori 
et al., 2010, 2009; Galletti et al., 2003; Monaco et al., 2011). It is possible that, in the 
present study, simply seeing the common world-referenced objects automatically 
activated the corresponding innate motor representations, drawing attention to those 
features usually emphasised by the programmed use of these objects. When 
considering the interaction effect for viewing world-referenced objects (vs body-
referenced objects) used in a meaningful way, a greater demand on visual analysis 
still appears, although unique activations were then restricted primarily to the visual 
cortex. Indeed, a study by de Jong et al. (2001) has nicely shown that extensive 
activity in the visual cortex along with other parieto-occipital regions can be observed 
in a task that demands precise location identification and thus visually guiding the 
hand in external space. Likewise, the stored action programmes associated with 
world-referenced objects may stress more visual analysis for motor control.  
 
The main effect of world-referenced objects (relative to body-referenced objects) 
reflected activation in the bilateral posterior insular cortex and a cluster in the left 
anterior prefrontal cortex. The insula cortex is known as a multisensory integration 
area converging together cognitive, somatic and autonomic information (Jones, 
Ward, & Critchley, 2010) and sustaining proprioceptive sensation (Dijkerman & de 
Haan, 2007). It is also associated with mental rotation of limbs in space (Bonda, 
Petrides, Frey, & Evans, 1995) and its activity reflects a discrepancy between the 
executed hand action and the visual feedback of the action (Farrer et al., 2003). More 
generally, Chaminade and colleagues (2005) suggest that the insula is usually 
recruited when a task demands attention to limbs (such as comparison between the 
imagined and the observed orientations in Bonda et al., 1995; between the observed 
and the executed movements in Farrer et al., 2003; Chaminade et al., 2005). This 
final view is corroborated by the current data, based on a task requiring focus on the 
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hand actions shown in a series of consecutive films. Similarly, the anterior prefrontal 
cortex has been implicated in multiple cognitive processes including volitional and 
attentional control (Burgess, Gilbert, & Dumontheil, 2007; Haggard, 2008; Pollmann, 
2012). Changes in its neuronal response have been shown to link to the attentional 
demands for holding in mind an intention during an ongoing task (Okuda et al., 1998) 
as well as to the goal-related conflicts between episodic events during action 
observation (Hrkać, Wurm, Kühn, & Schubotz, 2015). It is likely that while the activity 
in the insula cortex is modulated by attention to the hand actions, the anterior 
prefrontal cortex serves to focus on the goal of the task, i.e. contrasting actions in 
successive scenarios, although it is not clear why these effects are stronger for the 
body-referenced objects. 
 
On the contrary, the specific interaction effect for viewing the use of body-referenced 
objects in a meaningful, typical way uniquely elicited stronger activation in the 
posterior STS and OFA (a cluster in the lateral, ventral occipital lobe). In particular, 
greater involvement of the posterior STS was also observed in the study of Lotze et 
al. (2006) for gestures showing the (typical) use of objects upon the body than 
isolated hand gestures demonstrating the use of objects in extrapersonal space. The 
authors attributed this observation to the specific function served by the STS in 
processing body-referenced movements along with socially relevant signals. Such an 
interpretation, however, might not be entirely accurate because there are 
considerable baseline dissimilarities between the kinds of stimuli used for 
comparison in the study of Lotze et al. (2006): the videos presenting the use of 
objects in external space focus only on the hand (and the object) but the videos 
presenting the use of body-referenced objects has zoomed out to contain also the 
actor’s face and more body parts as well as other extra inputs such as the 
accompanying facial features and social/contextual cues. Past studies have already 
121 
demonstrated that the STS is modulated simply by perception of face or face-related 
properties (e.g. Haxby et al., 1999; Kanwisher et al., 1997; Puce et al., 1998), 
emotional expression (Narumoto et al., 2001), and other socially relevant information 
(Barraclough, Xiao, Baker, Oram, & Perrett, 2005; Beauchamp, 2015; Deen, 
Koldewyn, Kanwisher, & Saxe, 2015). So, is STS additionally engaged in processing 
body-referenced movements? Our findings appear to back up this proposal. In the 
present study the use of body-referenced and world-referenced objects were shown 
in videos, and both types of videos were carefully matched in terms of the presence 
of the performer (and the comparable amount of the body presented, including the 
face, the upper trunk and the hands), the neutral facial expression and the overall 
foreground and background (a table and a plain white wall). The sole differences lie 
in the kind of the object used and the associated actions, which were indeed the 
variables of current interest. Note that the STS emerged only when the body-
referenced objects were used in a meaningful way because in this condition all body-
referenced objects would really work on the body as the target recipient, just as how 
they are designed to function typically. As a result, the current results give important 
value added to the literature by providing direct support for the proposed involvement 
of the posterior STS in representing body-referenced movements.  
 
Many functional imaging studies have mentioned the sensitivity for body movements 
in the posterior STS (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Beauchamp, Lee, Haxby, & 
Martin, 2002; Bonda, Petrides, Ostry, & Evans, 1996; Grossman, Battelli, & Pascual-
Leone, 2005; Pelphrey et al., 2003; Puce et al., 1998; Vaina, Solomon, Chowdhury, 
Sinha, & Belliveau, 2001), and possibly other ventral occipito-temporal regions 
including an inferior occipital area in the lateral cortex known as the occipital face 
area (OFA). Of particular relevance, OFA is located slightly posterior to the 
extrastriate body area (EBA; Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001), which is 
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also shown to be responsive to body movements (Astafiev, Stanley, Shulman, & 
Corbetta, 2004; Grossman & Blake, 2002; Grossman et al., 2000; Thompson, Clarke, 
Stewart, & Puce, 2005). An important further question would be what information 
these brain structures attend to and code in the processing of body action. Grezes, 
Frith, & Passingham (2004) presented participants with videos of an actor lifting a 
box and noted elevated STS activity when the participants viewed particular 
scenarios in which the actor may have appeared to make sudden postural 
adjustments to a box that was heavier than expected. These authors postulate that 
the STS activation is due to its sensitivity to postural changes as well as to a 
corresponding adjustment in the observers’ action representation. Similarly, 
Thompson and collaborators (2005) showed that the STS (and possibly EBA) 
responds to configural information in body motion since the STS was found to be 
more active when the moving and intact mannequin is viewed compared with moving 
limbs (fragmented from the torso). Considering these proposed functions, greater 
STS involvement during the observation of body-referenced movements may reflect 
a corresponding emphasis on postural representation, potentially linked to intrinsic 
movement control. On the other hand, while the OFA and EBA are sensitive to 
biological movements, it has been argued that these ventral occipito-temporal 
structures are also responsible for decoding visual form information rather than the 
motion per se (Beauchamp, Lee, Haxby, & Martin, 2003; Michels, Lappe, & Vaina, 
2005). For example, the OFA and EBA are more responsive to stimuli that provide 
more form information (videos of moving human) than those that have limited form 
information (point-light animations of body motion) (Beauchamp et al., 2003). Further 
studies will be required to confirm the respective roles of the posterior STS, OFA 
(and EBA) in the processing of body motions, and particularly body-referenced 
movements. One such question that needs clarification might be whether augmented 
response in STS for the body-referenced movements reflects an increase in attention 
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to the body configuration and postural cues.  
 
Finally, there was a unique association between activity in the posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC) and the meaningful use of the body-referenced objects. This was not 
expected but it is consistent with other findings relating this area to the retrieval of 
episodic memory and self-referential thoughts. Functional neuroimaging studies have 
shown that the PCC is active during recognition of personally familiar information 
(Gorno-Tempini et al., 1998; Leveroni et al., 2000; Maddock et al., 2001) and is 
involved in the processing of positive and negative traits during self-reflection 
(relative to a general context) (Fossati et al., 2003; Johnson et al., 2002). There is 
also evidence that the PCC is sensitive to emotionally salient stimuli (Maddock, 
Garrett, & Buonocore, 2003) and likely to mediate interactions between emotion and 
memory, through its connections with other emotional processing regions (Baleydier 
& Mauguiere, 1980; Maddock, 1999; van Hoesen, Maddock, & Vogt, 1993). The use 
of body-referenced objects including mostly self-care and grooming tools/items (e.g. 
hair dryer, tooth brush, make-up, razor, tweezers, lip balm) in this experiment may 
have drawn the observers’ attention more to the face as well as implicitly trigger the 
associations with personally relevant sensational experience, when compared with 
the world-referenced tools (e.g. hammer, screwdriver, trowel, cutter knife, stapler, 
paint brush). This may have led to stronger activation of brain areas subserving self-
relevant episodic memory, even when watching another person. 
 
We recognise that the differentiating patterns of neural activations for viewing 
different types of object use might be the result of implicit processing of the 
surrounding cues linked to a particular type of object use. This reflects attentional 
modulation (Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, & Petersen, 1990; Haxby et al., 
1994; Kastner, De Weerd, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1998; Kastner & Ungerleider, 
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2000). For example, the use of body-referenced objects may draw the viewer’s 
attention to the face while the use of world-referenced objects may shifts the focus 
away from it (to the table). Future studies can examine the nature of the potential 
attentional bias using an eye-gaze tracking technique as well as to determine how 
different types of object use may still be perceived differently after visual attention is 
controlled.  
 
4.4.2	  The	  Effect	  of	  Meaningfulness	  
The specific influence of meaning on brain responses to action has also been 
previously investigated during action perception and several studies have focused on 
identifying the neural distinctions between (meaningful) object-related actions and 
meaningless actions (see Table 4.1). Our analysis on the contrast of “meaningless > 
meaningful” yielded stronger responses in the bilateral parietal lobes including the 
right IPL and IPS, and the right premotor cortex. These results are in keeping with 
those reported by Decety et al. (1997) and Hetu et al. (2011), who compared 
meaningless hand movements with pantomimes of the typical use of everyday 
objects. A noteworthy point to highlight is that, in the study of Decety et al., the right 
superior and inferior parietal areas in particular also survived a corrected threshold of 
p<0.05 for whole-brain multiple comparisons (the same as here), while in that of Hetu 
et al. all the reported areas in the premotor-parietal network appeared to surpass this 
corrected threshold as well, judging from their corresponding large peak Z-scores 
reported. Villarreal et al. (2008) did not report explicitly any potential results for the 
‘meaningless > meaningful’ contrast and they also did not observe any outstanding 
premotor-parietal activations for the reverse comparison. In contrast, Yoon et al 
(2012) showed an opposite effect, i.e. greater activity in the bilateral IPL reported for 
meaningful actions than meaningless actions with objects. However, a careful 
comparison between our result and that of Yoon and colleagues’ paper may 
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demystify the seemingly contrasting differences: first, the peak voxels of the IPL 
areas in the study of Yoon et al. were located more posteriorly and inferiorly than the 
peak voxels of the parietal clusters here; second, in the study of Yoon et al. the IPL 
areas were revealed from an analysis using a much lower voxel-wise threshold and 
these results failed to survive overall a FWE-corrected threshold, while our results 
from the ‘meaningless > meaningful’ contrast (as well as in the studies of Decety et 
al. and possibly in Hetu et al.) have exceeded a corrected threshold (p<0.05) for 
multiple corrections. Overall findings from our and past studies (Decety et al., 1997; 
Hetu et al., 2011), therefore, favour a strong, robust effect of meaningless actions 
modulating the action observation network. 
 
Our meaningful actions are actions that demonstrate the most typical way to use a 
common object (functionally) while the meaningless actions were odd, unusual 
movements carried out with the object. Apart from having no real meaning per se, a 
meaningless action can be considered a novel, less familiar stimulus. This 
interpretation corresponds with the familiarity effect on action observation, with more 
familiar actions usually relating to reduced neural activity in the premotor-parietal 
network  (or novelty effect in reverse) (Liew, Han, & Aziz-Zadeh, 2011; Valyear, 
Gallivan, McLean, & Culham, 2012). For example, our study bears a close 
resemblance to that of Vogt et al., whose participants viewed guitar chords that they 
had practised (familiar, seen) prior to fMRI scanning as well as chords that they had 
not practised (unfamiliar, novel) (Vogt et al., 2007). As a task during scanning, these 
participants were asked to remain focused in order to reproduce the presented 
chords with high accuracy in later events. The scans of these participants revealed 
augmented response in the bilateral superior and inferior lobules (and also left 
premotor cortex) during observation of the non-practised chords (relative to the 
practised ones), which may suggest that when active observation is required 
126 
participants tend to exert extra demand on the action representation system for 
encoding the (unfamiliar) non-practised stimuli. Comparably, the participants in our 
study also had to focus and memorise an observed action in order to compare it with 
the one shown in the next video.  
 
In addition to the familiarity issue, the effect of meaningfulness of an action may also 
relate to the viewer’s perception of the intended goal of the action. The use of a 
common object is often associated with a particular movement plan that has a clear 
end goal. During the experiment, the participant might try to contemplate (mentalise) 
the prospective actions of the actor once the actor started picking up the object to be 
use. Such mental processing is known as the theory of mind (Blakemore & Decety, 
2001; Frith & Frith, 2012). Particularly in the meaningless use conditions, seeing an 
unexpected action might conflict with the participant’s existing understanding of how 
an everyday object is usually used to achieve its itended function. This challenged 
the participant’s theory of mind and likely increased the demand on the action 
observation system. Future experiments can assign an intentional cue to each action 
video prior to its presentation so as to disintegrate the intentional influence from the 
factor of meaningfulness.  
 
	  
4.4.3	  Limitations	  of	  the	  Study	  
There were several limitation in the present study. Although we did carefully control 
the video stimuli to ensure they only differed in the object being used and the 
accompanying action being carried out, these videos might still have subtle 
dissimilarities other than the variables of current interest.  First, the use of body-
referenced objects, especially in a meaningful manner, might always benefit from 
having the face or the body as the target recipient while the world-referenced objects 
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were not actually used upon an external target item (e.g. no nails to be hit on by the 
hammer). Moreover, the use of world-referenced objects tended to take place 
naturally within the lower visual field (i.e. on the table, such as writing and ironing) 
while the use of body-referenced objects were often higher or in the centre of the 
visual field.  
	  
4.4.4	  Conclusion	  
By showing different activation sites that are specific for viewing actions associated 
with the use of different kinds of objects, the current study  provides novel evidence 
that distinct neural representations emerge for actions depending on different frames 
of reference. In particular, the typical use of body-referenced objects is likely to 
recruit more the regions subserving postural adjustment and body configuration, 
while the typical use of world-referenced objects is likely to be more dependent on 
visuo(motor) guidance. Furthermore, our data confirm that the observation of actions 
outside our motor repertoire results in greater involvement of the premotor-parietal 




Chapter 5. Dissociation the processing involved in object 
naming 
This chapter is adopted from my published article “The relation of object naming and 
other visual speech production tasks: A large scale voxel-based morphometric study” 
(Lau et al., 2015). 
 
5.0. Abstract 
We report a lesion-symptom mapping analysis of visual speech production deficits in 
a large group (280) of stroke patients at the sub-acute stage (<120days post stroke). 
Performance on object naming was evaluated alongside three other tests of visual 
speech production, namely sentence production to a picture, sentence reading and 
nonword reading. A principal component analysis was performed on all these tests’ 
scores and revealed a ‘shared’ component that loaded across all the visual speech 
production tasks and a ‘unique’ component that isolated object naming from the other 
three tasks. Regions for the shared component were observed in the left fronto-
temporal cortices, fusiform gyrus and bilateral visual cortices.  Lesions in these 
regions linked to both poor object naming and impairment in general visual-speech 
production. On the other hand, the unique naming component was potentially 
associated with the bilateral anterior temporal poles, hippocampus and cerebellar 
areas. This is in line with the models proposing that object naming relies on a left-
lateralised language dominant system that interacts with a bilateral anterior temporal 
network. Neuropsychological deficits in object naming can reflect both the increased 







Recognising a specific object and saying aloud its name promptly is for the most part 
an effortless task. However, deficits in naming objects emerge as a frequent 
symptom of brain damage (Bayles & Tomoeda, 1983; Bell et al., 2001; Hodges et al., 
2000; Hodges & Patterson, 2007) occurring, for instance, in at least 14% of stroke 
patients (e.g. Nøkleby et al., 2008; Tatemichi et al., 1994). In clinical practice, object 
naming is widely used as a test of language functions in bedside neuropsychological 
examination (e.g. in MoCA, MMSE). It is also common as a behavioural treatment 
approach for naming disorders, or aphasia at large, to train whole word naming to 
simple pictures (e.g. Conroy et al., 2009; Nickels, 2002). In this study, we examined 
the cognitive and neural relevance between object naming and other visual speech 
production tasks using a lesion-deficit mapping approach. 
 
Deficits in object naming among neurological patients could arise at several levels of 
processing. Existing cognitive theories (Humphreys et al., 1999; Levelt et al., 1999) 
posit that naming an object requires at a minimum four processing steps to take 
place: 1) visual perception; 2) retrieval of semantic knowledge about the object; 3) 
access to the associated phonological representation; and 4) articulation. Likewise, a 
neuroanatomically-constrained model (Ueno & Lambon Ralph, 2013; Ueno, Saito, 
Rogers, & Lambon Ralph, 2011) specifically highlights the interactive contribution of 
a semantic and a phonological pathways in supporting naming. Disruptions to various 
parts of these pathways, using computational simulation, have been shown to affect 
naming and other spoken language abilities. In correspondence with the 
computational account, an elegant VBM study by Butler and collaborators (Butler et 
al., 2014) examined the common neuro-cognitive components that are shared across 
a number of language (including object naming) and executive function tasks. They 
identified three components: phonology, semantic and executive-cognition. In 
particular, object naming was loaded almost equally on both phonology and 
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semantic. Also, as reported in this study, the phonological component was related to 
the left perisylvian regions encompassing temporal, insula and inferior frontal cortices 
while the semantic component was related to left anterior temporal area.  
 
Evidence from neuropsychological reports suggest that object naming is supported 
by a large network of different brain regions along the Sylvian fissure with the left 
frontal and temporal lobes being particularly critical (Damasio, Grabowski, Tranel, 
Hichwa, & Damasio, 1996; Damasio et al., 2004; Hillis et al., 2001; Hillis et al., 2006). 
Baldo et al. (2013) used voxel-based lesion symptom mapping to relate performance 
on a test of object naming to neural correlates based on the lesion maps of patients 
with left hemispheric stroke. Their results showed an association between naming 
deficits and lesions to significant portions of the left temporal cortex including the 
superior and middle sections and underlying white matter with an extension to inferior 
parietal cortex. Similar patterns of extensive left perisylvian lesions were reported in 
studies using cortical electrical stimulation during neurosurgery (Corina et al., 2010) 
and perfusion-weighted magnetic resonance imaging (DeLeon et al., 2007). In 
particular, DeLeon and colleagues (2007) identified the lesions to the superior and 
middle temporal gyri and the anterior temporal pole to be most predictive of the 
lexical-semantic mapping deficits (i.e. a failure to linking concepts to phonological 
output) in naming. Additionally, a recently growing body of literature has emphasised 
the role of the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) in naming (e.g. Domoto-Reilly et al., 
2012; Rogers et al., 2006). Notably patients with semantic dementia typically have 
prominent ATL atrophy and progressive anomia (i.e. naming impairment) (Bright, 
Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2008; Jefferies & Lambon Ralph, 2006; Noppeney et al., 
2007). According to Patterson and Roger (Patterson et al., 2007; Rogers et al., 
2004), ATL serves as a central representation ‘hub’ of the brain, integrating modality-
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specific representations (e.g. smell, shape, colour, name) from different regions to 
constitute domain-general concepts (see also Lambon Ralph, 2014 for a review).  
In many neuropsychological studies of object naming (e.g. Baldo et al., 2013; 
DeLeon et al., 2007), patients have been restricted to those only with left hemispheric 
damage. This limited the ability to draw inferences about potential contributions of 
particular regions in the rest of the brain to a given function. For example, Brambati 
et al. (2006) examined the anatomical organisation of object naming using voxel-
based morphometry (VBM) in patients with a range of neurodegenerative diseases. 
They reported a link between overall naming performance and bilateral atrophy in the 
superior and inferior temporal gyri, anterior fusiforms and hippocampi, and other left-
sided atrophy. Similarly, studies using functional imaging show activations in 
extensive brain regions during object naming (Garn, Allen, & Larsen, 2009; Léger et 
al., 2002; Okada et al., 2000; Spitzer et al., 1998). Price and colleagues (2005) 
conducted a meta-analysis of the functional imaging studies on object naming in 
healthy individuals. This meta-analysis study identified regions primarily along the 
occipito-temporal cortices on the left; however, greater involvement of the right 
hemisphere was also noted when object naming was compared with baseline 
conditions controlling for perceptual processing and speech production. In the current 
study, we performed whole brain correlation analysis using VBM. 
 
Object naming is very similar to other speech production abilities such as reading as 
they both require speech response driven by visual inputs. Interestingly, however, 
there is limited comprehensive account of how object naming is distinguished from 
other visual speech production tasks at the neuronal level. Only a few fMRI studies 
have directly contrasted the neural activation of object naming to single word reading 
(Bookheimer et al., 1995; Moore & Price, 1999; Price et al., 2006). For example, 
Moore and Price (1999)’s study found shared mechanism in the inferior temporal 
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cortex (amongst other regions) which responded more to both words and objects 
relative to viewing meaningless visual stimuli. Compared with word reading, 
increased activation during object naming was observed in the anterior fusiform. The 
authors (Moore & Price, 1999) explained that the anterior part of fusiform has been 
linked to semantic processing, with object naming being more dependent on 
semantic processing than reading. Functional imaging studies of other speech 
production tasks alone such as sentence production in picture description (e.g. 
Grande et al., 2012) highlight the involvement of a large bilateral network which 
includes both anterior (e.g. inferior frontal gyrus, anterior part of superior and middle 
temporal gyri) and posterior (e.g. temporo-parietal and occipital cortices) regions of 
the left hemisphere. However, there is a lack of neuropsychological data directly 
comparing performance on object naming with a series of visual speech production 
tasks using a common set of patients.  
 
The present study used performance data from a stroke sample on a clinical 
cognitive screen (BCoS; Humphreys et al., 2012). The BCoS assesses language 
abilities including object naming as well as reading and picture description. All these 
tasks assess identification of visual stimuli and generation of spoken responses. 
Despite the similarities, each task potentially has its specific demands. To increase 
the demands on recognition and semantic processing, the object naming task in 
BCoS includes low frequency object items. In contrast, the sentence production 
(picture description) task is designed to assess primarily syntactic and morphological 
processing while demands on recognition and semantic/name retrieval of the target 
objects were made minimal (by using very frequent object items, e.g. ‘book’, and also 
by actually providing the name of the target objects alongside the picture stimulus to 
the participant). The sentence reading task requires the participant to read aloud a 
sentence containing some relatively low frequency and exception words (i.e. 
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‘irregular words’ as described in Coltheart et al., 2001). This task would tap both 
lexical and sublexical phonological processing. Finally, BCoS also assesses nonword 
reading, which can only be achieved by sublexical phonological processing and not 
aided with semantic knowledge (see Behavioural Measures in Methods for detailed 
description). Table 5.1 outlines the potential cognitive-language processes underlying 
these four visual speech production tasks. We speculate that the object naming task 
may have greater demands on recognition and semantic knowledge of objects 
relative to other tasks tested in the present study.   
 
Table 5.1: Outline of the cognitive processes underlying the visual speech 
production tasks in BCoS 









5. Synt 6. Output 
lexical 
phonol 




TASK         
a. Obj 
Name ✓✓ X X ✓✓ X ✓✓ X ✓✓ 
b. Sent 
Prod ✓ ✓ ✓✓ ✓ ✓✓ ✓✓ X ✓✓ 
c. Sent 
Read X ✓✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓✓ 
d. NW 
Read X ✓✓ X X X X ✓✓ ✓✓ 
a. Object naming; b. Sentence production; c. Sentence reading; d. Nonword reading;  
1. Object recognition; 2. Word/Letter recognition; 3. Action recognition; 4. Semantic; 5. 
Syntax; 6. Output lexical phonology; 7. Output sublexical phonology; 8. Articulation.  
‘X’ signifies this type of processing is likely absent in the task; ‘✓’ signifies this type of 
processing is likely involved; ‘✓✓’ is important for completion of the task 
 
In a large sample of sub-acute stroke patients, we examined the lesions associated 
with impaired object naming and then in relation to other visual speech production 
tasks (in order to isolate regions specific to object naming). As another approach, we 
also performed a principal component analysis in order to identify the shared and 
unique mechanisms of object naming and the other language tasks. We applied a 
fully-automated voxel-based correlational method to assess the relationship between 
the performance on the language tasks (based on the raw and PCA scores) and the 




All patients were recruited from the stroke units of 12 hospitals in the West Midlands, 
UK, as part of the Birmingham University Cognitive Screen trial (BUCS; 
http://www.bucs.bham.ac.uk). The broad inclusion criteria of the trial were that the 
patient should be at a non-chronic stage (< 120 days post stroke), physically stable 
and well enough to maintain concentration for around an hour to complete the 
cognitive assessment (judged by a trained assessor of the multi-disciplinary stroke 
team). No restrictions were placed according to aphasic type or severity. The sample 
of this present study was made up of 280 patients (141 male, average age: 70.88y ± 
14.06std, ranging between 26 and 93 years) selected from the BUCS database of 
532 cases with clinical CT scans available. As previously estimated in the patient 
group of the BUCS sample, 41.4% had middle cerebral artery (MCA) stroke, 10.4% 
posterior cerebral artery stroke and 13.4% due to other affected vascular territories 
(Chechlacz, Rotshtein, Demeyere, Bickerton, & Humphreys, 2014). For the present 
study, we excluded patients whose CT scans were of poor quality (n= 37), or if the 
scans showed abnormally large ventricles (n=4). To control for the potential 
confounding effect due to the presence of abrupt high intensity signals, we also 
eliminated cases with haemorrhage (n=42). We further excluded patients who were 
non-right-handed (n=54), or who were scanned more than 120 days post stroke 
(n=1) or on the same day (within 24 hours) of their stroke (n = 114). This resulted to a 
final total of 280 patients. A lesion overlap map for our patients is presented in Figure 
5.1. As shown, lesions of the patients cover the entire brain in the two hemispheres 
with maximum overlaps in the right MCA territory (See Appendix D for the method 
used to create the individual lesion maps).  
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All patients provided written informed consent conforming to the ethics protocols 
approved by the UK National Health Service ethics committee, the local NHS trusts 
and the Birmingham University ethics procedures.  
 
Figure 5.1. Stroke lesion overlap map showing the distribution of lesions 
(based only the patients who had an identified lesion in the brain, n=237).  
 
Lesions were identified using an automated delineation method (outlined in Gillebert et al., 
2014). Shared voxels (across patients) are shown on a heat map with the deepest red 
indicating that the most number of participants had that voxel included in their lesion. 
 
5.2.2	  Behavioural	  Measures	  	  
The cognitive abilities of the patients were examined using the BCoS Cognitive 
Screen (Humphreys et al., 2012) (see also Bickerton et al., in press; 
www.cognitionmatters.org.uk). The test battery was developed to examine five core 
‘domains’ of daily cognitive functions: i) language, ii) attention and executive 
functions, iii) memory, iv) praxis and v) number processing. This is achieved by 27 
paper and pencil tasks with each designed to tap into various cognitive processes 
under each domain (http://www.cognitionmatters.org.uk/bcos.php). The tests were 
designed to be aphasia and neglect friendly, to be as sensitive as possible to identify 
cognitive impairments (with validated age-matched cut-off scores) and to optimise 
time efficient test administration (i.e. the entire screen was developed to be 
completed within 60 minutes). During the study, experimenters were blind to the 
specific condition of the patient and the location of any lesion. On average, patients 





Object naming falls within the language domain of BCoS (also referred to as ‘picture 
naming’).  The stimuli comprise 14 grey-level, shaded hand drawings. The items 
were chosen to cover a range of frequency according to the subjective familiarity 
ratings (469-543 out of 700) from the MRC psycholinguistic database (Wilson, 1988). 
In order to represent a variety of semantic categories, half of the items were living 
things (e.g. bat) and half non-living (e.g. spanner). Among the living items there were 
2 animals, 3 fruit and 2 vegetables while the non-living category consisted of 2 tools, 
1 kitchen implement and 4 other household implements. In order to detect word 
production problems sensitive to stimulus length, half of the items had a long name 
(being composed of 6 to 9 letters) and half a short name (3 to 5 letters). During the 
task, participants were presented with each drawing of an object printed centrally on 
an A4 sheet of paper. A maximum of 15 seconds were allowed per item for the 
patient to give a response. Each correct naming response carried one point and the 
maximum task score was 14.  
 
Other visual speech production tasks 
In addition to object naming, we assessed performance on other BCoS tests that also 
required speech output to visual stimuli. The tests included sentence production to a 
picture (to describe what a person was doing), reading a sentence containing some 
low frequency and exception words and reading some nonwords (for details refer to 
Appendix B). 
5.2.3.	  Neuroimaging	  Assessment	  
Acquisition of brain images 
For each patient, computed tomography (CT) images were collected as part of the 
standard clinical procedures. The scans were acquired using one of these scanners: 
Siemens Sensation 16; GE Medical System LightSpeed 16 or LightSpeed plus. The 
CT images were provided by the hospitals in digital DICOM format after they had 
been anonymised. These images covered the whole brain with an in-plane resolution 
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of 0.5 x 0.5 mm2 and a slice thickness of 4-5 mm. The in-plane resolution (along the 
x-y plane) of a CT image was higher than that of a typical MR structural scan (1 x 1 
mm2), but the resolution along the superior-inferior direction (z-axis) was poorer in CT 
compared to MR.  
 
CT images depict the density of the tissue and as such have a clear biological 
interpretation. CT scans also provide an undistorted image of the tissue density.  
However changes in tissue density, especially due to ischemic stroke, may be 
underestimated on a CT scan, at least when the scan is conducted within the first 24 
hours after a stroke (Mohr et al., 1995). Therefore, in the current study, we included 
only patients who had their CT taken at least 24 hours post stroke. Also, to account 
for possible changes in lesions following a stroke, the analysis models included as a 
covariate the interval (in days) between the stroke and the CT scan. On average the 
CT scans were taken 7.26 days after stroke, with 74% of cases within one week of 
the stroke. 
 
Pre-processing of brain images 
The CT images were pre-processed using SPM8 (Statistical Parametric Mapping, 
Welcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, United Kingdom; 
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~spm). The quality of the CT scans was first assessed visually 
to ensure only good quality data (e.g. free from head movement and other image 
artifact) were included in the analysis. This quality check was done on the raw CT 
images and also on the segmented, normalised images by comparing them to the a-
priori tissue templates. This resulted in removal of around 7% of the patients. Pre-
processing started with converting the images to Nifti format and normalising  
(Ashburner & Friston, 2003) them to an in-house CT template. This initial 
normalisation stage was primarily based on skull shape and aimed to transform the 
images into MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) space to optimise the following 
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procedures. Next, the unified-segmentation algorithm implemented in SPM12 (i.e. 
Seg8 in SPM8; Ashburner & Friston, 2005) was employed. In the unified model, the 
priors of the tissue class, from which intensities are drawn, are encoded by 
deformable tissue probability maps. The a-priori tissue class maps indicate the 
probability of finding expected signal sources at each voxel: grey matter (GM), white 
matter (WM), cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), bone, fat and air in the brain. To account for 
the presence of damaged tissue due to stroke, a modified segmentation procedure 
similar to the approach of Seghier and colleagues (2008) was adopted to include a 
seventh tissue class. In creating an additional prior for abnormal tissue, we assumed 
that in each grey or white matter voxel there is a 10% chance of it belonging to an 
abnormal tissue class. This 10% estimation was computed based on the lesion 
volume size (versus the brain size) estimated in BUCS database (for details, see 
Chechlacz et al., 2012). Furthermore, for the grey and white matter tissue 
classification, we assumed a single Gaussian distribution for the underlying 
intensities. To account for potential inhomogeneity of the abnormal tissue we used 2 
different Gaussian distributions to model the intensities in this tissue class. What is 
more, CT images as opposed to MRI do not suffer field bias due to field strength 
inhomogeneity; therefore we did not correct for that in the model. Finally, the 
segmented white and grey matter images were normalised using the parameters 
estimated in the unified-segmentation algorithm again and smoothed using a 12-mm 
full-width-at-half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel to accommodate random field 
theory assumptions of continuity (Worsley & Friston, 1995). The preprocessed GM 
and WM maps were then used in our analyses to explore voxel by voxel the 
relationship between brain lesion and behavioural performance.  
5.2.4.	  Data	  Analysis	  
Behavioural measures 
All the patients completed the object naming test. For the additional visual speech 
production tasks used in the analyses, we replaced missing data with the group 
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average. Data from 2 patients were missing in sentence reading, 8 in sentence 
production and 8 in nonword reading. To examine the relationship between the 
performance on object naming and the covariates, a non-parametric Spearman-rank 
correlation (two-tailed) analysis was carried out.  
 
Principal component analysis (PCA) was performed using Matlab 7.9 (The 
MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) to identify shared and unique components of object 
naming in relation to other language tasks. Our sample consisted of 280 subjects, 
which is considered fairly adequate (N=300) for PCA (Comrey & Lee, 1992). To 
increase the robustness of the analysis, especially for small to moderate sample size, 
a subject-to-variable ratio of at least 5:1 has also been suggested (Hatcher, 1994). 
With 280 cases and 4 variables in this study, a ratio of 70:1 is very adequate to justify 
the purposes of PCA. The use of PCA to rotate behavioural data which is then 
related to the distribution of brain lesions has been demonstrated in recent 
neuropsychological studies of stroke (Butler et al., 2014; Chechlacz, Rotshtein, & 
Humphreys, 2014) and developmental prosopagnosia (Garrido et al., 2009).  
To account for differences in the maximum scores of the language tests (object 
naming: 14; picture description: 8; sentence reading: 40; nonword reading: 6), we re-
scaled the raw scores on each test linearly to range between 0-20. We used in the 
PCA the re-scaled scores of the 280 participants on the four language tests and then 
extracted component loadings (i.e. coefficients) and eigenvalues. No additional 
rotation was applied to the data. Individual performance scores on each principal 
component were also derived and used in the VBM analyses.  
 
Voxel-based morphometry (VBM)  
Using SPM8, all reported VBM analyses were performed on the scans from 280 
patients to determine the neural correlates of object naming and its related cognitive 
components. Random effects analyses were conducted within the general linear 
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model framework and correlations between the behavioural measures and the 
integrity of brain tissues were computed (Ashburner & Friston, 2000).  
We created three separate general linear models. First, we determined the common 
lesions that were associated with object naming deficits in our sample using the 
participants’ raw scores (analysis 1). Second, we identified the lesions unique for 
object naming by controlling in the model for other language tasks including sentence 
production, sentence reading and nonword reading (analysis 2). Third, we examined 
the neural correlates of the individual scores on the principal components derived 
from the PCA (analysis 3). This model included all principal components though we 
focused primarily on the lesions associated with a shared language component and a 
component that was unique to object naming. Reduced integrity of grey and white 
matter were analysed separately for each model.  
In all analyses, the following measures were included as covariates of no interest: 
age, gender, years of education, interval between stroke and CT scanning, interval 
between stroke and cognitive testing, and measures of general cognitive state (we 
used tests of each participant’s overall orientation, see Appendix C for details).  
Inclusion of these covariates allowed us to control for various confounding factors 
that might have potential impact on cognitive performance or the extent of lesion. For 
completeness, in the tables of results we report all clusters with the amplitude of 
voxels surviving Z-score > 2.32 (uncorrected across the whole brain) and an extent 
threshold of at least 300 voxels. However, we focused mainly on the results that were 
reliable at p<0.05 cluster-level corrected for multiple comparisons, unless otherwise 
stated. The brain co-ordinates throughout are presented in the standardised MNI 
space. Anatomical labelling was based on the Anatomical Automatic Labelling 
toolbox (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002), the Duvernoy (1999)’s Human Brain Atlas, 
the JHU White matter tractography atlas (Hua et al., 2008) and the MRI Atlas of 
Human White Matter by Mori (2005).  
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5.3. Results 
5.3.1.	  Behavioural	  Results	  
On average, patients were able to name 10.02 (sd=3.88) objects correctly. 
Compared to the cut-off points established from the age-matched healthy controls 
(http://www.bcos.bham.ac.uk), 108 patients scored lower than the cut-off points and 
were classified as impaired. Table 5.2 provides the descriptive data and average 
scores on the cognitive and language tasks.   
 
Performance on object naming was significantly but weakly associated with age (rs= -
0.164, p<0.01) and years of education (rs=0.218, p<0.01). In addition, individuals who 
performed worse at object naming also had poorer overall ‘orientation’, measured in 
terms of their knowledge of personal information (rs= 0.548, p<0.01) and time and 
space (rs= 0.328, p<0.01). Assessment on the ‘time and space’ measure was based 
on multiple-choice tests and hence did not rely on speech production. Not 
surprisingly object naming was correlated significantly with all other language 
measures including sentence production (rs= 0.596, p<0.01), sentence reading (rs= 
0.636, p<0.01) and nonword reading (rs= 0.566, p<0.01). 
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive data and average test scores of the sample (N=280).  
The scores reflect: Means (Standard deviations in paratheses)  
Variables Scores 
Age in years  70.88   (14.06) 
Years of education 10.89   (2.51) 
Stroke-scan interval (in days)  7.26   (13.78) 
Stroke-cognitive screen interval (in days)  24.07   (21.1) 
BCoS Cognitive Screen Tests:  
i. Object naming (max=14) 10.02   (3.88) 
ii. Sentence production (max=8) 6.35   (2.55) 
iii. Sentence reading (max=42) 34.49   (13.08) 
iv. Nonword reading (max=6) 4.01   (2.26) 
v. Orientation (general cognitive state)  
- Personal Info. (max.=8) 
- Time & Space (max.=6) 
 
7.3   (1.63) 
5.48   (0.99) 
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As an attempt to dissociate processes underlying object naming and the other visual 
speech production tasks, we ran a PCA on the re-scaled raw data of four language 
tests (i.e. object naming, sentence production, sentence and non-word reading). The 
PCA revealed that the four tasks all loaded on the first component with loadings 
ranging between 0.4 and 0.6. This ‘shared’ component accounted for 77.9% of the 
variance. As all the tasks required both visual perception and generation of a verbal 
response, we assume that this component represents a process relating to the 
conversion of visual information into phonological outputs. Another component of 
interest accounted for 4.7% of the variability and had a dominant high loading from 
object naming, separating it from the other three visual speech production tasks. This 
component likely highlights specifically the deficits at recognising objects that are 
less emphasised or not required for the other language tasks tested. Table 5.3 shows 
the loadings on these two components and the correlations between the raw scores 
on each language test and the individual scores on each of the two principal 
components. There were two other components from the PCA outputs: 1) one 
dissociating nonword reading from the other three language tasks (11.6% of the 
variance explained); and 2) one specifically dissociating sentence reading from 
sentence production (5.8% of the variance explained). As these two other 
components were not unique for object naming, they were not the central focus of the 














Table 5.3: Component loadings and correlations between the behavioural 
scores on each of the BCoS language tests and on the principal components 
 
 
The shared language 
component  
 The unique object 
naming component 
Language Tests Loading Correlation  Loading Correlation 
Object Naming 0.422 0.795**  0.840 0.584** 
Sentence Production 0.495 0.754**  -0.285    -0.078 
Sentence Reading 0.489 0.798**  -0.461    -0.003 
Nonword Reading 0.582 0.887**  0.020     0.082 
For each component, the first column shows the loadings from each of the language tests 
and the second column shows the correlation coefficients between the raw scores on each 
language test and the subject’s scores on each component. *Significant at 0.05; **significant 
at 0.001.  
 
To further explore the presence of a unique object naming component we counted 
the number of patients who were classified as impaired in object naming but showed 
normal performance on all the other language tasks. Only 7 patients fulfilled the 
criteria. On the other hand, there were 10 patients classified as impaired in all the 
three language tasks but retained normal functioning in object naming. This may 
suggest a potential double dissociation between object naming and other visual-
speech language tasks although it appears to be a very rare phenomenon 
As lesion size is a factor potentially contributing to the severity of any deficit, each 
patient’s lesion volume was calculated. We then examined its relationship with the 
performance on the four language tasks and the rotated scores for the shared and 
unique naming components. Lesion volume correlated weakly with object naming (rs 
=-0.167, P=0.005), sentence reading (rs =-0.136, P=0.023), sentence production (rs 
=-0.207, P<0.001) and nonword reading (rs =-0.126, P=0.035). Regarding the PCA 
components, lesion volume again correlated weakly with the general language 
component (rs =-0.175, P=0.003) but not at all with the unique naming component (rs 
=-0.058, P=0.337).  
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5.3.2	  Neuroimaging	  Results	  
Next, we related the behavioral measures to the neuroimaging data in order to 
determine the structural lesion correlates of object naming and their associations with 
underlying cognitive processes represented by the two principal components of 
interest. Here, we report the results of three analyses, and for each we computed 
separate probability maps for grey and white matter (GM & WM, respectively): 
Analysis 1 - correlation with only the raw score of object naming; Analysis 2 - 
correlation with object naming after accounting for performances on the other visual 
speech production tasks; Analysis 3 – (a) correlation with the individual scores on the 
‘shared’ language component and (b) with the ‘unique’ object naming component.  
 
GM analyses 
Analysis 1 – Overall performance on object naming: 
This VBM analysis based on the raw scores of object naming alone revealed a 
significant positive relationship with voxels in the left fronto-temporal and medial 
temporal regions and also the bilateral occipital cortices. In particular, impaired 
performance was significantly associated with GM damage in the bilateral posterior 
visual cortices, the left superior temporal gyrus extending to insula and inferior frontal 


















Table 5.4: Grey matter correlates of Analysis 1 – overall object naming and 
Analysis 3a – a ‘shared’ language component.  
  Analysis 1: 
Overall Object Naming (NO control of 
other language tasks) 
 Analysis 3a: 













  x y z   x y z  
Fronto-temporal region       




5523** -64 -12 -3 (4.23)  6516** -66 -15 -3 (4.32) 
Temporo-occipital region       
 Left fusiform 6486** -22 -33 -18 (4.33)  2861** -22 -33 -18 (4.22) 
 Left posterior 
occipital 




3361** 14 -93 24 (3.8)   10 -91 -9 (3.26) 
Note: The first column under each analysis reports the size (number of voxels) of each of the 
clusters with amplitude of voxels surviving Z=2.32 (uncorrected) and an extent threshold of 
300 voxels. In each cluster, the MNI coordinates (x,y,z) and the peak reliability in brackets 
(Z) are reported. ** p<0.05 FWE-corrected significant at cluster level. Acronyms: IFG – 
inferior frontal gyrus; STG – superior temporal gyrus 
 
 
Analysis 2 – Performance on object naming in relation to the other language tasks: 
To identify the neural correlates specific to object naming but not to other visual 
speech production tasks, we included the scores of 3 other language tests (i.e. 
sentence production, sentence reading and non-word reading) as covariates in a 
separate model. The results of this analysis did not survive the cluster-level threshold 
of p<0.05 with FWE correction. However, they do suggest that lesions to the bilateral 
anterior superior temporal and inferior frontal gyri, the left hippocampus and several 
regions in the cerebellum were associated uniquely with object naming (Table 5.5, 
Analysis 2). Notably, lesions to the left fusiform and lingual gyri were not found to be 





Table 5.5: Grey matter correlates of Analysis 2 – object naming after controlling 
for other language tasks and Analysis 3b – a ‘unique’ naming component.  
  Analysis 2: 
Object Naming (after controlling 
for other language tasks) 
 Analysis 3b: 
Unique Object Naming 
Component  








  x y z  x y z 
Fronto-temporal region       
 Left IFG 
 
668 -56 17 1 (3.06)  1709 -56 17 1 (3.14) 
 Left ant. STG 
(covering STP) 
482 -48 15 -24 (2.92)   -44 14 -23 (2.98) 
 Right IFG 
 
499 51 20 -8 (2.91)  2106 50 18 -9 (3.38) 
 Right ant. STG 
(covering STP) 
 45 12 -17 (2.79)   45 8 -20 (3.49) 
             
Medial temporal region       
 Left hippocampus 857 -39 -30 -5 (3.18)  1387 -42 -28 -12 (4.00) 
 Right 
hippocampus 
      488 34 -27 -3 (3.14) 
Occipital region        
 Right posterior 
occipital 
1540 12 -88 25 (3.68)  1156 10 -90 30 (3.36) 
Cerebellum        
 Middle cerebellar 
cluster 
458 -6 -70 -14 (2.80)  3431** -3 -69 -14 (3.41) 
 Left cerebellar 
cluster 
2635 -30 -81 -21 (3.46)   -15 -87 -27 (3.37) 
 Right cerebellar 
cluster 
970 14 -87 -33 (3.58)  1056 15 -85 -32 (4.00) 
Note: The first column under each analysis reports the size (number of voxels) of each of the 
clusters with amplitude of voxels surviving Z=2.32 (uncorrected) and an extent threshold of 
300 voxels. In each cluster, the MNI coordinates (x,y,z) and the peak reliability in brackets 
(Z) are reported. ** p<0.05 FWE-corrected significant at cluster level. Acronyms: IFG – 
inferior frontal gyrus; ant. STG – anterior superior temporal gyrus; STP – superior temporal 
pole 
 
Analysis 3 – The ‘shared’ and the ‘unique’ naming components: 
This VBM analysis correlated each brain voxel with the subject’s score on a principal 
component generated from the PCA procedure. From analysis 3a (Table 5.4), the 
‘share’ component was reliably correlated with lesions in the left lateral fronto-
temporal and fusiform regions and the bilateral visual cortices. These were similar to 
the lesion pattern observed when performance on object naming was modelled alone 
(without controlling for any other language tasks; i.e. Table 5.4, Analysis 1; see also 
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Figure 5.2). On the other hand, the lesion pattern associated with the ‘unique’ naming 
component (Table 5.5, Analysis 3b) mirrored the results yielded in Analysis 5.2 
(Table 5.5) where performances on the other three language tasks were partialled 
out from object naming (Figure 5.3).  
 
Figure 5.2. Voxel-wise statistical analysis of grey matter damage: overall object 
naming and the shared language component.  
 
Note: VBM results showing voxels corresponding to grey matter damage in (red) overall 
object naming, (yellow) the ‘shared’ language principal component and (orange) their 
overlay. Please note that the lesioned areas are coloured according to their significance level 
in the VBM analysis, where brighter colours mean higher t-values. The numbers in brackets 
indicate peak MNI coordinates. Rows (1) & (2) show the neural correlates of the results in 
different views of the brain. Across each row, the first two images are T1-weighted MR 
images overlaid with statistical parametric maps (SPMs) generated from the VBM analyses. 
In addition, to further illustrate the possible use of CT scans in lesion-function mapping 
analysis, SPMs are plotted on CT images (the right-most image across each row) of the 
same axial views. IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; STG, superior temporal gyrus; FG, fusiform 









Figure 5.3. Voxel-wise statistical analysis of grey matter damage: object 
naming with control of the performance on other visual speech production 
tasks and the unique naming component.  
 
Note: VBM results showing voxels corresponding to grey matter damage in (blue) object 
naming after controlling for the other visual speech production tasks, (green) the ‘unique’ 
naming principal component and (cyan) their overlay. Please note that the lesioned areas are 
coloured according to their significance level in the VBM analysis, where brighter colours 
mean higher t-values. The numbers in brackets indicate peak MNI coordinates. Also refer to 
the notes in Figure 5.2 for further guidelines on viewing the images. L, left; R, right; hippo, 
hippocampus; STP, superior temporal pole. 
 
WM analyses 
Analysis 1 – Overall performance on object naming: 
VBM analysis of WM maps and object naming scores alone revealed a significant 
relationship between object naming deficits and reduced white matter density in an 
extensive region encompassing the temporal and inferior parietal lobes in the left 
hemisphere and the bilateral visual cortices (Table 5.6, Analysis 1). Damage to WM 
in temporo-parietal areas is likely to disconnect the inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus, 
inferior longitudinal fasciculus, parts of the superior longitudinal fasciculus including 
the arcuate fasciculus (Hua et al., 2008; Mori et al., 2005). Bilateral occipital white 
matter lesions, on the other hand, are linked to damage of the posterior end of the 
inferior fronto-occipital fasciculi (Hua et al., 2008; Mori et al., 2005). 
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Table 5.6: White matter correlates of Analysis 1 – object naming and Analysis 
3a – a ‘shared’ language component.  
 Analysis 1: 
Overall Object Naming (NO 
control of other language 
tasks) 
 Analysis 3a: 
















 x y z  x y z  
Temporo-parieto-occipital region        





 >> Left occipital   -28 -27 33 (4.75)  
 4105** 15 -88 15 (3.97)  >> a large cluster of bi-occipital, 
left temporal and inferior parietal 
cortices 
 
 >> Right occipital   
 11114** -45 -33 -12 (5.5)   
 >> Left temporal  
extending into parietal 
   
Note: The first column under each analysis reports the size (number of voxels) of each of the 
clusters with amplitude of voxels surviving Z=2.32 (uncorrected) and an extent threshold of 
300 voxels. In each cluster, the MNI coordinates (x,y,z) and the peak reliability in brackets 
(Z) are reported. ** p<0.05 FWE-corrected significant at cluster level. Acronyms: IFOF – 
inferior frontal-occipital fasciculus; ILF – inferior longitudinal fasciculus; SLF – superior 
longitudinal fasciculus; AF – arcuate fasciculus 
 
 
Analysis 2 – Performance on object naming in relation to the other language tasks: 
After controlling for performances on the three other visual speech production tasks, 
object naming correlated with WM integrity of a smaller area in the left temporal lobe 
and a small cluster of voxels in the cerebellum (Table 5.7, Analysis 2). However, 
these relationships were only weakly reliable at the cluster level. Lesion to this 
temporal area affects most likely the temporal tail of the arcuate fasciculus. Damage 
to the cerebellum, on the other hand, is likely to impede transfer of information along 








Table 5.7: White matter correlates of Analysis 2 – object naming after controlling for 
other language tasks and Analysis 3b – a ‘unique’ naming component.  
 Analysis 2: 
Object Naming (after 
controlling for other language 
tasks) 
 Analysis 3b: 
Unique Object Naming 
Component 
  










 x y z  x y z  
Temporal region        
 2782* -44 -31 -12 (4.81)  3123* -42 -30 -11 (4.76)  Temporal end 
of AF 
      
Cerebellum         
 490 -8 -55 -35 (3.05)  749 -4 -52 -35 (3.28)  MCP 
Note: The first column under each analysis reports the size (number of voxels) of each of the 
clusters with amplitude of voxels surviving Z=2.32 (uncorrected) and an extent threshold of 
300 voxels. In each cluster, the MNI coordinates (x,y,z) and the peak reliability in brackets 
(Z) are reported. ** p<0.05; *p<0.1 FWE-corrected significant at cluster level. Acronyms: AF 
– arcuate fasciculus; MCP – middle cerebellar peduncle 
 
Figure 5.4. Voxel-wise statistical analysis of white matter damage: overall object 
naming and the shared language component.  
 
Note: VBM results showing voxels corresponding to white matter damage in (red) overall object 
naming, (yellow) the ‘shared’ language principal component and (orange) their overlay. Please note 
that the lesioned areas are coloured according to their significance level in the VBM analysis, where 
brighter colours mean higher t-values. The numbers in brackets indicate peak MNI coordinates. On 
the top row are two T1-weighted MR images overlaid with statistical parametric maps (SPMs) 
generated from the VBM analyses. In addition, to further illustrate the possible use of CT scans in 
lesion-function mapping analysis, SPMs are plotted on a CT image (bottom right) of the same axial 
view as the T1-weighted image above it.  
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Analysis 3 – The ‘shared’ and the ‘unique’ naming components: 
A significant relationship was found between the subject’s score on the ‘shared’ 
component and WM density of an extensive region in the left temporal and parietal 
cortices and the bilateral occipital cortices (Table 5.6, Analysis 3a). There is a high 
degree of similarities between these results and those of Analysis 1, which modelled 
object naming alone (Figure 5.4). In contrast, the white matters associated with the 
‘unique’ naming component (Table 5.7, Analysis 3b) greatly overlap with the outputs 
of Analysis 2 (Table 5.7), the one that looked at object naming after partialling out the 
performances on other language tasks (Figure 5.5).  
Finally, we included lesion volume as an additional covariate in all the VBM analyses 
and the pattern of results did not change. 
 
Figure 5.5. Voxel-wise statistical analysis of white matter damage: object naming with 
control of the performance on other visual speech production tasks and the unique 
naming component.  
 
Note: VBM results showing voxels corresponding to white matter damage in (blue) object naming after 
controlling for the other visual speech production tasks, (green) the ‘unique’ naming principal 
component and (cyan) their overlay. The numbers in brackets indicate peak MNI coordinates. Also 
refer to the notes in Figure 5.4 for further guidelines on viewing the images. 
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5.4. Discussion 
To examine the relationship between object naming and other visual speech 
production tasks, we carried out a principal component analysis across the language 
tasks. This analysis revealed a ‘shared’ component that loaded across all the tasks. 
This component was linked to damage to the bilateral posterior occipital cortices and 
left-lateralised regions including the fusiform and the superior temporal gyrus (STG) 
extending into the insula and the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). Similarly, the white 
matter damage associated with this ‘shared’ language component was left 
lateralised. These regions were also related to poor object naming when it was 
assessed alone without controlling for performances on other visual speech 
production tasks. In contrast to these analyses of common language processes, we 
also evaluated the processes particularly stressed in object naming by (i) including 
the other visual speech production tasks as regressors in the VBM analysis and (ii) 
examining the ‘unique’ naming component that dissociate object naming from the 
other tasks. These analyses indicated particular involvement in object naming of the 
two anterior superior temporal poles (extending to IFG), as well as the hippocampus 
and cerebellum.  
5.4.1	  Shared	  Neural	  Substrates	  of	  Object	  Naming	  
PCA across object naming, sentence production, sentence and nonword reading 
produced a component that accounted for more than 75% of the total variance and 
the loadings from the four tasks on this component ranged between 0.4 and 0.6. This 
‘shared’ component is likely to stress more visual recognition, phonological retrieval 
and articulation because all the tasks rely on speech response to a visual input and 
the nonword reading task would not require semantic processing. When analysed 
alone, object naming (Analysis 1) was linked to the same left lateralised network as 
the ‘shared’ component (Analysis 3a). This indicates that without additional care 
being taken to isolate factors stressed by object naming, lesion-symptom analyses of 
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object naming tend to highlight the visual and phonological processing found in a 
number of language tasks.  
 
The four language tasks employed in the present study all potentially demand high-
level processing of visual inputs. This may be why the shared component was linked 
to the lateral occipital cortex and the fusiform gyrus. In agreement with our findings, 
these two regions have often been associated with processing of complex visual 
inputs such as faces, objects and words (Bar et al., 2001, 2006; Dien, 2009; Grill-
Spector, Kourtzi, & Kanwisher, 2001; Herbster et al., 1997; Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006; 
Malach et al., 2002; McCarthy et al., 1997), even though each type of stimulus may 
recruit slightly different segments of the striate and extrastriate cortices (see 
Dehaene et al., 2002; McCandliss et al., 2003, but also Price and Devlin, 2003; 
Starrfelt and Gerlach, 2007). Yet, it is likely that stroke which typically affects a large 
area in the brain impairs various types of high-level visual processing simultaneously 
(as in our case) due to the spatial proximity of the corresponding loci within the 
occipito-temporal regions. 
 
The involvement of the left inferolateral frontal gyrus (extending to the insula) and the 
superior temporal gyrus in shared language processes is not surprising. These 
results accord with a recent study showing links between these temporo-frontal areas 
and a phonological factor of language (Butler et al., 2014). The IFG has long been 
held to play an important role in production of meaningful speech (Broca, 1861). 
Infarction to this frontal area has been related to a number of speech impediments 
including apraxia of speech and expressive aphasia (for a detailed review, see 
Caplan, 1987). Besides, a body of evidence implicates also the left insular gyrus (a 
neighbouring brain structure of the IFG) in speech production (Dronkers, 1996; Kleist, 
1934; Mazzocchi & Vignolo, 1979; Mohr et al., 1978).  A recent review of the clinical 
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and functional imaging literature suggests that the insula participates in articulatory 
planning and control processes (Ackermann & Riecker, 2010). Along with STG these 
areas constitute part of the dorsal ‘speech-processing’ pathway that has been 
proposed to specialise in phonological processing (Hickok & Poeppel, 2007; 
Rauschecker & Scott, 2009; Saur et al., 2008).  
 
The present study also observed associations between white matter lesions in the 
left temporal and bilateral ventral occipital lobes and impairment in a general visual-
to-speech language function, represented by the shared component. Putting together 
the previously proposed functions of various parts of the visual-to-speech network, 
here we suggest that impairment in the general language function requiring visual-to-
speech interaction can also be the results of disconnection between the occipital and 
ventral temporal lobes and/or also between the occipital and inferior frontal lobes via 
the temporal regions.  
5.4.2	  Unique	  Neural	  Substrates	  of	  Object	  Naming	  
We also attempted to dissociate the brain regions recruited especially by object 
naming. This was done by analysing the neural correlates of object naming with the 
other three language tasks included as regressors, and also by assessing the 
‘unique’ PCA component that isolated object naming from the other tasks. This 
‘unique’ object naming component, likely emphasising the deficits at recognising 
objects, was associated with lesions to the bilateral anterior temporal lobes, the 
hippocampi and several cerebellar areas (Analysis 3b). Corroborating evidence was 
provided by an additional analysis (Analysis 2) using object naming as the variable of 
interest while controlling for other visual speech production tasks. However, these 
‘unique’ associations did not reach family-wise significance (apart from a cerebellar 
area). This is probably because the occurrence of cases of deficits at object naming 
only in the absence of more general language impairment is rather rare.  
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Nevertheless, we note that the observation of a potential bi-anterior temporal 
association with object naming is in agreement with previous studies testing semantic 
dementia (Jefferies & Lambon Ralph, 2006; Lambon Ralph, Lowe, & Rogers, 2007) 
and temporal lobe epilepsy (Hodges & Patterson, 2007; Lambon Ralph, Ehsan, 
Baker, & Rogers, 2012; Seidenberg et al., 2002). These past studies concur that the 
anterior temporal lobes contribute to semantic representation and comprehension 
(see also Gough et al., 2005; Pobric et al., 2007; Schwartz et al., 2009; Tranel et al., 
1997; Woollams, 2012) necessary for accurate object naming. Problems with 
recognising objects (agnosia), sometimes limited to the recognition of unique objects 
such as faces, has been related to anterior temporal atrophy, primarily in the right 
hemisphere (Acres, Taylor, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009; Gainotti, Barbier, & 
Marra, 2003). Taken together with the results of left-lateralised lesions associated 
with the shared language component (discussed earlier), our findings are 
complementary to a proposed model of naming that suggests a left-localised 
phonological representation system which connects strongly to a bilaterally 
distributed conceptualisation network (Lambon Ralph, McClelland, Patterson, Galton, 
& Hodges, 2001; Schapiro, McClelland, Welbourne, Rogers, & Lambon Ralph, 2013). 
Consistent with the predictions of this proposal, some patients with predominantly 
left-temporal lobe atrophy has been reported to show a more rapid decline for 
naming relative to recognising objects, whereas parallel declines in both naming and 
comprehension are showed in patients with greater reduction of neural substrates in 
the right (than left) temporal lobe (Lambon Ralph et al., 2001).  
 
The unique involvement of cerebellar areas and hippocampus in object processing is 
less clear. Recent literature has implicated the hippocampus in some forms of 
semantic processing (Bonelli et al., 2011; Holdstock et al., 2002; Manns et al., 2003; 
Ryan et al., 2008; Schacter et al., 1996) or processing of complex visual stimuli 
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(Sawrie et al., 2000; Sehatpour et al., 2010; Vannucci et al., 2003) and the 
cerebellum in high-level cognitive operations (Desmond & Fiez, 1998; Molinari, 
Leggio, & Silveri, 1997). Still, further investigation is needed to clarify the unique 
contribution of these neural substrates to object naming deficits following stroke.  
5.4.3	  Methodological	  Consideration	  
Our study provides additional evidence for the use of the clinically acquired 
behavioural and structural imaging data in voxel-based correlation analysis (refer 
also to Chechlacz et al., 2012). Specifically, the behavioural data were derived from a 
large-scale clinical trial of cognitive testing and the CT scans were collected from 
clinics and hospitals as part of the standard everyday medical practice. Despite being 
the preferred modality in clinical stroke units (e.g. Karnath el al. (2004) reported that 
CT was used for 72 out of 140 stroke patients at admission), CT images are not 
usually used in statistical anatomical research. Only recently the first high-resolution 
CT template (to aid normalisation of the images) was published (Rorden, Bonilha, 
Fridriksson, Bender, & Karnath, 2012) and image-processing algorithms were 
improved to make statistical analysis of large CT datasets more feasible (Gillebert, 
Humphreys, & Mantini, 2014).  This chapter reported the use of CT scans in 
automated lesion-symptom mapping to answer a psycholinguistic question and the 
findings accord with past studies based on other high resolution structural scans. 
 
CT scanning measures tissue density and provides meaningful biological signals, 
making them relatively easy for comparison across scanner sites. However, CT 
scans, similar to T1- and T2-weighted MR images, fail to detect cortical dysfunction 
arising from inadequate cortical perfusion within a region that is structurally intact. 
Abnormal reduction in perfusion may contribute to cognitive deficits (for example 
see Hillis et al., 2000; Karnath et al., 2005; Ticini et al., 2010). Besides, it has been 
shown that lesions caused by ischemic stroke may not be immediately identified 
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when CT scans are acquired too early (Wardlaw & Farrall, 2004), especially within 
the first 24 hours post stroke (Mohr et al., 1995). The current study, therefore, 
excluded scans that were taken less than a day after a stroke. As tissue loss 
continues for a few weeks to several months after stroke, signals arising from 
lesioned tissues may vary with time. To control for that, we added the interval 
between the stroke and the scan acquisition as a covariate measure.  
 
The use of clinical data in general also has a few shortcomings. Behavioural and 
imaging measurements may not be as accurate as those acquired in a lab 
environment. This is mostly because under the time pressure in clinical settings 
measurements are designed to capture the most essential diagnostic information at 
the expense of the reliability gained through trial repetition. However, the advantage 
we have had here is a much larger sample size compared to a typical lesion-
symptom mapping study, as well as the reduced burden imposed on patients wishing 
to contribute to research. After all, we believe this represents a reasonable trade-off 
(for more information about this clinical trial, see also Bickerton et al., 2014). 
Moreover, in many past studies patients were pre-selected based on specific lesion 
locations (e.g. Baldo et al., 2013; DeLeon et al., 2007; looking at left hemispheric 
damage only) or cognitive impairment (e.g. Mesulam et al., 2009; Schwartz et al., 
2009; focusing only on specific aphasic patients). Here, we used minimal exclusion 
criteria, meaning that our results can be generalised to a broad population of patients 
with sub-acute stroke at large. As another point to note, the four tests included in our 
comparison all require visual and phonological (/motor) processing and both types of 
processing were captured by the shared PCA component. This could be a limitation 




The one-to-one lesion-symptom mapping correlational approach used in VBM is 
another potential limitation. Object naming is a complex cognitive task and damage 
to any parts of the cortical network sustaining the underlying cognitive processes 
would lead to deficits at object naming. The fact that lesions are usually sampled 
unevenly across the brain in stroke patients (Ng, Stein, Ning, & Black-Schaffer, 2007) 
may be a limitation for mass-univariate (voxel-wise) analysis since this is likely to 
reduce the statistical power of identifying brain-function (lesion-deficit) relationship 
contributed by less frequent lesions (see also Chechlacz et al., 2013). Yet, it is worth 
mentioning that the lesion coverage of our patients encompassed the entire brain.  
 
As a final note, the current study used parametric analysis, with both the brain signal 
and the behaviour measures represented as continuous variables. In contrast with 
having lesions manually delineated by the researchers or any human staff, the brain 
tissue density was automatically assessed by a unified-segmentation algorithm (for 
details, see Methods: Pre-processing of brain images), which was implemented to 
optimise tissue classification for VBM analysis. This procedure has several 
advantages. First, it is user independent and hence replicable. Also, it is blind to the 
cause of tissue reduction and would note any abnormal tissue change. In other 
words, results may not be attributed solely to ‘lesion’ per se but there could be other 
neurodegenerative conditions causing brain abnormality. Be that as it may, we argue 
that overlooking tissue loss that is not primarily caused by a stroke insult (it would be 
the case in manual lesion delineation procedures) may result in misinformed 
function-lesion mapping because any abnormal tissue change, whatever the cause, 
can impair cognitive functioning.  
 
5.4.4	  Implications	  of	  the	  Study	  
The clinical and scientific values of the present study are threefold. Firstly, we tested 
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the relevance between object naming and other common spoken language abilities 
because in many bedside neuropsychological assessments object naming is often 
tested to indicate retained language function (e.g. in MoCa, MMSE). Our results 
suggest that deficit at object naming in the majority of patients can be a good 
predictor for more general language impairment, which is evidenced by the great 
extent of the shared lesions contributing to a ‘shared’ language component in a 
typical clinical population. Secondly, our study provides evidence for the possibility of 
using data collected primarily for everyday clinical assessment to address a scientific 
question in the psycholinguistic context. Particularly, clinical CT scans were analysed 
with the use of the most up-to-date statistical tools that were originally developed for 
handling high resolution imaging data. As discussed above, our findings correspond 
with the past literature based on other neuroscience techniques. Finally, to date there 
are various treatment approaches (and their variations) for naming impairment, or 
aphasia at large, including explicitly training individuals in whole word naming (with or 
without provision of particular cues) (for review see Nickels, 2002). Another approach 
to the problem specifically directs at the level of phonologic processor through 
training in phoneme production and comprehension of phonological sequence 
knowledge (Kendall et al., 2008). Our data posit that naming deficits are very likely to 
occur with more generic language impairment in converting visual inputs to speech 
production.  As a result, training tapping into more general language-cognitive 




The current study used VBM in a large sample of sub-acute stroke patients to 
determine the common and dissociable neural substrates of object naming in relation 
to various language tasks that require visually-driven speech production. We showed 
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a distinction between a large neural network commonly engaged across various 
language tasks (within the left temporal cortex and its surrounding areas) and a 
number of potentially specific brain regions (particularly the bilateral anterior temporal 
lobes) required to support object naming. These findings are in line with the 
hypothesis that object naming relies on a left-lateralised language dominant system 
that interacts closely with a bi-anterior temporal network.  Beyond this, our work also 
highlights the value of examining patient performance in object naming in relation to 
other language tasks, as is done by screens such as the BCoS which provide an 
overall profile of cognition in patients.   
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Chapter 6.General Discussion 
The present work has evaluated the roles of dorsal and ventral processing streams in 
recognition and use of objects. I first investigated how the brain processes semantic 
and action knowledge in different object-related tasks. To this aim I examined 
structural data from stroke patients and functional data from healthy individuals using 
a voxel-wise statistical analysis method. With data of different modalities (structural 
CT, fMRI) from different sources (patients’ lesions; healthy subjects’ functional 
activity) handled with a systematic analysis approach, I attempted to find convergent 
evidence to support the dissociation of semantic and action processing. In follow-up 
studies, I also looked into the potential differentiation within the processing of object-
related action and the processing related to recognition, separately. 
 
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) presented a study that assessed the 
relationships between patients’ lesions and their deficits at various object-related 
functions, using voxel-based morphemtry (VBM). Previous patient-based evidence 
for dissociation between object recognition and object-directed action mainly comes 
from single case or case series neuropsychological reports. However, these cases 
are rare and patients do not usually have perfectly selective lesions that are 
restricted to one visual stream/or certain brain structures of interest. In contrast to 
these past studies, I sampled a large group of patients (N=247), who all completed a 
battery of tests taken from the BCoS Cognitive Screen. They included four tasks, 
each of which assessed different object-related functions, including i) object 
recognition, ii) actual object use, iii) pantomimed use and iv) pantomimed gesture 
recognition. I probed for the potential shared and dissociated cognitive mechanisms 
underlying these object-related functions using principal component analysis (PCA).  
VBM analysis was performed to determine the unique grey matter substrates that 
were associated with deficit at each of the object-related functions, as well as their 
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common substrates (based on patients’ CT scans). I also mapped the 
neuroanatomical correlates of the principal components identified in the PCA 
procedure. The global null conjunction analysis of the four object-related tasks 
revealed common lesions to the somatosensory cortex (S1 and S2). Damage to this 
brain area, potentially related to cross-modal representation, was also observed in a 
complementary VBM analysis of a shared component (that loaded almost equally on 
all the four object-related tasks). I also demonstrated that unique lesions for deficits 
at object recognition and the three action tasks were reliably dissociable. i) Unique 
lesions for object recognition were found in ventral stream structures encompassing 
the fusiform gyrus, as well as the superior temporal and inferior frontal cortices. In 
contrast, the overall ability to interact with objects relied on areas within the dorsal 
stream, and there was evidence of a dissociation between the three action tasks, 
instantiated at the neuroanatomical level: ii) actual object use was specifically related 
to grey-matter integrity in the medial parieto-occipital cortex (mPOC); iii) pantomimed 
use was uniquely linked to the posteromedial occipital cortex; iv) unique substrates 
for pantomimed gesture recognition were primarily found in the left IPS and 
surrounding parietal areas. Correspondingly, comparable results were also revealed 
by the VBM analyses of the relevant principal components (each stressing specific 
processes of a particular task). To our knowledge this is the first VBM study that 
examined object recognition and various object-directed action functions together 
using the same sample of patients.  
 
With a slightly different emphasis, the second empirical study (Chapter 3) used fMRI 
to examine the kinds of knowledge that are processed rather than the types of 
cognitive processing undergone in different parts of the brain. Existing 
neuropsychological and functional imaging studies have shown neural differentiation 
between action and conceptual (functional) knowledge about tools. In a similar vein, 
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the key objective of this second study was to further explore whether this 
differentiation between the two types of knowledge could be generalised to other 
semantic categories, i.e. when the category of animals was also considered. A 
factorial design was adopted, allowing a direct comparison of the differences in 
neural activation related to object category (animals, manipulable artefacts) and type 
of knowledge (action, conceptual) respectively. The main effects of knowledge type 
revealed that decision demanding action knowledge uniquely activated the left 
parietal (anterior half of SPL, IPL, IPS) and premotor (dPMC, vPMC) cortex as well 
as the left posterior temporal areas, whereas conceptual decision uniquely activated 
mainly the midline brain structures including the PCG, as well as the left anterior 
temporal lobe. By comparing the patterns of activation, it was noted that the unique 
neural correlates of artefacts bore strong resemblance to those of action knowledge 
while the unique correlates of animals were in great correspondence with those of 
conceptual knowledge. These findings lend support specifically to the property-based 
theories (Warrington & McCarthy, 1987; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) for categorical 
specificity – the representation of animals is weighted more strongly towards retrieval 
of conceptual knowledge, mediated mainly by the PCG and anterior temporal cortex, 
while the representation of artefacts is more reliant on access to action knowledge, 
mediated by a frontoparietal network. 
 
The third empirical study (Chapter 4) has a specific focus on processing of observed 
actions. It explored the potential differentiation of neural representations for different 
forms of action, categorised based on their meaningfulness and the type of object 
involved. As reported in neuropsychological studies, some patients are quite severely 
impaired in their imitation performance, particularly with gestures related to using a 
body-referenced object (toothbrushing) rather than those related to using a world-
referenced object (hammering).  This study in Chapter 4 used fMRI to evaluate the 
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modulatory effect of the type of action on cerebral activation while the participants 
(neurologically healthy individuals) were watching a series of movies that 
demonstrated the use of two kinds of objects (i.e. body-referenced, world-
referenced). In these demonstration movies, an object can be used either in a 
meaningful (common) or a meaningless (not common) way. The main effects of 
object kind showed involvement mainly in different parts of the (parieto-)occipital 
cortex for the two different kinds of objects used, with an exceedingly greater extent 
of involvement in these areas for the world-referenced ( > body-referenced) objects. 
Moreover, the meaningfulness of action modulated neural responses in the anterior 
regions of bilateral parietal lobes and the right dorsal premotor cortex, which were 
more responsive during the observation of meaningless, compared with meaningful, 
actions. This effect was possibly due to the extra demand on the frontoparietal ‘action 
representation’ network for encoding the unfamiliar, meaningless stimuli. There were 
also interaction effects – viewing of the meaningful, typical use of world-reference (> 
body-referenced) objects uniquely elevated activity in the posterior visual cortex, 
which is possibly due to an increased focus on visual guidance in motor control for 
acting on a target in external space; on the contrary, viewing of the meaningful, 
typical use of body-referenced (> world-referenced) objects excited bilaterally the 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and a lateral inferior occipital area (i.e. the 
occipital face area, OFA), as well as the PCC. The pSTS and OFA in particular have 
been associated with processing of body configural and postural cues. To my 
knowledge, this is the first direct, systematic investigation that shows dissociation of 
neural representations for the use of body-referenced and world-referenced objects. 
The last empirical investigation (Chapter 5) specifically focused on the information 
processing in recognition and naming of objects. It was a lesion(brain)-
symptom(function) mapping study on visual speech production deficits in a large 
group of stroke patients (N=280) in the sub-acute stage (<120 days post-stroke). 
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Performance on object naming was evaluated alongside three other tests of visual 
speech production, namely sentence production to a picture, sentence reading and 
nonword reading. All these tests were taken from the BCoS Cognitive Screen. A 
principal component analysis was performed on the tests’ raw scores and revealed a 
‘shared’ component that loaded across all four visual speech production tasks and a 
‘unique’ component that isolated object naming from the other three tasks. Regions 
for the shared component were observed in the left fronto-temporal cortices, fusiform 
gyrus and bilateral visual cortices. Lesions in these regions linked to both poor object 
naming and impairment in general visual-speech production. On the other hand, the 
unique naming component was potentially associated with the bilateral anterior 
temporal poles, as well as the hippocampus and cerebellar areas. These results 
were largely mirrored by an additional analysis defining object naming as the variable 
of main interest together with the other three language tasks included as regressors. 
Taken together, these data are in line with the models proposing that object naming 
relies on a left-lateralised language dominant system that interacts with a bilateral 
anterior temporal network (Lambon Ralph et al., 2001; Schapiro et al., 2013). 
Neuropsychological deficits in object naming can reflect both the increased demands 
specific to the task and the more general difficulties in language processing. 
 
In the beginning of this thesis, I asked two questions: 1) Is there a generic 
dissociation between dorsal and ventral contributions to object-related processing? 2) 
Is there further differentiation within each processing stream, i.e. in action and 
recognition-related processing separately?  
 
Comparing the results reported in Chapters 2 and 3, convergent findings were 
provided overall from the voxel-based morphometric analysis of patients’ lesion data 
and the fMRI study with healthy participants, supporting a clear dorsal and ventral 
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distinction between recognition and action to objects: an association was observed 
between ventral brain structures and the retrieval of semantic knowledge/object 
recognition while a dorsal fronto-parietal-occipital network was found to support the 
processing of action knowledge/object-oriented action. Also, specific dissociations 
were observed within the representations for object-oriented actions as well as the 
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Figure A.1. VBM analysis – grey matter substrates of object-related cognitive 
functions (level of performance assessed as in raw test scores). The patient’s ‘site of 
admission’ was added as an additional covariate. 
 Cluster  Peak  Coordinates  Brain structures (location) 
 Size  (Z-score)  x y z   
Global Null 
 713*  3.40  -58 -24 -11  Left mid MTG 
   3.95  -45 -37 -8  Left mid MTG and surrounding white 
matters 
Object Recognition 
 2638**  4.56  -22 -36 -20  Left P-mTG including fusiform gyrus 
 1331  3.40  -58 14 7  Left IFG extending into mid STG 
Actual Object Use 
 2271**  3.92  -8 
 
-64 27  Bilateral mPOC (precunus, cuneus, 
parieto-occipital fissure) 
 1075  3.74  -4 -57 -20  Cerebellum (vermis) 
 929  4.14  -44 29 -11  Left IFG 
Pantomimed Object Use 
 3325**  4.03  15 -96 4  Right P-mOC (V1 and extrastriate 
areas) 
 663  3.73  -18 -96 21  Left P-OC 
Pantomime Recognition 
 2427**  3.42  -44 -34 37  Left IPS and neighbouring areas 
 1799**  3.91  -4 -45 10  Bilateral anterior cingulate cortex  
 621  3.40  -18 -52 3  Right posterior thalamus 
 599  3.38  -32 2 43  Left precentral gyrus 
 537  3.05  -10 -7 10  Left thalamus  
 484  3.16  42 -30 52  Right postcentral gyrus 
Other covariates in the analysis included: age, gender, years of education, interval 
between stroke and CT scanning, interval between stroke and cognitive testing, and 
measures of general cognitive state. Abbreviations: MTG, middle temporal gyrus; 
pmTG, posterior medial temporal gyrus; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; STG, superior 
temporal gyrus; mPOC, medial parieto-occipital cortex; pmOC, posterior medial 
occipital cortex; V1, primary visual cortex; pOC, posterior occipital cortex; IPS, 
intraparietal sulcus; VBM, voxel-based morphometry. Significant at **p<0.05; *p<0.1, 







Visual Speech Production Tasks 
The other tests of visual speech generation used in the present study are sentence 
production, sentence reading and nonword reading from the BCoS Cognitive Screen 
(Humphreys et al., 2012).  
 
Sentence Production (also referred as ‘Sentence Construction’ in BCoS) 
This task consists of two items. For each item, the patient is instructed to recognise a 
photograph and construct a sentence that fulfills two criteria: (1) the sentence must 
describe what a person in the given photo is doing upon an object or two and (2) the 
sentence must contain the two words provided alongside the photo.  The two given 
words are either (in the 1st item) the names of two objects or (in the 2nd item) the 
name of an object and the identity of a person. The first item should allow the patient 
to produce a simple sentence that depicts a person carrying out an action upon an 
object in relation to another object [agent – action – object1 (in) object2]. The second 
item requires production of a more complex sentence that describes a person 
carrying out an action upon an object in relation to another person [agent1 – action – 
object – (on) – agent 2]. The test assesses whether the patient has problems in 
semantic and syntactic processes, as well as problems in articulation. 
For each item, the photo is centrally presented on the page, with two given words 
printed below the photo, also in the centre column of the page, one word above the 




There are two sentences in this task, allowing assessment of the patient’s ability to 
read both regular (such as ‘belong’, ‘concert’) and exception (i.e. irregular words, 
such as ‘castle’, ‘sword’) words. The sentences also include different word classes 
(i.e. verbs, nouns, pronouns, adjectives, adverbs and prepositions), as well as 
suffixed and prefixed words. Each sentence is presented across several lines (3 lines 
for the first sentence and 5 lines for the second sentence) in centred alignment on 
the page, making the task prone to neglect on both the left and the right side of the 
text, and sensitive to problems in visual disorientation (where the examinee with such 
a problem finds it difficult to locate words and to scan across the page). The assessor 
times how long it takes for the patient to read out each sentence.  
 
Nonword Reading 
The task contains six pronounceable nonwords, each five or six letters long. The 
items are presented three at a time in the middle of the page. The test assesses the 
ability to use phonological procedures in reading, while lexical procedures are 
assessed by examining the reading of exception words in the sentence reading task 
mentioned above. The assessor times how long it takes for the patient to read out the 




General Cognitive State Measures 
 
Orientation 
The two orientation tests examine respectively (1) the patient’s access to personal 
information (semantic autobiographic knowledge such as name, age, highest 
education qualification and etc.) and (2) his/her orientation in time and space (e.g., 
where are you right now? What month is it?). Both tests consist of open verbal 
questions. There are 8 questions in the personal information test and 6 in orientation 
in time and space. For the orientation in time and space test, in addition, there is a 
multiple choice (four choice responses) to be presented in the case of a non-
response, an error response made by the patient to the initial question or in cases 
where aphasia prevents a verbal response to the open question. A maximum of 15 






Calculation of Lesion Volume 
The participant’s lesion was automatically identified following a voxel-based outlier 
detection procedure (outlined in Gillebert et al., 2014) based on the Crawford-Howell 
parametric t-test for case-control comparisons (Crawford, Garthwaite, & Howell, 
2009; Crawford & Howell, 1998). This procedure produced an outlier t-score map that 
coded the degree of abnormality of each voxel intensity, based on the comparison to 
the normal range from control scans (Gillebert et al., 2014). The outlier map generally 
contained both positive and negative values. By thresholding the t-score map at a 
given significance level, a lesion map was obtained that contained values of −1, 0 or 
+1. A value of −1 coded voxels with significantly lower intensities than normal, most 
likely related to the presence of ischemia; conversely, a value of +1 coded voxels 
with significantly higher intensities than normal, most likely related to the presence of 
haemorrhage (even though the cases with hemorrhage were excluded in this current 
study; see ‘Subjects’ section). The lesion map in MNI space was also converted to 
the original CT space by inverting the spatial transformations used to move from 
individual to MNI space. This allowed a direct comparison with manual classification 
conducted on the original CT scan. This method is efficient and objective in 
identifying lesions for use in analysis with a large sample of patients and has been 
shown to perform at a striking level comparable to hand tracing (Gillebert et al., 
2014). To ensure that our results were not merely attributable to lesion size, each 
patient’s volume was calculated from the lesion identified and then entered as a 
covariate in the additional VBM analyses. Identified lesion for each subject using 
these procedures was overlapped on each other to create a lesion overlap map 
(Figure 1).   
 
 
 
